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Executive Summary 
   
 
This report is a quantitative history of ownership consolidation in the radio industry over the 
past decade, studying the impact of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and accompanying 
FCC regulations. 
 
 
A Brief History of Radio Regulation 
 
Since the 1930s, the federal government has limited the number of radio stations that one 
entity could own or control.  In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) began gradually to relax these limits.  Finally, in the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996 (Telecom Act), Congress eliminated the national cap on station 
ownership, allowing unlimited national consolidation.  With the same law, Congress also 
raised the local caps on station ownership.  In addition, as this study describes in detail, the 
FCC regulations implementing the Telecom Act allowed more consolidation to occur than 
alternative regulations would have allowed. 
 
 
Methodology and Data Sources 
 
To keep the quantitative analysis as simple and transparent as possible, we have not included 
technical statistical analysis.  Instead, we have filled this report with standard, antitrust-style 
measures of concentration; our own new methodologies for measuring localism and 
diversity; and many time-series analyses that simply track who owned what when.  The study 
covers thirty years of historical data wherever possible; in other places, the study focuses on 
the last ten to twelve years—the main period of interest for examining the impact of the 
Telecom Act. 
 
The FCC’s own efforts at collecting data on the radio industry are inadequate, as we 
emphasize throughout the study.  Just as the FCC does, we have relied on industry-collected 
data to measure changes in radio consolidation and programming.  These proprietary sources 
include: Media Access Pro (Radio Version) from industry consultants BIA Financial 
Networks, Duncan’s American Radio, and Radio and Records magazine.  
 
 
Major Findings of the Study 
 
Highlights from the study are organized here in similar fashion to its three chapters.  The first 
chapter focuses on national radio consolidation, the second on local radio consolidation, and 
the third on radio programming. 
 
4
 Emergence of Nationwide Radio Companies 
 
1. Fewer radio companies: The number of companies that own radio stations peaked in 
1995 and has declined dramatically over the past decade.  This has occurred largely 
because of industry consolidation but partly because many of the hundreds of new 
licenses issued since 1995 have gone to a handful of companies and organizations. 
2. Larger radio companies: Radio-station holdings of the ten largest companies in the 
industry increased by almost fifteen times from 1985 to 2005.  Over that same period, 
holdings of the fifty largest companies increased almost sevenfold. 
3. Increasing revenue concentration: National concentration of advertising revenue 
increased from 12 percent market share for the top four companies in 1993 to 50 
percent market share for the top four companies in 2004. 
 
Figure 1: National Share of Radio Listeners, Commercial Sector, 2005. 
 
 
 
4. Increasing ratings concentration: National concentration of listenership continued 
in 2005—the top four firms have 48 percent of the listeners, and the top ten firms 
have almost two-thirds of listeners [see Figure 1]. 
5. Declining listenership: Across 155 markets, radio listenership has declined over the 
past fourteen years for which data are available, a 22 percent drop since its peak in 
1989. 
 
 
5
 Consolidation in Local Radio Markets 
 
6. The Largest Local Owners Got Larger: The number of stations owned by the 
largest radio entity in the market has increased in every local market since 1992 and 
has increased considerably since 1996 [see Figure 2]. 
 
Figure 2: Number of Stations Owned in a Market by the Largest Owner 
in a Market, 1975-2005, Average by Market Group. 
 
 
 
7. More Markets with Owners Over the Local Cap: The FCC's signal-contour market 
definition allowed companies to exceed local ownership caps in 104 markets. 
8. Increasing Local Concentration: Concentration of ownership in the vast majority of 
local markets has increased dramatically. 
9. How Lower Caps Can Be Justified: The FCC’s local caps—in fact, even lower caps 
than the current caps—can be justified by analyzing how the caps prevent excessive 
concentration of market share. 
10. Declining Local Ownership: The Local Ownership Index, created by Future of 
Music Coalition, shows that the localness of radio ownership has declined from an 
average of 97.1 to an average of 69.9, a 28 percent drop. 
11. Restoration of Local Ownership is Possible: To restore the Local Ownership Index 
to even 90 percent of its pre-1996 level, the FCC would have to license dozens of 
new full power and low-power radio licenses to new local entrants and re-allocate 
spectrum to new local entrants during the digital audio broadcast transition. 
6
 Radio Programming in the Wake of Consolidation 
 
12. Homogenized Programming: Just fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial 
programming. 
13. Large Station Groups Program Narrowly: Owners who exceed or exactly meet the 
local ownership cap tend to program heavily in just eight formats. 
14. Only Small Station Groups Offer Niche Formats: Niche musical formats like 
Classical, Jazz, Americana, Bluegrass, New Rock, and Folk, where they exist, are 
provided almost exclusively by smaller station groups. 
15. Small Station Groups Sustain Public-Interest Programming: Children’s 
programming, religious programming, foreign-language and ethnic-community 
programming, are also predominantly provided by smaller station groups. 
16. Format Overlap Remains Extensive: Radio formats with different names can 
overlap up to 80% in terms of the songs played on them. 
 
Figure 3: Average Pairwise Overlap Between Stations in the Same Format, 
By Owner, June 25-July 1, 2006. 
 
 
 
17. Individual Stations Use Highly Similar Playlists: Playlists for commonly owned 
stations in the same format can overlap up to 97%.  For large companies, even the 
average pairwise overlap usually exceeds 50% [see Figure 3]. 
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 18. Network Ownership Is Also Concentrated: The three largest radio companies in 
terms of station ownership are also the three largest companies in terms of 
programming-network ownership. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Radio consolidation has no demonstrated benefits for the public.  Nor does it have any 
demonstrated benefits for the working people of the music and media industries, including 
DJs, programmers—and musicians.  The Telecom Act unleashed an unprecedented wave of 
radio mergers that left a highly consolidated national radio market and extremely 
consolidated local radio markets.  Radio programming from the largest station groups 
remains focused on just a few formats—many of which overlap with each other, enhancing 
the homogenization of the airwaves. 
 
From the recent new-payola scandal to the even more recent acknowledgements that giant 
media conglomerates have begun to fail as business models, we can see that government and 
business are catching up to the reality that radio consolidation did not work.  Instead, the 
Telecom Act worked to reduce competition, diversity, and localism, doing precisely the 
opposite of Congress’s stated goals for the FCC’s media policy.  Future debates about how to 
regulate information industries should look to the radio consolidation story for a warning 
about the dangers of consolidated control of a media platform. 
 
 
About Future of Music Coalition 
 
Future of Music Coalition (FMC) is a national non-profit education, research and advocacy 
organization that identifies, examines, interprets and translates the challenging issues at the 
intersection of music, law, technology and policy. FMC achieves this through continuous 
interaction with its primary constituency—musicians—and in collaboration with other 
creator/citizen groups. 
 
 
About the Primary Author 
 
Peter DiCola is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.  
He received his J.D. magna cum laude from the University of Michigan Law School in May 
2005, and was awarded the Henry M. Bates Memorial Scholarship.  Currently, he serves as 
the Research Director of the Future of Music Coalition while he works on his dissertation.  
He has research interests in the fields of telecommunications law, intellectual property law, 
law and economics, labor economics, and industrial organization.  He is the co-author, with 
Kristin Thomson, of Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians? (2002), 
which was cited by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Prometheus Radio 
Project v. FCC.  He has also written a chapter, “Employment and Wage Effects of Radio 
Consolidation,” for the scholarly collection Media Diversity and Localism (Lawrence 
Erlbaum and Associates, 2006). 
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Introduction 
 
 
adio is not what it used to be.  A brief and obscure regulatory provision tucked into 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 – Congress’s comprehensive rewriting of 
telephone and cable regulations – eliminated or relaxed the previous limits on radio-
station ownership.  As a result, ownership of radio stations consolidated intensively over the 
next five years with some ownership groups acquiring dozens, if not hundreds, of radio 
stations across the country. The unprecedented creation of large radio conglomerates 
represents a fundamental transformation of the radio landscape. 
 
With speed exceeding Wal-Mart’s ascent to retail dominance,1 Clear Channel and, to a lesser 
extent, Viacom/Infinity/CBS Radio gained unprecedented market shares both nationally and 
locally.  But Clear Channel’s rise presents greater problems than Wal-Mart’s.  Radio is not 
about shelf space but about the public airwaves, one of the only free and ubiquitous media 
through which the public can access culture and information.  And Clear Channel’s gains in 
market share came through a regulatory experiment in which Congress allowed more 
mergers and acquisitions than ever before. These changes have shown cause for alarm. 
 
In 2002, the Future of Music Coalition published a study that examined radio consolidation 
and its effects on the public and the music community.2  We compared radio to a public park, 
threatened by privatization and over-commercialization.  And we raised concerns about how 
consolidation had led to homogenized programming, facilitated a new form of payola,3 and 
presented musicians with fewer opportunities to get on the air. 
 
Our 2002 study was submitted to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as part of 
its biennial review of its media ownership rules.  Many citizens and public-interest groups 
from a variety of political perspectives participated in the proceeding, leading to a record-
breaking number of comments filed at the FCC, most in opposition to further media 
consolidation.  Despite strong evidence and negative public opinion, the FCC did move 
ahead with recommendations to loosen ownership regulations on radio, TV and newspapers.  
It wasn’t until a win by media reform advocates in Prometheus v. FCC at the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals that the FCC was prevented from further relaxing the radio ownership 
                                                
1 Wal-Mart’s national retail market share rose from 9 percent in 1987 to 27 percent in 1995, 
comparable to Clear Channel’s rise from 2 percent national radio-revenue market share in 1995 to 28 
percent by 2001.  See Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, “The Race for Retail Market Share in the 
Southeast,” 2002 Econ South q. 2, at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=D3F86AD9-
E129-43A7-93E52B3590A62543&method=display (last visited November 28, 2006). 
2 Peter DiCola and Kristin Thomson, Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians? 
(2002), at http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy.cfm (last visited November 28, 2006). 
3 See, for example, Office of New York State Attorney General, “CBS Radio Settles Payola 
Allegations,” (Oct. 19, 2006), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/oct/oct19a_06.html (last 
visited November 30, 2006). 
R 
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limits that remained after the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  In 2006, the FCC launched 
another review of its media ownership rules.  With this new study we hope to contribute an 
updated and greatly expanded perspective on the recent history of radio consolidation. 
 
 
Contents and Purposes of This Study 
 
This study contains three chapters, each of which is divided into several subsections.  
Chapter 1 takes the most expansive look at the national radio industry.  It surveys a thirty-
year history, tracing ownership consolidation from 1975 to 2005.  Chapter 2 focuses on local 
radio markets and the extreme consolidation they have experienced since the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  Chapter 3 examines radio programming, and how 
consolidation appears to have affected the radio formats, individual songs, and the volume of 
syndicated network content carried on the air. 
 
We will submit this study to the FCC in its 2006 review of media ownership rules.  We 
believe this research will cause policy makers to question the benefits of consolidation as 
they decide whether to further relax radio station ownership regulations.  In fact, the data 
contained in this report should urge the FCC to re-institute certain regulations or develop new 
regulations to address the loss of competition, diversity, and localism in radio.  We also hope 
that this new, comprehensive, and unprecedented history of radio consolidation can inform 
current and future policy debates about the information industries. 
 
The listening public deserves an explanation of how the radio industry has changed over the 
past decade.  Working people—from musicians to DJs to local advertisers—need to 
understand how the media environment has changed, often for the worse.  Although our data 
analysis has been robust, we have tried to make the results contained in this report clear and 
easy to understand.  We provided graphs and figures wherever appropriate, documented our 
sources diligently and displayed reproducible results. 
 
 
The Value of Radio 
 
With the onset of internet radio, satellite radio, podcasting, and portable digital music devices 
(including cell phones) over the past decade or so, some observers mistakenly consider 
traditional, terrestrial radio to be of waning importance.  Traditional radio companies have 
actually begun making the transition to digital broadcasting, sometimes called “HD Radio,” 
but this transition has happened slowly and the results remain uncertain.  But digital or not, 
radio remains one of our most valuable media.  No new technology has the penetration that 
radio has.  Approximately 94 percent of Americans listen to radio each week.4  Compare that 
to the 42 percent of US households that had high-speed internet access as of March 2006.5 
                                                
4 The Arbitron Company, “Radio Today: How American Listens to Radio, 2006 Edition,” at 
http://www.arbitron.com/national_radio/home.htm (last visited November 30, 2006). 
5 John Horrigan, “Home Broadband Adoption 2006,” available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/184/report_display.asp (last visited November 30, 2006). 
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Radio remains important and vital in many ways. The kinds of audio content offered by 
traditional radio—DJed sequences of songs, live concerts, news and talk shows, education 
and how-to guides—remain incredibly popular. Advertisers still buy radio time.  Musicians 
still seek radio play to further their careers.  Emergency authorities still rely on radio during 
disasters like hurricanes, fires, and chemical spills.6  Noncommercial radio has become 
increasingly vital, with National Public Radio (NPR) doubling its listenership in the past five 
years.7 Even the vast majority of early adopters of new audio technologies expect to maintain 
their current habits of listening to traditional radio.8  
 
Although new audio technologies present exciting opportunities for consumers and 
musicians, they do not predict the demise of traditional radio.  For example, satellite radio 
can program in more granular musical genres, but cannot build local connections between 
musicians and communities like traditional radio does.  Webcasts might have a local focus, 
but they lack the audience of traditional radio and cannot transmit to your car.  Podcasts 
provide a portable means to hear music, news, or other audio programs in your car or 
anywhere else.  But licensing copyrighted music for podcasts presents a significant hurdle.9 
 
Of course, solutions to the problems with and limitations of these new technologies are 
possible.  Podcast licensing could advance more quickly, for instance, or technology to put 
webcasts into cars could arise.  Such developments would benefit the public.  But they would 
not necessarily threaten the value of radio.  Media technologies need not replace each other, 
but can instead complement each other.  The addition of satellite, webcasting, and podcasting 
makes the music marketplace more open and competitive.  These new technologies have 
helped musicians and individual listeners route around the bottlenecks that consolidation has 
caused in traditional media like radio.  The ultimate effect of new technologies on radio 
depends on radio companies’ responses to these business challenges—and on policies that 
facilitate the best outcome possible for the public. 
 
                                                
6 See Eric Klinenberg, Fighting for Air: The Battle to Control America’s Media (forthcoming 2007). 
7 Jacques Steinberg, “Money Changes Everything,” New York Times, March 19, 2006, Sec. 2, p. 1. 
8 Arbitron & Edison Media Research, “The Infinite Dial: Radio’s Digital Platforms,” p. 13, available 
at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/digital_radio_study.pdf (last visited August 27, 2006). 
9 See, for example, Michelle Kessler, “Storm Clouds Gather Over Podcasting,” USA Today, August 3, 
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2005-08-03-podcasting-usat_x.htm (last 
visited December 1, 2006). 
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Bigger Is Definitely Not Better 
 
So far the responses of policy makers and radio companies have fallen far short of ideal.  
Congress’s response to new technologies’ development was to eliminate or relax ownership 
limits to allow radio companies to consolidate.  Radio companies’ response was to acquire 
lots of stations as quickly as possible.  Clear Channel multiplied its station holdings by a 
factor of 30, going from 40 stations to 1,200 stations within five years of the Telecom Act.10  
In addition to its radio holdings, Clear Channel amassed television stations, billboards, 
concert promotion, and concert venue properties. 
 
We wrote in our 2002 study that Clear Channel’s “bigger is better” strategy was misguided 
and expressed doubts about the supposed “synergies” they sought.11  As it turned out, Clear 
Channel’s strategy had both dubious legality12 and dubious profitability.  By the spring of 
2005, the company had abandoned its attempt to use its holdings across several media for 
leverage, breaking the company into three parts: radio/television, concerts, and billboards.13  
In November 2006, on the heels of a six-year decline in the company’s stock price,14 a group 
of private equity investors purchased Clear Channel’s assets.15  At the same time, Clear 
Channel announced that it would sell off 448 of its radio stations in markets outside the top 
100 ranked by size, as well as all 42 of its television stations.16 
 
Serious policy concerns remain despite the Clear Channel buyout.  Thomas H. Lee Partners 
is one the two leading private equity firms in the purchase, along with Bain Capital.  It also 
has holdings in two other large radio companies, Univision and Cumulus Media Partners, 
which it might have to relinquish.  For example, Thomas H. Lee Partners’ three radio 
properties would own a combined 17 stations in the Houston-Galveston market, well beyond 
the current cap of 8 stations per owner.  The FCC should retain its current rule for attributing 
ownership interest, which sets a 5 percent threshold for what counts as “ownership” when 
                                                
10 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
11 DiCola and Thomson, Radio Deregulation, pp. 30-31. 
12 Allegations against Clear Channel include payola, antitrust tying, fraud, racketeering, and theft of 
public funds.  See Chapter 1 of this study and the sources cited therein. 
13 Press Release, “Clear Channel Communications Announces Planned Strategic Realignment of 
Businesses to Enhance Shareholder Value,” April 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1438 (last visited 
December 2, 2006). 
14 We refer here to the broad downward trend that is easily visible from a simple stock chart, not to 
temporary ups and downs of the stock.  See, for example, the “1-decade” chart for stock symbol CCU 
at http://www.investorguide.com (last visited December 2, 2006). 
15 Angela Moore, “Clear Channel Agrees to $18.7 Billion Buyout,” Marketwatch.com, Nov. 27, 2006 
(corrected version). 
16 Press Release, “Clear Channel Announces Plan to Sell Radio Stations Outside the Top 100 Markets 
and Entire Television Station Group,” November 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1825 (last visited 
December 2, 2006). 
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enforcing the ownership caps.17  Otherwise, the current trend of taking media companies 
private will open another loophole in the media ownership rules. 
 
Some observers have gone so far as to claim that the Clear Channel sell-off of 448 stations 
alleviates concerns about concentration in the radio industry.18  No facts support such a 
claim.  Even after the sell-off, Clear Channel will retain its dominant position, with over 700 
stations in 88 markets out of the top 100 ranked by size.  Those stations represent 88 percent 
of Clear Channel’s listenership and 86 percent of its revenue—leaving its market share 
mostly intact and well ahead of the second-largest firm.19  Moreover, Clear Channel’s new 
private-equity owners could retain an option to buy back their holdings in Univision (with 73 
stations) and Cumulus Media Partners (with 37 stations).20  Either way, Clear Channel will 
retain ample size to pose a threat to competition in the markets where they will remain. 
 
The research in this study will show how much damage has already occurred with respect to 
the FCC’s policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism.  Relaxing the local ownership 
limits further would simply let Clear Channel get bigger—again—when the lesson from the 
past decade of experience with consolidation suggests doing exactly the opposite.  Clear 
Channel’s size was the root cause of their many problems in radio: the potentially illegal 
business practices, the loss of localism, the harms to programming diversity, and so on. 
 
More than anything, the Clear Channel buyout shows that policy makers must develop 
skepticism about the public benefits of such unproven—and ultimately, in this case, 
illusive—economies of scale.21  The public has been harmed by both the formation of Clear 
Channel as a radio giant and the policy that allowed it to form.  We cannot predict the future.  
Perhaps the 448 sold-off stations will go to local, independent, and minority owners who will 
revitalize radio.  But it would take far more than 448 new or newly independent stations to 
restore local ownership to what it was.22  And Clear Channel’s business practices—most 
importantly, its modern version of payola—may have damaged the health of the radio 
bandwidth.  Listenership is down.  We can only speculate—though we are not alone in our 
speculation—that listenership has declined because of the damage to diversity and localism 
from Clear Channel’s rise.  Policy makers must not repeat their mistake, which flowed from 
the false premise that bigger is better.  Not so for radio companies. 
                                                
17 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 n. 2 (2004).  Investment companies, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3, can 
own up to 20 percent of a station before the FCC will deem them to have a “cognizable interest.” 
18 “[N]ow that Clear Channel is splitting the company and most likely selling the 448 stations 
designated for divestiture to numerous buyers, industry observers believe consolidation opponents 
will be appeased enough to let the big-market deregulation the company is seeking slide by.”  Ron 
Orol, “Clear Channel Needs FCC Help,” Deal.com, November 21, 2006 (subscription required; copy 
on file with the author). 
19 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
20 Orol, “FCC Help.” 
21 “Economies of scale” refers to the economic situation in which a larger firm can produce goods or 
services more efficiently (up to a point, at least) than a smaller firm.  The opposite situation of 
“diseconomies of scale,” in which larger firms produces goods or services less efficiently, is equally 
possible both in theory and in real-world practice. 
22 See Chapter 2 of this study, in particular the section entitled “The Local Ownership Index.” 
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Lessons from Radio for the Internet 
 
In a rapidly changing media environment, it becomes all the more important to learn lessons 
from the experience of established industries like radio.  Brand new industries are harder to 
measure, understand, and evaluate.  But data are available to measure the radio industry in 
various ways, however imperfect those data might be.  In fact, the “experiment” Congress 
created, by allowing intensive consolidation in the radio industry, allows us to study 
consolidation in an information industry.  Historical data on the radio industry give us a way 
to see what happens when ownership of the platform and the content in an information 
industry becomes concentrated in relatively few companies’ hands.  While these similarities 
are not a perfect correspondence, they are useful given the lack of comprehensive, 
standardized data about the emerging marketplace. 
 
Studying radio consolidation provides lessons beyond just radio.  We can extrapolate from 
radio’s experience to suggest what could happen if a few owners of the internet’s 
infrastructure gain effective control over the entire internet platform—the subject of the 
current debate over network neutrality.23  In the mid-1990s, it was the radio industry that 
convinced Congress and the FCC of the need for a set of regulations that would allow them 
to buy more stations, both locally and nationally.  The rationale presented at the time was that 
the radio industry needed to take advantage of economies of scale in order to survive in a 
crowded media marketplace.  If new regulations passed, the radio industry promised to 
deliver more and better programming to serve the public. 
 
However, the Telecom Act had a radically different outcome.  As articulated in the next three 
chapters, the Act led to massive industry consolidation, a loss of localism, and a lack of 
programming diversity.  Even more compelling, the Telecom Act, in conjunction with the 
FCC’s own application of market definitions, served to protect incumbents and reduce 
economic competition—all at the expense of small businesses and the public. 
 
A similar scenario has developed around the issue of network neutrality.  Powerful 
telecommunications and cable corporations are telling Congress and the FCC that they need 
to be able to charge content providers for the use of their networks.  Once again industry 
incumbents are asking policymakers for regulations and legislation that secures greater 
compensation for them at the expense of small businesses and the public.  In this way, radio 
remains the canary in the coalmine.24  Its experience with extreme consolidation can suggest 
paths we should avoid with internet and wireless technology. 
 
Information industries like radio are vital to our culture, our democracy, and our economy.  
Together the information industries (software, telecommunications, television, movies, and 
                                                
23 See, for example, CNet articles at http://news.com.com/Net+neutrality+showdown/2009-1028_3-
6055133.html (last visited November 28, 2006). 
24 FCC Commissioner Michael Copps has also used this metaphor.  See Jonathan Lawson, “Fixing 
Radio,” Reclaim the Media, February 28, 2005, at http://reclaimthemedia.org/radio/fixing_radio (last 
visited December 7, 2006). 
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so on) have grown to about 5 percent of total U.S. gross domestic product, nearly doubling in 
share since World War II, 25 and are among the few U.S. industries to enjoy a positive trade 
balance.  Research about how information companies and information industries behave, like 
the research contained in this report, is therefore highly valuable.  Even in a time of new 
technologies, studying radio remains essential. 
 
 
Industry Research and Access to Data 
 
Over the past two decades, radio companies have sought “regulatory relief” in the face of 
allegedly declining business prospects.  In addition to—or, in some cases, instead of—
developing new radio programming and other new services for listeners, radio companies 
have asked Congress to change the rules in ways that benefit them as incumbents.  That is, 
one benefit for radio companies of gaining unprecedented size was dominance over any 
potential new entrants to the radio industry.  Larger companies can hold more sway over 
advertising customers as well as suppliers of programming, such as musicians. 
 
Federal administrative law requires that research back up any FCC decisions about adopting, 
modifying, or changing rules that affect incumbent radio companies.  The FCC itself 
maintains a research staff to perform some research from an ostensibly neutral perspective.  
But the radio industry submits dozens of research reports each time the FCC has a 
proceeding to advocate for their perspective. 
 
There are endemic problems to much of the research involved in this process.  Both the 
FCC’s and the industry’s research are based on the same data, which are collected by and 
belong to the industry.  Only variables that the industry sees fit to measure get measured.  
Only questions that the industry sees fit to ask get asked—unless public-interest groups fill 
the gap.  To conduct our research, we have to purchase proprietary data sets from the 
industry, often the same data sets used by the FCC itself.  With careful critical analysis, we 
make the most of these flawed, incomplete, and expensive data.  But throughout this report 
we will emphasize the importance of disinterested research to the FCC’s policy-making 
process and the need for enhanced collection of and access to radio data. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The public park that is our radio airwaves remains endangered by consolidated control.  We 
hope to save the park for the public’s enjoyment by telling its story and by suggesting how 
we can properly maintain its value.  Radio—still a miraculous, inexpensive, ubiquitous, and 
valued technology—is worth saving. 
 
                                                
25 Only the financial sector has grown faster than the information sector of the U.S. economy.  See 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Gross-Domestic-Product-by-Industry Accounts, 1947-2005,” at 
http://bea.gov/bea/industry/gpotables/gpo_list.cfm?anon=645 (last visited November 28, 2006). 
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If measured by the three long-standing goals of competition, localism, and diversity, the 
experiment with radio consolidation launched by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a 
policy failure.  Chapter 1 shows the loss of competition in radio nationwide.  Chapter 2 
documents the accompanying loss of local ownership over the last decade.  Chapter 3 
highlights the lack of diversity on commercial radio and from large station groups.  
 
If there is a silver lining to this cloud of failed oversight, it will be the lasting lessons that are 
already being applied in the debate over network neutrality and structural decisions about the 
internet marketplace.  Radio’s story has played a major role in spawning the movement 
against media consolidation.  And concerns about access to the data used in the FCC’s 
decision-making process have clarified the need for more substantial and transparent 
information to monitor media industries.  Never again should these decisions be made in the 
dark.  With this study we aim to shed some light. 
 
We start with the history of radio consolidation from a nationwide perspective. 
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Chapter 1 
National Radio Consolidation 
 
 
adio listeners—and most Americans are radio listeners—have seen the radio industry 
transformed over the past decade.  Standardized programming formats like “KISS-
FM” and syndicated shows like Glenn Beck have become even more widespread.  
Music radio, which has always been hit-driven, now features songs picked by national 
programming directors instead of local program directors and DJs.  Commercials now 
consume more of the typical radio broadcast.  But at the same time, more listeners have tuned 
out.  And thousands of independent, local radio station owners have sold their stations to 
national chains. In 1995 there were just over 6,600 different owners of radio stations.  By 
2005, that number had fallen by one-third, to just over 4,400. 
 
These changes to the radio landscape can be traced to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
or the Telecom Act.  In that piece of legislation, Congress relaxed local restrictions on radio-
station ownership and eliminated the national ownership cap entirely.  Radio companies had 
lobbied hard for this bill, telling Congress that, in a competitive media marketplace, they 
needed to be able to take advantage of economies of scale to survive.  But, they also 
suggested that being allowed to purchase more stations would also allow them to program 
more diverse programming for listeners.  One senator argued that radio companies needed 
deregulation “to allow them to compete in the new digital marketplace” and “to provide the 
best possible service to listeners.”1  This law is to blame, however, for increasing 
concentration of ownership in the radio industry—with no demonstrable benefits for citizens 
and radio listeners. 
 
The Telecom Act changed the radio industry profoundly. For decades, the FCC had placed a 
cap on the number of radio stations one company could own in the United States.  With the 
Telecom Act, Congress removed the cap entirely.  The elimination of the national cap 
transformed U.S. radio in several ways.  The following are among the most crucial: 
 
• Fewer radio companies: The number of companies that own radio stations peaked in 
1995 and has declined dramatically over the past decade.  This has occurred largely 
because of industry consolidation but partly because many of the hundreds of new 
licenses issued since 1995 have gone to a handful of companies and organizations. 
• Larger radio companies: Radio-station holdings of the ten largest companies in the 
industry increased by almost fifteen times from 1985 to 2005.  Over that same period, 
holdings of the fifty largest companies increased almost sevenfold. 
                                                
1 Statement of Senator Conrad Burns, Senate Committee Report 104-023: Telecommunications 
Competition, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp104&sid=cp104uo5cr&refer=&r_n=sr023.104&item=&sel=TOC_204865
&. 
R 
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 • Increasing revenue concentration: National concentration of advertising revenue 
increased from 12 percent market share for the top four companies in 1993 to 50 
percent market share for the top four companies in 2004. 
• Increasing ratings concentration: National concentration of listenership continued 
in 2005—the top four firms have 48 percent of the listeners, and the top ten firms 
have almost two-thirds of listeners. 
• Declining listenership: Across 155 markets, radio listenership has declined over the 
past fourteen years for which data are available, a 22 percent drop since its peak in 
1989. 
 
This study extends and expands on Future of Music Coalition’s 2002 study, Radio 
Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians?  Like the previous study, it is an 
attempt to understand the way dramatic changes to the structure of the radio industry have 
affected the public, with special attention paid to the impact on musicians. This study 
contains not only new statistics from the past four years, but also newly available historical 
data, which make it possible to examine three decades’ worth of information.  This broader 
historical approach vividly documents the unprecedented changes that have occurred in the 
radio industry since 1996. 
 
Chapter 1 takes a nationwide look at the radio industry.  It first describes the legal changes 
that have occurred in radio, and then provides a statistical look at topics like how the FCC 
issues new radio licenses, how the FCC regulates station ownership, changes in the 
concentration of market share, and trends in radio listening.  Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 will 
cover the important issues of local radio markets and changes in programming formats.  
 
 
A Brief History of the FCC and Radio Regulation 
 
This section puts the passage of the Telecom Act in context, explaining: 
 
• How the FCC’s broadcast license process acts as a de facto restriction on entry into 
the radio industry; 
• How the FCC gradually increased the local ownership cap and how Congress 
eliminated the national ownership cap in 1996; and 
• What economic theories motivated the “deregulation” of the 1980s and 1990s—and 
why the assumptions required for those theories do not hold true in the radio industry. 
 
The FCC as Regulator of the Radio Industry 
 
When you hear about the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), you may think about 
a government regulatory agency enforcing indecency regulations: radio shock jocks getting 
fined, the flap over the Janet Jackson incident at the Super Bowl, or the prohibition on using 
curse words on the air.  Or, if you are a bit older, you might think about the FCC enforcing 
something called the Fairness Doctrine, an FCC regulatory policy that guaranteed equal 
broadcast time for different political perspectives (and was repealed in the 1980s).  This 
report will discuss the FCC in a different way than you might be accustomed to—as an 
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 enforcer of limits on ownership.  Instead of indecency or political balance, this report will 
focus on how FCC policy influences which types of radio companies can participate and 
thrive in the current media environment. 
 
The FCC affects the business of radio by limiting what the companies that own radio stations 
can do. For example, the FCC can use rules or regulations to limit the number of radio 
stations that one company can own.   These types of limits have existed for a long time and 
have their roots in many different political goals.  Some politicians and citizens in the U.S. 
have long been concerned that ownership of too many media outlets would lead to too much 
political power in the hands of a single company, a company which could either threaten or 
align itself with the government to the detriment of democracy.  Other politicians and 
citizens believe that small, local companies will better respond to the public’s desires for 
entertainment and news.  From these concerns came the FCC’s three policy goals for 
broadcast, including radio: competition (having many firms in the industry), diversity (in 
terms of programming, ethnic perspectives, and political viewpoints), and localism. 
 
The FCC’s Licensing Process and Its Economic Consequences 
 
Among its many powers, the FCC decides who receives licenses to broadcast radio.  The 
FCC manages this process partly to prevent radio stations’ signals from interfering with each 
other.  Known as the “scarcity rationale,” this theory conceives of the radio frequency 
spectrum as a scarce resource in which only a limited number of signals can coexist while 
still being heard.  The FCC has a responsibility to maximize the usage of this scarce resource 
without depleting its functionality. What good are twice as many stations on the air if the 
signals are overlapping to the point of distortion?  The FCC is the arbiter of this delicate 
balance.  Some technologists have disputed the scarcity rationale for technical and other 
reasons, but for the purposes of this report our focus is on the considerable economic impact 
of the FCC’s power to control the number of radio stations that can coexist in a local market. 
 
The FCC’s power to act as an economic regulator via this localized licensing process has 
fundamentally shaped the radio industry.   
 
Imagine that the federal government set up a regulatory agency to issue permits for setting up 
any new coffee shops in each town.  That agency—call it the Federal Coffee Commission—
might argue that no new coffee shops can open in cities because any new coffee shops would 
have to be located too close to the coffee shops already crammed onto every street corner.  In 
such a crowded coffee environment, no single coffee shop would make enough money to 
survive, as the new shops cut into the old shops’ profits.  Finally, the Commission might say, 
consumers would struggle to tell the different coffee shops apart if every city block had too 
many of them.  How can you meet your friend at the café on Main between Washington and 
Madison when there are seventeen cafés fitting that description? 
 
Restricting the licenses for new coffee shops would benefit large incumbent companies like 
Starbucks by protecting the territory around their current coffee shops.  But the policy would 
frustrate those hoping to open new coffee shops.  And the arguments that the restrictions 
benefit consumers might not hold water.  Profits might not decline, or might have been great 
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 enough already for shops to survive.  Consumers could perhaps tell the cafés crowded into 
each city block apart by their brand names.  So the Federal Coffee Commission’s restrictions 
on licenses for new coffee shops can seem either prudent or ill-conceived, depending on your 
political and economic views.  But in any case the restrictions would be controversial.  And 
the real FCC’s rules on new radio licenses have certainly been that.  
 
As the coffee example suggests, one major consequence of limiting the number of radio 
licenses is that it protects the companies that already own stations—the incumbent radio 
companies. The FCC’s licensing process is an entry restriction or a regulatory barrier to 
entry. 
 
Entry restrictions protect incumbents from losing profits to new competitors.  If an 
entrepreneur has an idea for a great new kind of programming, or for a lineup of syndicated 
programming that her community might enjoy more than the current offerings, she has three 
main options.  She will either have to: (1) purchase a station from an incumbent, (2) try to 
sell her idea to an incumbent, or (3) obtain a license for a new station from the FCC.  Options 
(1) and (2) both mean that the incumbents will benefit from our entrepreneur’s idea, perhaps 
getting most of the profits created, since the incumbent will have a stronger bargaining 
position.  Only option (3) allows the entrepreneur to benefit fully from her own idea, since 
the fees for a new FCC license are nominal compared to the cost of purchasing an existing 
station. 
 
In this way, the FCC entry restrictions protect incumbent companies from competition.  Most 
of the time, new competitors either have to deal with incumbents to participate in the radio 
industry or they cannot enter the market at all.  As a result, the FCC’s decisions about how it 
issues licenses at the local level has had profound economic consequences on the radio 
industry nationwide. 
 
Limits on How Many Stations One Company Can Own 
 
The National Radio Ownership Rule was a regulation adopted by the FCC under the 
authority Congress gave to the FCC in 1934, when the Communications Act created the 
agency.  In 1953, the FCC set the national cap at 14 stations: no company could own more 
than 7 AM stations or 7 FM stations.  Thus, radio stations in the U.S. were owned by a very 
large number of companies.  Radio was a highly unconcentrated industry because 
ownership of radio stations was so widely dispersed. 
 
Additional FCC regulations ensured that radio stations were locally owned.  While a locally 
owned radio station might have carried programming from a national network like NBC, 
such a station would traditionally broadcast locally produced programming as well.  At the 
time, FCC regulators felt that small, local radio companies would best serve the public 
interest—a term used by Congress dating back to the Radio Act of 1927 and the 
Communications Act of 1934 to describe the obligations of broadcasters to serve their local 
communities.  Thus the geographic reach of each radio company was strictly limited. 
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 FCC regulations also contain the longstanding Local Radio Ownership Rule, which prevents 
one company from owning more than a certain number of stations within a local market.  
Chapter 2 will discuss local radio and the Local Radio Ownership Rule in detail. 
 
Radio “Deregulation” in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
Starting in the 1980s, the FCC began to gradually increase the national ownership cap.  In 
1984, the cap increased to 24 stations (no more than 12 AM or 12 FM), and in 1992 the cap 
increased to 36 stations (no more than 18 FM or 18 AM).  By 1994, the national cap was 40 
stations per company—no more than 20 AM stations or 20 FM stations, with allowances for 
minority-owned broadcasters to exceed the cap slightly. 
 
The FCC relaxed the national ownership limit partly because the U.S. had many more radio 
stations in the 1980s than in previous decades. New technology had made it possible to allow 
even more stations to coexist in local markets without interference.  In addition, the FCC was 
influenced by an economic theory specific to the broadcast industry that was (mistakenly) 
interpreted to suggest that an industry made up of larger companies might offer more diverse 
programming than an industry made up of smaller companies.2 
 
In the 1990s, radio companies urged Congress to step in and relax ownership restrictions 
even further.  They claimed that without the ability to take advantage of economies of 
scale—the idea that bigger companies can cut per-unit costs—the radio industry would not 
survive financially.  Coupled with the theoretical justifications for relaxing the national cap, 
the radio companies convinced Congress to eliminate it in 1996 with the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act. Congress also significantly relaxed the Local Radio Ownership 
Rule, but left it in place.  (Chapter 2 focuses on the Telecom Act’s effects on local radio.) 
 
But economies of scale are not a law of nature; diseconomies of scale are just as likely.  For 
some industries, larger companies can produce goods or services more efficiently.  But in 
other industries, smaller companies are more efficient.  Furthermore, companies becoming 
larger in order to cut their unit costs does not benefit consumers unless the good or service 
being produced retains the exact same quality.  Otherwise the benefits of lower unit costs 
must be weighed against the harms of inferior products.  Thus the theoretical benefits of 
economies of scale in radio industry would not exist if the quality of programming declined 
as companies grew larger. 
 
Another major reason for increasing—and ultimately eliminating—the national cap was 
ideological.  With the Reagan administration came a “deregulatory” philosophy that 
disfavored restrictions on what businesses could do.  This policy was influenced by the 
simple economic theory that markets devoid of government intervention best serve the public 
interest. 
 
                                                
2 See Peter DiCola & Kristin Thomson, Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians? 
(2002), pp. 8-14. 
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 Unfortunately, many of the simplifications required for the free-market economic theory to 
hold do not apply at all to the radio industry.  For instance, the Telecom Act removed the 
national ownership cap but left the FCC’s entry restrictions in place.  Without free entry to 
spur active competition between companies, the benefits of free markets to consumers may 
not occur.  Instead, raising the caps while continuing to restrict licenses meant that the FCC 
was mainly protecting incumbent companies at the expense of new entrants—and radio 
listeners. 
 
 
New Radio Licenses 
 
To provide some beginning context for understanding the radio industry by the numbers, this 
section details how: 
 
• New radio licenses continue to be issued, but at a slower pace than in previous 
decades, demonstrating the lack of free entry into the radio business. 
• Many of the licenses have gone to a small group of owners, and as a group, new 
licensees are increasingly focused on Christian programming. 
• Entry restrictions mean that radio is not a free market, and that “deregulation” was 
instead pro-incumbent regulation. 
 
New Radio Licenses Are Hard to Come By 
 
How hard is it to get a license for a new radio station from the FCC?  Obtaining a license has 
traditionally been a difficult, years-long, and highly competitive process.  The FCC has 
always decided how many new radio licenses to grant each year, and continues to do so.  But 
since 1996, the FCC has allocated these new licenses by auctions for commercial stations and 
by a points system for noncommercial stations.  The FCC now gets about 30,000 inquiries 
annually from prospective licensees, yet the FCC only grants about 200 new licenses 
nationwide each year.  And the FCC has granted new licenses at a decelerating rate over the 
past decade.  As Table 1-1 shows, the FCC granted only 177 new licenses per year from the 
end of 1995 through the end of 2005.3 
 
                                                
3 Source data: Media Access Pro, BIA Financial Networks, data as of November 2005.  These figures 
do not correspond exactly to the figures available on the FCC’s website; the differences depend on 
whether stations are considered to exist when licensed or when they have actually constructed their 
radio tower and begun broadcasting.  The figures from the BIA database are preferable because they 
extend back to 1975, whereas the FCC’s published figures only date back to 1990. 
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 Table 1-1.  Number of FCC-Licensed Stations from 1975 to 2005  
and the Rate of New Licenses per Year over Each Decade. 
 
Year Total Number of Licensed Stations (AM and FM) 
New Licenses per Year 
Over Previous Decade 
1975 7,472 --- 
1985 9,450 198 
1995 11,734 228 
2005 13,504 177 
 
Radio licenses from the FCC are specific to an AM or FM frequency.  Licensees must apply 
to the FCC to change frequencies or to increase the power or height of their broadcast tower 
(which both determine how far a station’s signal reaches).    Radio licenses also come with a 
classification of either commercial or noncommercial.  The main difference is that the FCC 
prohibits noncommercial stations—also called “educational” stations—from broadcasting 
advertisements.   
 
Figure 1-1 shows the total number of FM, FM-educational, and AM stations from 1990 to 
2005.4  During this period, the number of both commercial and noncommercial FM licensees 
grew, while the number of AM licenses decreased slightly.  This decline in the number of 
AM stations may have occurred because stations went off the air or perhaps because 
licensees requested to switch from AM to FM.  The percentage growth in FM-educational 
licenses was larger than that of commercial FM licenses.  AM-educational licenses are rare 
and are not broken out in the FCC’s numbers. 
 
The data used to construct Figure 1-1 come from the FCC itself.  These are, in fact, the only 
data on radio station ownership made available through the FCC’s web pages.  But it would 
be a stretch to say that even these data are readily available, since it required data from 55 
separate pages to construct Figure 1-1.  And these data don’t tell you who owns the stations, 
or where the stations are—they only tell you how many stations have been licensed in total 
across the country.  It’s possible to download the many parts of FCC’s complex relational 
database, which contains much more detailed engineering and ownership data.  But the 
average citizen (or even the average researcher) cannot make much use of it without hours of 
work and lots of guidance. 
 
                                                
4 Source data: Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Licensed Broadcast Station Totals in the 
USA—1990 to Present, at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/totals/index.html (last visited May 2nd, 
2006). 
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 Figure 1-1.  AM, FM, and FM-Educational Stations, 1990-2005. 
 
 
 
It is unfortunate that critical data is not available in a form that would allow citizens to 
understand the transformation of the radio industry.  Only by purchasing expensive and 
proprietary data sets can one begin to track the changes that have transpired in radio with 
quantitative methods.  It is also unfortunate that the majority of the more comprehensive data 
sets come from the industry itself.   As a result, researchers and policy makers must evaluate 
the industry on the industry’s own terms, based on the measures it chooses to create and 
distribute. 
 
Thus, from here onward, this chapter (and this report) will mainly rely on data from industry 
sources.  These data are proprietary and expensive, but can answer many more questions than 
the FCC’s data.  Primarily, this chapter will rely on information from Media Access Pro, a 
database created by BIA Financial Networks with information collected by surveying radio 
companies themselves. 
 
The Total Number of Radio Stations in the U.S. 
 
Figure 1-2 shows a longer history of the number of licensed radio stations in the U.S., broken 
down into four categories by AM vs. FM and by commercial vs. noncommercial.5  In Figure 
                                                
5 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 1-2, unlike Figure 1-1, each category of stations is represented by an area, not just a line.  
These areas are then stacked on top of one another, so that the chart also shows the total 
number of stations in the U.S.—just over 13,500 stations at the end of 2005.  Currently there 
are over 8,700 FM stations and over 4,700 AM stations.  Among the FM stations, about 
6,200 are commercial stations and about 2,500 are noncommercial (or educational).   Among 
the AM stations, only 119 of them are noncommercial, leaving just under 4,600 commercial 
AM stations. 
 
Figure 1-2.  FCC-Licensed Stations, 1975 to 2005. 
 
 
 
The message of Figure 1-2 is largely the same as that of Figure 1-1: new licenses have been 
going almost entirely to FM stations in recent years.  But going back to 1975 provides a 
broader context for understanding the changes to radio of the last decade.  Information for 
particular variables is not always available going that far back, even in the proprietary 
databases.  Whenever possible, however, the analyses of this chapter will cover a three-
decade span. 
 
More importantly, Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show that the total number of radio stations in the 
U.S. is indeed growing.  But a large portion of the growth involves noncommercial FM 
stations.  With only a few dozen commercial FM stations receiving new licenses each year, 
entry into commercial radio is quite restricted.  The average metropolitan area has only seen 
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 a new commercial FM station once every three or four years.  As a result, incumbent radio 
companies do not face new competitors very often. 
 
Who’s Getting the New Licenses 
 
New licenses can create the opportunity to bring new individuals and organizations into the 
radio industry. These new licensees could bring fresh perspectives that would result in new 
programming to serve the diverse public interest.  This becomes even more important in the 
context of consolidating ownership, as the incumbent companies get larger and the diversity 
of station ownership declines.  (Chapter 3 will discuss the programming choices of large 
incumbents versus those of small companies and new entrants.) 
 
So who are the new licensees in radio?  Over the past ten years, a fairly large percentage of 
the new licenses have gone to just a few companies, as Table 1-2 describes.6 
 
Table 1-2.  Owners of Newly Licensed Radio Licenses, 1996-2005. 
 
Owner Number of Stations Percentage 
American Family Association 115 6.9% 
Educational Media Foundation 51 3.1% 
Calvary Satellite Network Int’l 26 1.6% 
Flinn Broadcasting Corp. 15 0.9% 
Family Stations 13 0.8% 
Clear Channel Communications 12 0.7% 
University of Wyoming 11 0.7% 
Moody Bible Institute of Chicago 11 0.7% 
Baker Family Stations 11 0.7% 
New Life Evangelistic Center 9 0.5% 
All others (1,062 different owners) 1,383  
TOTAL 1,657 --- 
 
The 115 stations licensed to American Family Association and the 51 stations licensed to the 
Education Media Foundation over the past ten years add up to 10 percent of the newly 
licensed stations, across AM and FM, commercial and noncommercial.  Ten percent may not 
seem like an overwhelming number.  But consider that when American Family Association 
receives 115 licenses (instead of, say, one), 114 other individuals, companies, and 
organizations do not get a license. 
 
FM Translators and Satellite Feeds 
 
Many of the leading acquirers of new noncommercial radio licenses have also taken 
advantage of FM translator stations.  A translator receives signals from a full-power FM 
station and rebroadcasts that signal at a low power (250 watts or less).  Some translators “fill 
                                                
6 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 in” signals to parts of a full-power FM station’s designated broadcast area that are blocked by 
mountains or other features of the terrain, while others extend a full-power station’s 
broadcast area.  There are no ownership restrictions on translators; specifically, the 
ownership restrictions that apply to full-power radio stations do not apply to translators.7 
 
In 1990, the FCC changed the rules for how FM translator stations for noncommercial full-
power FM stations could receive their signals.  Before, translators had to receive their signal 
via terrestrial means, for example microwave, phone lines, or cable lines.  But with the 1990 
rule change, FM translators for noncommercial full-power FM stations could receive their 
signals via satellite.8  To receive a license, FM translators still must have an association with 
a full-power FM station.  But the ability to deliver signals by satellite made translators more 
attractive.  And media-ownership limits have never applied to translators; an entity can apply 
for as many translators as it wants.  Many noncommercial broadcasters—including the major 
acquirers of new noncommercial FM licenses like American Family Association, 
Educational Media Foundation, and Calvary Satellite Network—have accumulated many 
translators to go with their new full-power FM licenses.9  These translators do not have to be 
in the same local market as their parent FM station. Their FM translators can now 
rebroadcast satellite feeds of those organizations’ programming, multiplying the impact of 
their new full-power licenses. 
 
The companies and organizations that have obtained new radio licenses since 1996 have 
handled the application process skillfully, whether through auctions for commercial stations 
or through the points system for noncommercial stations.  They have also taken advantage of 
the relaxed rules for how FM translators receive their signals.  Taken together, the changes to 
the licensing process and the changes to the translator rules have increased consolidation in 
non-commercial radio.  As a result, these changes might threaten competition, diversity, and 
localism and are cause for concern. 
 
Low-Power FM Stations 
 
Low-power FM stations are one mitigating factor in the increasing concentration of existing 
and even newly licensed full-power radio stations.  Broadcasting with a power of 100 watts 
or less, these low-power station licenses are available only to noncommercial entities without 
other broadcast or newspaper holdings.  Licenses for low-power FM stations first became 
                                                
7 Federal Communications Commission, “FM Translator and FM Booster Stations,” at 
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/translator.html. 
8 Federal Communications Commission, Amendment of Part 74 of the Commission's Rules 
Regarding Translator Stations, MM Docket 88-140, FCC 90-375, 5 FCC Rcd 7212 (1990), available 
at http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-bin/assemble?docno=901204. 
9 For documentation that these entities employ an FM-translator strategy, and a discussion of other 
issues related to FM translators in general, see DIYMedia.net, “God Squads Fall From Grace,” at 
http://www.diymedia.net/feature/lpfm/f022505b.htm. 
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 available in January 2000.10  As of June 30, 2006, the FCC’s database indicated that 728 low-
power FM stations were operational and that 341 more had obtained construction permits.11 
 
Congress has limited the number of frequencies available for low-power FM stations.  By 
statute, the FCC may only grant low-power FM stations at frequencies that are more than 
three frequencies away from any current full-power licensee’s frequency (counting by 
increments of 0.2 MHz, as the FCC does when allocating spectrum).  For example, if a full-
power FM station is broadcasting at 91.5 FM in a particular city, then no low-power FM 
station can be licensed at 90.9, 91.1, 91.3, 91.7, 91.9, or 92.1. 
 
The stated purpose of this “third adjacent channel” rule is to protect full-power licensees’ 
broadcast signals from interference.  But an engineering study commissioned by the FCC and 
conducted by the MITRE Corporation concluded that such concerns are unfounded—
especially at a distance of three frequencies. 12  As a result, the restrictions on low-power FM 
licenses provide another example of entry restrictions.  Congress is not protecting the 
integrity of full-power licensees’ signal. Rather, the FCC is protecting incumbents from 
competition from local, independently owned low-power FM broadcasters.13 
 
Not Deregulation, but Pro-Incumbent Regulation 
 
The statistics in this section make plain that “deregulation” is a deceptive misnomer for what 
happened in radio in the 1980s and 1990s.  Strong regulations on entry still exist in radio.  
The vast majority of would-be competitors do not obtain radio stations.  Regardless of 
whether concerns about interference justify the FCC’s entry restrictions, the economic effect 
is to make the radio industry an exclusive party that only two hundred new invitees per year 
can attend.  Entry restrictions benefit incumbents, protecting them from the vagaries of true 
competition and facilitating their efforts to acquire an increasingly large fraction of all U.S. 
radio stations—as the next section describes. 
 
 
                                                
10 Federal Communications Commission, “Low Power FM Broadcast Radio Stations,” at 
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/lpfm. 
11 Federal Communications Commission, “FM Query Results,” http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-
bin/fmq?state=&serv=FL&vac=&list=2 (visited June 30, 2006) (clicking the link begins a query of 
the FCC’s engineering database that will deliver current results on all low-power FM station). 
12 According to Media Access Project, The Mitre Report found that: [1] eliminating third adjacent 
channel separation would not increase interference[; 2] LPFM would have no impact on digital 
radio[; and 3] there was therefore no need to consider the economic impact of LPFM on incumbent 
broadcasters.”  See Media Access Project, “Congress and LPFM,” available at 
http://www.mediaaccess.org/programs/lpfm/Congress.html (last visited August 25, 2006).  The Mitre 
Report itself is available at http://www.freepress.net/lpfm/MitreReport.pdf (last visited August 25, 
2006). 
13 As of this writing, the Senate Commerce Committee had voted in support of an amendment to a 
large telecommunications bill that would allow the FCC to grant more low-power FM licenses.  For 
updates, and for much more information on low-power FM radio, visit the website of the Prometheus 
Radio Project at http://www.prometheusradio.org/. 
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 When the Telecom Act Changed Everything 
 
This section documents how: 
 
• The Telecom Act resulted in an unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions. 
• The number of companies that own radio stations peaked in 1995, just before the 
Telecom Act, and has declined dramatically over the past decade, despite hundreds of 
new licenses issued. 
• Most of the decline in the number of owners occurred among owners of commercial 
stations. 
• The number of owners of noncommercial stations, however, has only increased 
slightly since the Telecom Act. 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions in the Wake of the Telecom Act 
 
Powerful radio companies had much to do with passing the Telecom Act, and they prepared 
for its coming by planning for various mergers and acquisitions so that stations could start 
changing hands immediately after the law passed.  These transactions took advantage of the 
radio companies’ new ability to become national, rather than just local or regional, media 
companies.  Radio stations have always switched owners from time to time—FCC 
regulations do not prohibit transfers of licenses, though transfers must be reported.  But the 
Telecom Act unleashed an enormous number of mergers and acquisitions, as Figure 1-3 
shows. 
 
Figure 1-3 does not count the number of deals in each year; rather, it shows the number of 
stations that changed hands each year.14  So, for example, a deal involving one station would 
count as one station transacted.  A merger between a radio company with 100 stations and a 
radio company with 50 stations would count as 50 stations transacted.  Graphing the number 
of stations transacted over time gives us a way to analyze the level of merger and acquisition 
activity in each year. 
 
                                                
14 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 1-3.  Number of U.S. Stations Transacted in Mergers and Acquisitions,  
1986-2005. 
 
 
 
Before 1992, the number of stations changing hands was typically around 1,000 stations per 
year.  Between 1992 and 1996, that number increased to around 1,200 per year.  Then, as 
Figure 1-3 shows, merger and acquisition activity spiked upward.  During 1997 and 1998, the 
two years immediately following the Telecom Act, over 2,100 stations were transacted each 
year.  From 1999 through 2001, around 1,700 stations changed ownership each year, still 
above pre-Telecom Act levels.   Since 2002, however, the number of stations transacted each 
year has settled down to around 800 stations per year. 
 
A Growing Number of Stations—And a Shrinking Number of Owners 
 
The large number of mergers and acquisitions that occurred in the wake of the Telecom Act 
illustrates that the elimination of the National Radio Ownership Rule restructured the radio 
industry.  Figure 1-4 charts the number of FCC-licensed stations against the number of 
owners of radio stations.15  The red line charts the total number of stations in the U.S.—this 
just repeats the top outline of Figure 1-2.  The blue line represents the number of owners over 
the same time period.  The green line represents the number of stations per owner—the red 
line divided by the blue line. 
                                                
15 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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For the years 1975 through 1987, the blue line and the green line split into two. The 
transaction data from BIA Financial Networks are incomplete for these years.  We know who 
purchased the stations, but we don’t always know who sold them.  The “upper bound” on the 
number of owners represents what the number of owners would be if every single seller 
whose identity is unknown was an independent owner with just a single station to sell.  The 
“lower bound” on the number of owners represents the opposite, that is, what the number of 
owners would be if every single seller whose identity is unknown was an owner of multiple 
stations and continued to own other stations after the sale. 
 
Figure 1-4.  U.S. Radio Stations and Owners, 1975-2005. 
 
 
Note: Read the red and blue lines, which depict the number of stations and the number of 
owners, against the left-hand axis.  Read the green line, which depicts the number of stations 
per owner, against the right-hand axis. 
 
Figure 1-4 shows that the number of owners increased from 1975 to 1995.  In 1975, 
approximately 4,000 to 5,000 distinct companies, organizations, and individuals owned radio 
stations in the U.S.  That number gradually increased over the next two decades as the FCC 
licensed new stations, some of them to owners who had not previously owned any radio 
stations. But the number of owners peaked in early 1995 at just over 6,600 owners.  This 
includes owners of all station types: AM and FM, commercial and noncommercial.  After 
that peak, mainly after the Telecom Act, the number of owners declined precipitously, as the 
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 blue line shows.  At the end of 2005, the radio industry had just over 4,400 owners.  The 
green line in Figure 1-4 shows that the number of stations per owner increased from about 
1.75 to about 3.05 over this time period.   
 
Most Mergers Happened in the Commercial Sector 
 
Figure 1-5 takes the blue line from Figure 1-4, which represented the number of owners over 
time, and breaks the owners into seven categories: (1) those who own only commercial FM 
stations, (2) those who own only noncommercial FM stations, (3) those who own only 
commercial AM stations, (4) those who own only noncommercial AM stations, (5) those 
owning both commercial FM and commercial AM stations, (6) those owning both 
noncommercial FM stations and noncommercial AM stations, and (7) those owning a more 
complicated mix of stations (for example, both commercial and noncommercial FM 
stations).16 
 
Figure 1-5.  Owners Categorized by Type of Stations Owned, 1975-2005. 
 
 
 
The bottom three red-tinted areas of Figure 1-5 grow until the mid-1990s and then shrink. 
This shows that consolidation has occurred mainly in the commercial sector, because the 
number of owners who own commercial FM, commercial AM, or both commercial FM and 
                                                
16 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 commercial AM stations has declined since the Telecom Act.  From a peak of 5,529 owners 
of commercial stations in early 1993, the number of owners of commercial stations declined 
to a three-decade low of 3,134 by the end of 2005.  That constitutes a 43 percent drop in the 
number of distinct companies, organizations, and individuals who own commercial radio 
stations in a little less than thirteen years. 
 
Consolidation has occurred in the noncommercial sector as well.  The number of owners of 
noncommercial stations exceeded 1,300 in early 1996, peaked at 1,393 in early 2003, and has 
decreased only slightly (to 1,369) since then.17  That the number of noncommercial owners 
has held steady for a decade between 1,300 and 1,400—despite hundreds of new 
noncommercial licenses granted by the FCC over that time period—demonstrates two forces 
at work.  First, some consolidation has occurred in the noncommercial sector since the 
Telecom Act.  Second, as described earlier, a greater fraction of new licenses has gone to 
owners who already owned at least one, if not many, radio stations. 
 
 
Concentration of Station Ownership 
 
This section looks at three decades of data to show that: 
 
• The geographic reach of the largest radio companies has expanded over the last 
decade, suggesting a decline in locally owned broadcasting. 
• Radio-station holdings of the ten largest companies in the industry increased almost 
ninefold from 1995 to 2005.  Over that same period, holdings of the fifty largest 
companies increased more than fourfold. 
• The largest radio company, Clear Channel, owned about 1,200 stations nationwide as 
of the end of 2005.18 
 
The Geographic Reach of the New Large Radio Companies 
 
The previous section showed that a wave of mergers and acquisitions following the Telecom 
Act resulted in fewer entities having ownership of radio stations, and that most consolidation 
happened in the commercial sector.  This section explores in more detail how consolidation 
of station ownership has changed the radio industry.  Consolidation did not happen evenly 
among radio companies—it was not the case that each commercial company just bought one 
local competitor’s stations, and left it at that.  Rather, from the post-Telecom Act 
consolidation emerged national radio companies with broad geographic reach.  And some 
radio companies came to own many more stations than others. 
 
                                                
17 The blue-tinted areas in Figure 1-5 represent noncommercial owners; those areas have 
approximately the same top-to-bottom height for the years 1996 through 2005. 
18 As discussed in the Introduction, Clear Channel announced in November 2006 that it would be 
purchased by a pair of private equity investors, Bain Capital Partners and Thomas H. Lee Partners. 
Angela Moore, “Clear Channel Agrees to $18.7 Billion Buyout,” Marketwatch.com, Nov. 27, 2006 
(corrected version).  We address the implications of this buyout below. 
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 To study the geographic reach of a radio company, one can look at many different levels of 
geography within the U.S.  We will focus on four different geographic levels: states, markets, 
counties, and cities, listed from largest to smallest.  Among these terms, the “market” level 
may be unfamiliar and require some background.  For purposes of this study, “market” refers 
to a geographic unit defined by the Arbitron Company.19 
 
Figure 1-6.  Geographic Reach of Radio Companies, 1975-2005. 
 
 
 
A radio company might own stations in one or more states, one or more markets, and so on.  
The number of states, markets, counties, or cities in which a radio company owns stations 
provides a measure of that radio company’s geographic reach.  To look at the geographic 
reach of companies across the entire radio industry, one can ask how many companies owned 
stations in say, 10 states or more, in 10 markets or more, and so on.  Figure 1-6 displays the 
answers to precisely these questions.20 
                                                
19 Arbitron surveys radio listeners in about three hundred “markets” in the U.S. to rate stations 
according to estimates of how many people listen to them.  Arbitron markets correspond roughly to 
metropolitan areas.  Defining the geographic boundaries of a market allows people within the radio 
industry to talk about a station like WXRT’s ratings in the “Chicago market.”  The Chicago market as 
defined by Arbitron isn’t limited by Chicago’s city limits—in fact, the Arbitron market for Chicago 
includes Cook County (which contains Chicago) as well as adjacent counties (or parts of them). 
20 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
35
  
As of 1975, before the regulatory changes of the 1980s and 1990s, Figure 1-6 shows that: 
only 2 companies owned stations in ten different states; only 8 companies owned stations in 
ten markets; only 10 companies owned stations in ten counties; and only 9 companies owned 
stations in ten cities.  The number of radio companies with a wide geographic reach 
expanded gradually over the next two decades or so, until the FCC relaxed the National 
Radio Ownership Rule in 1992 and 1994.  At that point, both the number of companies with 
stations in ten counties and the number of companies with stations in ten cities began to grow 
(the top two lines in Figure 1-6). 
 
Since the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the number of radio companies with wide 
geographic reach has grown considerably, as measured by all four geographic levels included 
in Figure 1-6.  At the end of 2005, an unprecedented 121 companies spanned at least ten 
cities; 89 companies spanned at least ten counties; 38 companies spanned at least ten 
markets; and 25 companies spanned at least ten states. 
 
Clear Channel and the Dramatic Growth of the Largest Radio Companies 
 
The size of radio companies has increased dramatically over the past decade.  Table 1-3 
shows the ten largest owners as of 1995 and the ten largest owners as of 2005, as well as the 
number of stations owned.21  The largest single owner of radio stations, Clear Channel, 
owned 1,184 stations at the end of 2005.22 
 
Table 1-3. Top Ten Owners by Number of Stations Owned, 1995 and 2005. 
 
Rank 1995 Top Ten Owners Stations 
Owned 
2005 Top Ten Owners Stations 
Owned 
1 Clear Channel 39 Clear Channel 1,184 
2 Family Stations 37 Cumulus 295 
3 Salem Comm. Corp. 30 Citadel 223 
4 Evergreen Media Corp. 30 Infinity 178 
5 Minnesota Public Radio 28 Educational Media Foundation 138 
6 James Ingstad 28 American Family Ass’n 113 
7 Bible Bcstg. Ntwk 28 Salem Comm. Corp. 106 
8 American Radio Systems 24 Entercom 103 
9 Saga Communications 23 Saga Communications 86 
10 River City Bcstg. 23 Cox Radio 78 
 
 
                                                
21 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
22 In November 2006, in conjunction with the announcement of the private equity buyout of Clear 
Channel, it was reported that Clear Channel would sell off 448 of its stations.  The stations to be sold 
off would be those located outside the top 100 markets.  See Angela Moore, “Clear Channel Agrees 
to $18.7 Billion Buyout,” Marketwatch.com, Nov. 27, 2006 (corrected version). 
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 Clear Channel also controlled and managed an additional 16 stations through legal devices 
known as local marketing agreements, or LMAs.  (Two of the stations Clear Channel owns 
appear to be managed by other companies through LMAs).  At its peak, Clear Channel 
owned 1,205 stations and controlled a few dozen more through LMAs, but has since sold off 
a small fraction of its radio-station portfolio.  The FCC does not prohibit LMAs, though they 
require radio companies to report them.  Thus, even prior to the Telecom Act, the FCC 
allowed a business practice to undermine somewhat the purpose of the national ownership 
cap.  LMAs became less important when the cap was relaxed and then eliminated.  But the 
practice continues to allow some additional consolidation. 
 
The Fifty Companies with the Largest Number of Stations Over Time 
 
The distribution of stations across these growing radio companies has not been equal.  Figure 
1-7 shows the total number of stations held by the fifty largest owners over the last three 
decades.23  
 
Figure 1-7.  Number of Stations Owned by the Top 50 Owners, 1975-2005. 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 For each year, Figure 1-7 shows the number of stations owned by whichever fifty companies 
were largest at that particular point in time.  Each colored area corresponds to one ranking of 
owners by size. For example, the red area at the bottom of the graph corresponds to the 
largest owner at each point in time; the blue area second from the bottom corresponds to the 
second-largest owner at each point in time; and so on. 
 
Figure 1-7 looks like a rainbow ribbon.  Two conclusions from this graph are most important.  
First, the width of the entire ribbon grows considerably over time.  In 1975, the fifty largest 
radio owners owned a total of 512 stations.  That total grew to 589 stations by 1985, and to 
984 stations by 1995.  In 2005, the number of stations owned by the fifty largest radio 
owners reached 4,097 stations—a fourfold increase in the last decade.  
 
Second, some of the colored stripes in the ribbon are wider than others, and get wider over 
time.  The ten stripes on the bottom are the widest.  The ten largest radio owners totaled 290 
stations in 1995, but the 2,504 stations in 2005, representing an almost ninefold increase in 
the station holdings of the ten largest owners over the past decade.  Such intensive 
consolidation of ownership represents a dramatic change for the radio industry. 
 
 
Concentration of Commercial Market Shares in Revenue and Listenership 
 
Using data from before the Telecom Act to the present day, this section details how, among 
commercial stations: 
 
• National concentration of advertising revenue increased from 1993 to 2004, from 12 
percent market share for the top four companies to 50 percent market share for the top 
four. 
• National concentration of listeners continued in 2005—the top four firms have 48 
percent of the listeners, and the top ten firms have almost two-thirds. 
• Both revenue and listenership concentration could increase because of the 
ABC/Disney–Citadel merger, the Cumulus Media Partners purchase of Susquehanna, 
and the Clear Channel buyout in 2006. 
 
Unequal Shares of Listeners Among Radio Companies 
 
So far this chapter has discussed concentration in the radio industry as a matter of companies 
accumulating more radio stations.  But not all radio stations are equally valuable, for two 
reasons.  First, different stations acquire different kinds of licenses from the FCC in terms of 
how and where the FCC will allow the station’s antenna to broadcast.  Those differences—
AM or FM, high or low wattage, tall or short tower, and so on—affect how many listeners a 
radio station can reach with its broadcast signal.   Second, different stations will be more 
popular among listeners than others.  Many factors might determine how many people listen 
to a station, such as: the type and quality of programming on the station; the station’s place in 
the range of AM or FM frequencies (which corresponds to being on the left, middle, or right 
of the dial on older-style radios); the history of how many people have been in the habit of 
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 tuning into the station; and the amount of advertising the radio station does or buys for itself, 
for instance, over the air or on billboards. 
 
Stations with more listeners will be more attractive to advertisers and thus will get more 
advertising revenue, all else equal.  So measuring listenership and station revenue helps one 
understand a station’s economic and social influence.  Stations that reach more listeners 
might therefore have a larger role in providing entertainment, disseminating news and 
information, or other cultural activities.  Furthermore, radio companies that own stations with 
more total listeners and greater total advertising revenue will have a larger influence in the 
radio industry and in society generally.   
 
Figure 1-8 shows the concentration of commercial radio listenership nationwide in 2001 and 
2005 as a pie chart.24  Listenership is measured by the Arbitron Company in a statistic called 
“metro cume persons,” which estimates the number of individual people who listened to a 
station for at least five minutes within a fifteen-minute period. The national share of listeners 
for a particular radio company is the sum of the metro cume persons for each station the 
company owns divided by the total number of metro cume persons for all U.S. stations. In 
Figure 1-8, the top ten radio companies’ shares of listeners are broken out into separate slices 
of the listenership pie; the figure denotes the remaining thousands of companies and 
organizations as “all others.” 
 
Measuring radio concentration by listener share, as in Figure 1-8, shows even greater 
concentration than simply measuring by the number of stations owned.  Clear Channel’s 
share of nationwide listeners exceeded 27 percent by 2005, having grown slightly since 2001.  
Infinity, formerly a subsidiary of Viacom and now called CBS Radio, saw its listener share 
decline from 15.5 percent to 13.6 percent over four years.  But many of the other top-ten 
radio companies saw growth in their listener share over the last four years.  Overall, the top 
ten radio companies had a total market share of 65.3 percent in 2005, up slightly from 64.3 
percent in 2001. 
 
                                                
24 Listener ratings data are only available for commercial stations in the BIA Financial Networks 
database.  Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 
data. 
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 Figure 1-8.  National Share of Radio Listeners, Commercial Sector, 2001 and 2005. 
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 Unfortunately, statistics on metro cume persons at regular intervals over a longer historical 
period are not easily available.  But Figure 1-8 does provide suggestive information about the 
Telecom Act’s effect on listener share, since Clear Channel could not have enjoyed 27 
percent market share nationwide when it owned just 39 stations back in 1995. 
 
How Concentration of Revenue Share Has Increased Over Time 
 
Fortunately, estimates of annual advertising revenue for each radio station are available on a 
yearly basis dating from before the Telecom Act.25  Measures of revenue concentration apply 
only to the commercial sector; BIA Financial Networks does not estimate station-level 
revenue for noncommercial entities. 
 
Table 1-4 shows revenue market share statistics for the earliest and latest years currently 
available, 1993 and 2004.26  Note that, for the 1993 statistics, “Infinity Broadcasting” and 
“Infinity Broadcasting Corporation” are listed as separate entities.  BIA Financial Networks 
explains that corporate entities that are either totally distinct or that are related but structured 
or financed in different ways have been distinguished in their database by keeping or leaving 
out suffixes like “Corporation,” “Company,” “Incorporated,” and the like. 
 
Table 1-4.  Top Ten Commercial Owners by Estimated Revenue of Stations Owned. 
 
Rank 1993 Top Ten 
Owners 
Revenue 
($000) 
Market 
Share 
2004 Top Ten 
Owners 
Revenue 
($000) 
Market 
Share 
1 CBS 235,900 3.8% Clear Channel 3,560,125 26.3% 
2 Capital Cities/ABC 226,600 3.7% Infinity 2,207,500 16.3% 
3 Lehman Brothers 160,200 2.6% Cox Radio 485,600 3.6% 
4 Infinity Bcstg. Corp. 113,900 1.8% Entercom 479,125 3.5% 
5 Shamrock Holdings 105,000 1.7% ABC/Disney 454,700 3.4% 
6 Westinghouse Bcstg. 101,400 1.6% Citadel 406,957 3.0% 
7 Clear Channel 99,970 1.6% Radio One 375,500 2.8% 
8 Infinity 97,800 1.6% Univision 325,275 2.4% 
9 Bonneville Int’l  92,400 1.5% Cumulus 321,275 2.4% 
10 Cox Radio 91,150 1.5% Emmis 311,175 2.3% 
 
One can go beyond Table 1-4 to look instead at how aggregate measures of nationwide 
consolidation have changed in recent years in the commercial sector.  This chapter considers 
four different measures of concentration over time.  Three of the measures are concentration 
ratio measures, or CR measures for short.  A concentration ratio simply involves adding up 
the market shares of a certain number of companies.  For example, the abbreviation “CR2” 
                                                
25 BIA Financial Networks estimates the amount of advertising revenue each station collects each 
year.  Actual accounting records of station revenue are either not reported on a station by station basis 
by large radio companies or, for small companies, are not required to be reported in public financial 
statements.  Note that radio companies may have revenue from other sources beyond advertising; 
BIA’s measure does not purport to include those other sources. 
26 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 refers to the particular concentration ratio that is the total market share of the two companies 
with the greatest market share.  “CR10” would refer to the total market share of the top ten 
companies, as mentioned earlier with regard to Figure 1-8.   
 
The other measure of concentration is the sum of the squared market shares of every radio 
company.  Economists and antitrust lawyers call this the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or 
HHI.  This measure is useful because it can distinguish between an industry with one 
dominant company and an industry with a few large companies (but no single dominant 
company).  One might think that the fast-food hamburger industry, with McDonald’s, Burger 
King, and Wendy’s, has important differences compared to the computer operating system 
industry, which Microsoft has long dominated.  The concentration ratio measures can miss 
these differences. 
 
Consider an example with two industries.  In the first industry, the very large company might 
have 99 percent market share while the small company has 1 percent.  The HHI for that 
industry would be the sum of the squared market shares, that is, (99)2 + (1)2, or 9802.  In the 
second industry, the equally large companies each have 50 percent market share.  There, the 
HHI would be (50)2 + (50)2 = 5000.  The HHI in the first industry is almost twice as large, 
telling us that the first industry has much greater concentration than the second.  Now 
compare the CR2 measure in both industries.  The CR2 would be 100 for both (either 99 + 1 
or 50 + 50), obscuring the important difference in concentration.  While the CR measures are 
easier to calculate and understand, the HHI measure provides valuable information about the 
relative sizes of the largest firms, not just the total market share of the largest firms. 
 
When evaluating mergers, the Justice Department uses a rule of thumb that an industry of an 
HHI between 1000 and 1800 is concentrated, enough to warrant some concern about any 
future mergers.  (An HHI greater than 1800 is highly concentrated.)  Some economic theories 
predict that, in a concentrated industry, companies can artificially raise prices, stifle would-
be competitors, or reduce the quality of their products or services. 
 
In Figure 1-9, the HHI based on the revenue market shares in the radio industry is plotted as 
a red line against the left-hand axis (ranging from 0 to 1400).27  The CR2, CR4, and CR10 
measures are plotted against the right-hand axis.  All four measures start very small and 
increase rapidly between 1995 and 2000, before declining somewhat from 2001 to 2004. 
 
                                                
27 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 1-9.  Four Measures of Revenue Concentration 
in Radio’s Commercial Sector, 1993-2004. 
 
 
Figure 1-9 shows that nationwide concentration in the radio industry merits concern.  In 
1993, the HHI for the radio industry was 81.  In 2004, the HHI for radio was 1046—down 
from a peak of 1166 but still within the range of caution according to the Department of 
Justice’s merger guidelines. 
 
More broadly, Figure 1-9 represents what happened when the Telecom Act eliminated the 
National Radio Ownership Rule.  The radio industry changed from an unconcentrated 
industry to a concentrated industry in a matter of just five years. 
 
 
The Telecom Act Has Failed Radio on All Fronts 
 
To provide a sense of what has resulted from the increased concentration of ownership, this 
section shows that: 
 
• Across 155 markets, radio listenership has declined over the past fourteen years for 
which data are available, a 22 percent drop since its peak in 1989. 
• Large radio companies are not, in general, more efficient at creating revenue with 
their ratings, showing that bigger is not necessarily better. 
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 The Long Decline in Radio Listening 
 
An obvious and important measure of radio’s popularity is how many people tune in to listen.  
A radio-industry statistic called the Average Person Rating, or APR, provides one measure 
of listenership.  It refers to the percentage of the population listening to radio within a market 
at any particular moment, across both commercial and noncommercial stations.  Jim Duncan 
of Duncan’s American Radio has collected APR statistics for 155 markets from 1976 to 
2003.  Figure 1-10 present the average APR across those 155 markets over that time period.28 
 
Figure 1-10 shows that radio listenership, as measured by the average APR across markets, 
peaked at 17.6 percent in 1989, declining to a historic low of 13.8 percent in 2003 (the last 
year for which these data are available).  This represents a 22 percent decline in APR over 
fourteen years.  From its level of 16.4 percent in 1995, just before the Telecom Act, the 
average APR across markets declined 16 percent. 
 
Figure 1-10.  Radio Listenership as Measured by Average APR (Average Person 
Rating) Across 155 Markets, 1976-2003. 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Source data: James H. Duncan, Jr., An American Radio Trilogy 1975 to 2004, Volume One: The 
Markets (2005). 
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 Most of the decline in listenership has occurred during the time of rapid consolidation of 
station ownership that this chapter has documented.  If greater consolidation served the 
listening public well, one would expect radio listenership to have increased, to have stopped 
decreasing, or at the very least to have decreased at a slower pace.  But in fact, the decline in 
radio listenership has accelerated during the post-Telecom Act period of consolidation. 
 
The decline in listenership may have several different causes.  But because the decline began 
back in 1989, and experienced a rapid descent sometime around 1995 to 1998, one cannot 
point to internet radio, satellite radio, or iPods as the sole cause of declining listenership.  
Other, older technologies might have had some role, such as CD players in cars, but this is 
pure speculation.  Later chapters will investigate whether consolidation and the programming 
choices that have come with it have caused the decline in listenership, or at least part of it.  
But with the data described so far, one can see that the Telecom Act has not stemmed the 
flow of listeners away from radio. 
 
Recall that proponents of the Telecom Act argued that the law should allow radio companies 
to take advantage of economies of scale.  Bigger radio companies would, they claimed, serve 
listeners better (for example, through more diverse programming).  But Figure 1-10 shows 
that many listeners have turned away from radio, suggesting that the legislative and 
regulatory changes failed to make radio a more valuable public resource.  So what can we 
learn about the other argument for the benefits of economies of scale—the idea that bigger 
radio companies could save costs and operate more efficiently? 
 
The Economies of Scale Never Materialized—and the Stock Prices Have Sagged 
 
Radio companies’ financial and accounting statistics are not publicly available in a detailed, 
station-by-station form.  So, to measure radio companies’ efficiency, one can instead look at 
how efficiently they convert their listeners into advertising revenue.  The ratio of advertising 
revenue share to ratings share is known as the power ratio.  It is calculated by BIA Financial 
Networks, using ratings shares from Arbitron and their own revenue-share estimates.  For 
example, if a station has a 10 percent ratings share and a 10 percent share of advertising 
revenue, then its power ratio is 1.0.  If another station has a 10 ratings share but has a 12 
percent share of advertising revenue, its power ratio is 1.2. 
 
A station with a high power ratio might run its business more efficiently, might attract 
listeners who are particularly valuable to advertisers, or might have particularly loyal 
listeners who tune in for a greater amount of time per day.  Table 1-5 lists the average power 
ratios of stations owned by the top ten radio companies (by number of stations owned) in 
2001 and 2005.   
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 Table 1-5. Power Ratio of Top Ten Owners, 2001 and 2005. 
 
Rank 2001 Top Ten Owners 
Stations 
Owned 
Power 
Ratio 
2005 Top Ten 
Owners 
Stations 
Owned 
Power 
Ratio 
1 Clear Channel 1,198 1.07 Clear Channel 1,184 1.06 
2 Cumulus 237 1.04 Cumulus 298 1.04 
3 Citadel 178 1.06 Citadel 223 1.08 
4 Infinity 176 1.18 Infinity 178 1.20 
5 Entercom 98 1.05 Salem Comm. 104 1.00 
6 Salem Comm. 82 1.24 Entercom 103 1.05 
7 Cox Radio 78 1.11 Saga Comm. 86 1.10 
8 Radio One 62 0.72 Cox Radio 78 1.01 
9 Regent Comm. 61 1.04 Regent Comm. 74 1.03 
10 NextMedia Group 56 0.86 ABC/Disney 72 0.94 
--- INDUSTRY AVG. --- 1.05 INDUSTRY AVG. --- 1.04 
 
The evidence for the theory that bigger radio companies get a greater share of advertising 
revenue relative to their share of listeners is mixed.   In both 2001 and 2005, five companies 
within the group of top ten radio companies were at or below the industry average in power 
ratio.  Looking at the two largest radio companies by listenership and revenue, one sees that 
the average Clear Channel station has a power ratio only slightly above the industry average, 
while the average Infinity station has a consistently higher-than-average power ratio.   
 
Statistically, the correlation between the average power ratio for a company’s stations and the 
number of stations that company owns lies between 0.006 and 0.008 (on a scale from 0 to 1) 
depending on the year.  This is a weak correlation, certainly too weak to justify the sweeping 
changes like those the Telecom Act brought to radio.  The power ratio measure provides little 
evidence that bigger radio companies turn listeners into advertising revenue any more 
efficiently than smaller ones. 
 
This failure of the largest radio companies to deliver greater advertising revenue per listener 
might explain partially the sagging stock price of companies like Clear Channel, whose share 
price is at its lowest level in nearly seven years and has exhibited a steady downward trend 
since its peak in late 2001.  The stock prices of Citadel, Cumulus, Emmis, Entercom, and 
Radio One display similar downward trends over the past two to five years, depending on the 
company and when its stock went public. 
 
Media Company Break-Ups and What They Mean 
 
On November 16, 2006, private equity firms announced that they will pay $19 billion in cash 
plus $8 billion in assumption of debt to purchase Clear Channel.29  According to early 
reports, the new owners plan to sell off Clear Channel’s television stations as well as 448 
                                                
29 Angela Moore, “Clear Channel Agrees to $18.7 Billion Buyout,” Marketwatch.com, Nov. 27, 2006 
(corrected version). 
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 radio stations in medium- and small-sized markets.30  The buy-out comes on the heels of 
Clear Channel separating its radio/television business from its billboard business and 
spinning off its concert-venue business in 2005.31  Providing additional context for questions 
about the value of media mergers, Viacom also recently split itself into two halves.  The new 
CBS half took over the radio, billboard, and network-television properties and the new 
Viacom half took over the movie and cable-television properties.32  Since the split, CBS’s 
chief executive has discussed selling off some of its radio stations.33 
 
These developments provide even more evidence that economies of scale in radio did not 
materialize.  Why not?  One explanation is that diseconomies of scale are just as possible as 
economies of scale in theory and in practice.  Large, national companies might have a harder 
time meeting local listeners’ needs, managing their employees effectively, or responding 
quickly to challenges from competitors.  In a recent New Yorker article, finance and 
economics columnist James Surowiecki has pointed out that the top two companies in an 
industry often waste resources and attention on crushing each other, rather than serving 
customers or even achieving profitability.34  He uses the recent technological “arms race” 
between Microsoft and Sony in the video-game industry to show that having the biggest 
market share can actually lead to lower profit margins. 
 
Surowiecki’s story fits Clear Channel’s experience to a tee.  Acquiring a massive number of 
radio stations—including a virtual monopoly in the small Casper, Wyoming market—was 
part of the bigger-is-better strategy.  Clear Channel could offer something its next-largest 
radio competitor could not: advertising time in almost 200 markets.  Advertisers with 
products to distribute nationally would, in theory, benefit from an offer of one-stop shopping 
or volume discount pricing.  But the extended decline in Clear Channel’s stock price shows 
that this version of the bigger-is-better strategy has not translated into profits. 
 
Another aspect of Clear Channel’s bigger-is-better strategy was to acquire holdings in other 
media beyond radio.  With television stations and billboards, Clear Channel could offer 
advertising time or space on multiple platforms.  And with its concert-venue holdings, it 
planned to cross-promote musicians’ concerts, radio appearances, and radio airplay.  But 
these cross-media mergers have not succeeded either, even in business terms.  What’s worse, 
such strategies have led to allegations of illegality.  In addition to their attempts to take 
advantage of economies of scale, Clear Channel’s strategy has also involved: accepting 
                                                
30 Press Release, “Clear Channel Announces Plan to Sell Radio Stations Outside the Top 100 Markets 
and Entire Television Station Group,” November 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1825 (last visited 
December 2, 2006). 
31 Press Release, “Clear Channel Communications Announces Planned Strategic Realignment of 
Businesses to Enhance Shareholder Value,” April 29, 2005, available at 
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1438 (last visited 
December 2, 2006). 
32 See, for example, “Sumner Scores Split Decision,” Daily Variety, June 15, 2005, p. 1. 
33 “CBS, After Viacom Split, Posts Soft Profit Amid Radio Weakness,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 
2006, p. B2. 
34 James Surowiecki, “In Praise of Third Place,” New Yorker, December 4, 2006, p. 44. 
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 payments from independent promoters on behalf of record companies seeking airplay for 
their artists (the new form of payola);35 using their businesses outside radio to pressure 
musicians and discriminate against other owners of radio stations;36 and employing 
questionable accounting practices.37 
 
Radio companies of unprecedented size have, by definition, reduced competition in the true 
economic sense of having multiple companies competing on a level playing field.  They have 
even failed to generate benefits for investors.  In light of this, Congress and the FCC should 
become skeptical about the need for “regulatory relief” to allow media companies to grow 
even larger than they already are.  Furthermore, now that 448 Clear Channel stations might 
be on the selling block, the FCC should consider directing that these stations go to small, 
independent, local, or minority owners.  A precedent for such action exists in proposed FCC 
initiatives to promote minority ownership of media outlets38 and in the FCC’s general power 
over the licensing process, discussed earlier in this chapter.  Thus, the recent media breakups 
offer a chance for the FCC to take the initiative and play an extremely positive role in 
enhancing competition, localism, and diversity in radio. 
 
                                                
35 Clear Channel admitted using independent promoters until 2003, when it ceased the practice while 
denying its illegality.  Then, as a result of the New York State Attorney General’s investigation of 
payola, Clear Channel dismissed two employees named in the evidence against the record companies.  
See Ken Tucker and Katy Bachman, “CC Axes Two After Payola Probe,” Mediaweek.com, October 
12, 2005, at http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/news/recent_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001304228 
(last visited December 2, 2006).  The investigation by the New York State Attorney General has 
expanded from the record companies to the radio companies.  Separate settlement talks with the FCC 
continue.  See Brian Ross, “Radio Conglomerates in Talks to Settle Payola Probe,” ABCNews.com, 
April 3, 2006, at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=1800141&page=1 (last visited December 
2, 2006). 
36 Clear Channel executives have reportedly threatened to deny musicians airplay on their radio 
stations if the musicians do not perform at Clear Channel venues on tour.  The company has also 
refused to continue distributing content produced by Premiere Networks, which Clear Channel owns, 
to non-Clear-Channel radio stations.  See Eric Boehlert, “Radio’s Big Bully,” Salon.com, April 30, 
2001 (last visited December 2, 2006). 
37 Clear Channel’s concert business, now spun off and named Live Nation, has been embroiled in a 
lawsuit with the city of Mountain View, California, for racketeering, fraud, and theft of public funds, 
among other charges.  See Ray Waddel, “Audit Bad News for Clear Channel,” Billboard, September 
28, 2005. 
38 See, for example, Senator John McCain’s proposed tax certificate program, Telecommunications 
Ownership Diversification Act of 2003, S.267, 108th Congress; or former FCC Chairman William 
Kennard’s proposed initiatives, Office of the Chairman, “Studies Indicate Need to Promote Wireless 
and Broadcast License Ownership by Small, Women- and Minority-Owned Business,” December 12, 
2000, at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Enforcement/News_Releases/2000/nren0034.html (last visited 
December 5, 2006).  Such initiatives can be designed to comply with the requirements of the Supreme 
Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence.  See Leonard M. Baynes, “Life After Adarand: What 
Happened to the Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action in Telecommunications Ownership?,” 33 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 87 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000). 
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 Conclusion 
 
Declining listenership and the questionable financial benefits of bigger radio companies 
suggest that the Telecom Act has failed both citizens and long-term investors.  So who has 
gained?  The main beneficiaries have been managers and executives of incumbent radio 
companies, speculative short-term investors, and law firms and investment banks that 
received fees for orchestrating the many mergers and acquisitions (and now the media 
breakups) following the Telecom Act. 
 
This chapter has shown that by relaxing and then eliminating the National Radio Ownership 
Rule, the FCC and Congress allowed the radio industry to transform dramatically.  What 
once was an unconcentrated industry of small radio owners has become a concentrated 
industry nationally.  Chapters 2 and 3 explore in more detail how radio consolidation has 
affected the public, by examining the effect of radio consolidation on local markets and on 
programming. 
 
49
  
 
Chapter 2 
Local Radio Consolidation 
 
 
adio is a local medium.  One reason for this is simple: radio signals can only travel a 
certain distance while retaining sufficient strength to be heard.  In addition, the FCC 
limits the strength of radio broadcast antennae to prevent interference among 
different stations.  As a result, most radio stations primarily only reach citizens within a 
single county or metropolitan area, which helps make radio local. 
 
More importantly, radio is a local medium because the American public and its 
representatives have decided that localism in broadcasting is a social good.  U.S. policy has 
long promoted the goal that radio broadcasters should use the public-owned airwaves to 
serve local communities. Localism as an ideal has two basic components: (1) producing some 
or all programming within the communities in which that programming will be heard and (2) 
making programming choices according to a local community’s particular needs and wants. 
 
Today, the most important regulation for promoting localism is the Local Radio Ownership 
Rule.  With this rule, the FCC limits the number of stations each company, organization, or 
individual can own within each local market.  In theory, caps on local radio-station 
ownership encourage localism by maintaining competition among local broadcasters and by 
maintaining a diversity of ownership in each local market.  Local competition arguably 
fosters experimentation and a focus on consumers’ desires.  Diversity of ownership ideally 
leads to diversity in programming that includes local tastes and perspectives.  In this way, the 
three broadcast-policy goals Congress directs the FCC to pursue—competition, diversity, and 
localism—could complement and reinforce each other, if these theories hold true. 
 
Yet achieving the goal of localism may require more than local ownership limits.  Recent 
trends toward nationalization endanger what local programming remains.  Admittedly, since 
the early days of commercial radio, some programming has been syndicated nationally.  But 
most radio programming in the U.S. has traditionally been locally produced, locally chosen, 
and locally focused.   
 
Congress eliminated the National Radio Ownership Rule in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, as described in Chapter 1.  The ensuing nationalization of radio has threatened the 
industry’s tradition of localism. The true significance of recent regulatory changes and the 
national consolidation those changes have brought about lies in their effects on local radio 
markets.  After all, local radio stations are what people and communities experience. 
 
To document what has happened in local radio over the past decade, this chapter will show: 
 
R 
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 • The Largest Local Owners Got Larger: The number of stations owned by the 
largest radio entity in the market has increased in every local market since 1992 and 
has increased considerably since 1996. 
• More Markets with Owners Over the Local Cap: The FCC's signal-contour market 
definition allowed companies to exceed local ownership caps in 104 markets. 
• Increasing Local Concentration: Concentration of ownership in the vast majority of 
local markets has increased dramatically. 
• How Lower Caps Can Be Justified: The FCC’s local caps—in fact, even lower caps 
than the current caps—can be justified by analyzing how the caps prevent excessive 
concentration of market share. 
• Declining Local Ownership: The Local Ownership Index, created by Future of 
Music Coalition, shows that the localness of radio ownership has declined from an 
average of 97.1 to an average of 69.9, a 28 percent drop. 
• Restoration of Local Ownership is Possible: To restore the Local Ownership Index 
to even 90 percent of its pre-1996 level, the FCC would have to license dozens of 
new full power and low-power radio licenses to new local entrants and re-allocate 
spectrum to new local entrants during the digital audio broadcast transition. 
 
This chapter will first explain what we mean by local markets and local radio.  It will then 
explain the federal policies that apply to local radio ownership.  Next, it will document the 
growth of the largest local owners and the increase in concentration, as well as justify the 
FCC’s local ownership cap.  The chapter will introduce the Local Ownership Index that 
Future of Music Coalition has devised to describe the trend of increasing nationalization and 
will propose policies to ameliorate the harm to localism that the decline of local ownership 
implies.  Finally, the chapter will discuss the harms associated with increasing concentration 
in local radio markets and with declining local ownership. 
 
 
Arbitron Markets as Local Markets 
 
This preliminary section explains that: 
 
• Arbitron markets are the relevant markets in which to assess competition, diversity, 
and localism. 
• For the sake of displaying results in a readable way, it makes sense to categorize 
Arbitron markets into groups. 
• Categorizing Arbitron markets based on population and local commercial share does 
the best job of grouping similar markets together. 
 
Arbitron Markets 
 
The Arbitron Company, mentioned in Chapter 1, provides ratings of radio stations based on 
surveys of listeners.  Because radio signals have limited reach, Arbitron measures radio 
stations’ listenership on a market by market basis. 
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 Arbitron markets roughly correspond to the metropolitan areas of large, medium, and small 
cities.  They can cover just a single county or parts of multiple counties.  Occasionally 
Arbitron adds, subtracts, or changes a few of the markets it measures, but most markets have 
stayed the same over recent decades.  Currently there are 297 Arbitron markets, not including 
Puerto Rico. 
 
This chapter treats Arbitron markets as the relevant areas in which to assess competition, 
diversity, and localism in local radio.  One reason to do this is that the radio industry 
measures itself based on performance, i.e. listener ratings, within Arbitron markets.  
Moreover, Arbitron markets are areas in which most people are listening to the same set of 
radio stations.  They correspond, better than any other geographic division, to actual 
communities of listeners. 
 
Over 5,700 stations based in smaller towns and rural areas are not part of any Arbitron 
market.1  No statistics on listenership or revenue are available for these non-Arbitron 
stations, and this chapter will generally not address them. 
 
Arbitron Markets as the Relevant Local Markets 
 
Studying concentration in a market involves analysis that is similar to what the U.S. antitrust 
authorities—the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission—conduct.  In 
antitrust law, one of the most important questions is which market is relevant to assess the 
state of competition.  For example, should we measure a railroad company’s market share as 
a fraction of just the railroad industry?  Or should we also include the trucking industry and 
the airline-cargo industry as part of a broader domestic shipping industry?  Such questions 
can be contentious.  The answers depend on the specific industry and the specific concern 
about actual or potential harms to competition. 
 
In this chapter, we are implicitly arguing that local radio is the relevant market to analyze.  
Why local?  Because broadcast signals only travel so far at a sufficient strength to be heard.  
As the introduction to this chapter pointed out, people and communities experience their 
local radio stations, not every station in the country. 
 
But why analyze local radio alone, and not include other local media in the analysis?  
Although radio competes to a certain extent with other media like television and newspapers, 
we think radio has unique characteristics that make it important for its own sake.  Radio 
technology is cheap and ubiquitous.  It reaches people at work and in their cars.  And it has 
always been known as an especially “live and local” medium.  Not even satellite radio shares 
all these characteristics. 
 
Radio retains its importance even during the internet age.  Even though new internet 
technologies change the media environment profoundly, they do not appear to substitute for 
radio so much as supplement it.  According to a recent survey by Arbitron and Edison Media 
                                                
1 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Research, about three-quarters of respondents who use digital radio, internet radio, or 
podcasts say that they will continue to listen to traditional radio as much as they do now.2 
 
Why We Categorize Arbitron Markets into Groups 
 
We have calculated each statistic in this chapter for each of the 297 Arbitron markets 
individually.  But trying to see 297 separate lines on a single graph or chart and to understand 
the differences between them would be very difficult, if not impossible.  So, for the sake of 
displaying and discussing our results, we have classified the Arbitron markets into 12 market 
groups.  To do this, we take the numbers for the individual markets and calculate averages 
within each market group. 
 
Once we chose to sort the Arbitron markets into categories, it was important to choose the 
categories so that the markets in each were as similar to each other as possible.  The market 
groups we will use classify Arbitron markets based on two dimensions: population size and 
local commercial share. This categorization—the details of which we will explain in the next 
subsection—puts similar markets in groups with each other.  That way, the tables and figures 
we report are easy to read and understand, while still allowing us to describe trends in all the 
Arbitron markets accurately. 
 
Categorizing by Population, and Its Limitations 
 
Arbitron provides rankings of the 297 markets, based on population, with #1 being the 
market with the largest population.  The Arbitron market ranking is one very common and 
logical criterion used to classify markets.  We used such a classification in our 2002 study of 
the radio industry.   
 
Categories of markets based on population size make sense.  Bigger cities tend to have more 
radio stations, which leads to different dynamics in the industry.  Moreover, bigger cities 
have larger and more diverse economies, with higher costs of living, which can affect radio 
advertisers, radio listeners, and radio stations. 
 
But categories using population alone would put some markets together that are different in a 
fundamental way.  Many studies of the radio industry gloss over this complexity, but to 
categorize markets in a rigorous and accurate way, we think the issue deserves attention. 
 
Local Commercial Share 
 
Arbitron considers each radio station to be home to exactly one Arbitron market—there’s no 
double counting of stations.  Under the current version of the Local Radio Ownership Rule, a 
station must be home to an Arbitron market to be considered part of that market.   
 
                                                
2 Arbitron & Edison Media Research, “The Infinite Dial: Radio’s Digital Platforms,” p. 13, available 
at http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/digital_radio_study.pdf (last visited August 27, 2006). 
53
 Yet a single station can often reach listeners in markets that are not its home market.  This 
phenomenon of stations bleeding from one market into another occurs, at least to some small 
extent, in every market.  But in some markets, people listen predominantly to stations that are 
home to other, nearby markets.  It is these markets, with lots of outside-the-home-market 
listening, that we wish to categorize separately from others. 
 
The percentage of listening to home-market stations is called local commercial share, or 
LCS.  By definition, markets with lots of people listening to stations not home to them have 
relatively low LCS—sometimes as low as 10 or 20 percent LCS.  These are markets that are 
geographically close to a larger market—like San Jose with its close proximity to San 
Francisco.  Or they are markets that overlap with another market—like Nassau-Suffolk 
(Long Island) with New York City. 
 
Why We Categorize by Both Population and Local Commercial Share 
 
When a market has low LCS, and its listeners tend to listen to stations that are home to some 
other, nearby market, its radio industry might experience very different economic conditions 
than other markets with similarly sized populations.  We’ll illustrate this with an example, 
using St. Louis and Nassau-Suffolk as high-LCS and low-LCS markets, respectively, with 
similarly sized populations. 
 
The St. Louis market has 2.6 million people and is home to 69 stations according to Arbitron.  
Only 3 stations not home to St. Louis garner significant listener ratings there.  Contrast this 
with the Nassau-Suffolk market, which has 2.8 million people and is home to 25 stations.  
Fully 54 stations not home to Nassau-Suffolk garner significant listenership there.  Both 
markets are in the top twenty markets in population (Arbitron ranks Nassau-Suffolk at #15 
and St. Louis at #17).  But St. Louis listeners hear radio broadcasts from stations based 
predominantly in St. Louis, while Nassau-Suffolk listeners hear broadcasts from stations 
based predominantly in New York City and elsewhere.3 
 
What this means is that statistics for the St. Louis market—such as market share, listenership, 
what programming formats are available—will represent what transpires in St. Louis.  But 
the same statistics for the Nassau-Suffolk market will largely reflect how things have 
transpired in the New York City market.  The dependence of low-LCS markets on their 
nearby markets makes it important to analyze statistics about them separately.  Our 
classification of Arbitron markets allows us to do so. 
 
Classifying Arbitron Markets into Twelve Groups 
 
As explained earlier, this chapter classifies the 297 Arbitron markets into 12 groups based on 
both population and local commercial share (or LCS).  The twelve resulting groups are 
described in Table 2-1: 
 
                                                
3 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Table 2-1: Classification of Arbitron Markets 
 
Group Population Range LCS Range Number of Markets 
1 4,000,000 + 70% + 12 
2 2,000,000 – 4,000,000 55% + 13 
3 1,000,000 – 2,000,000 55% + 27 
4 600,000 – 1,000,000 55% + 23 
5 350,000 – 600,000 45% + 38 
6 200,000 – 350,000 70% + 32 
7 200,000 – 350,000 45% - 70% 23 
8 50,000 – 200,000 70% + 39 
9 50,000 – 200,000 45% - 70% 39 
10 50,000 – 350,000 0% - 45% 23 
11 350,000 – 1,000,000 0% - 45% 23 
12 1,000,000 – 4,000,000 0% - 45% 5 
 
 Figure 2-1 provides a graphical depiction of how we have classified the Arbitron 
markets into groups.  From top to bottom, the groups go in descending order of population 
size.  From left to right, the groups go in ascending order of LCS. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Color Diagram of Arbitron Market Classification. 
 
Pop.                               LCS 0-45% 45-55% 55-70% 70-100% 
4,000,000 +    Group 1 
2,000,000 – 4,000,000  Group 2 
1,000,000 – 2,000,000 
Group 12 
 Group 3 
600,000 – 1,000,000  Group 4 
350,000 – 600,000 
Group 11 
Group 5 
200,000 – 350,000 Group 7 Group 6 
50,000 – 200,000 
Group 10 
Group 9 Group 8 
 
 Table 2-1 and Figure 2-1 explain how the twelve market groups we have created vary 
by population and LCS.  Table 2-2, broken into twelve parts, lists the members of each of the 
twelve groups.4  (For those interested in statistics on the Arbitron markets reported on an 
individual basis, the tables in Appendix A to this chapter provide the population and LCS of 
each Arbitron market.) 
 
                                                
4 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
55
 Table 2-2: Membership of Market Groups, Listed in Order of Population Size. 
 
Market Group Arbitron Markets 
#1 New York;  Los Angeles;  Chicago;  San Francisco;  Dallas-Ft. Worth;  
Philadelphia;  Houston-Galveston;  Washington, DC;  Detroit;  Boston;  
Atlanta;  Miami-Ft. Lauderdale 
#2 Seattle-Tacoma;  Phoenix;  Minneapolis-St. Paul;  San Diego;  St. Louis;  
Baltimore;  Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater;  Denver-Boulder;  
Pittsburgh;  Portland, OR;  Cleveland;  Cincinnati;  Sacramento 
#3 Salt Lake City-Ogden-Provo;  Kansas City;  San Antonio;  Milwaukee-
Racine;  Columbus, OH;  Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill;  Providence-
Warwick-Pawtucket;  Las Vegas;  Orlando;  Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News;  Indianapolis;  Austin;  Raleigh-Durham;  Greensboro-
Winston Salem-High Point, NC;  Nashville;  New Orleans;  Memphis;  
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton;  Jacksonville, FL;  Hartford-New Britain-
Middletown;  Buffalo-Niagara Falls;  Oklahoma City;  Rochester, NY;  
Louisville;  Richmond, VA;  Birmingham;  McAllen-Brownsville-
Harlingen, TX 
#4 Dayton;  Greenville-Spartanburg, SC;  Tucson;  Honolulu;  Albany-
Schenectady-Troy, NY;  Tulsa;  Fresno;  Grand Rapids;  Ft. Myers-
Naples-Marco Island;  Allentown-Bethlehem;  Wilkes Barre-Scranton;  
Albuquerque;  Omaha-Council Bluffs;  Knoxville;  El Paso;  Monterey-
Salinas-Santa Cruz;  Syracuse;  Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle;  Bakersfield;  
Baton Rouge;  Toledo;  Springfield, MA;  Little Rock 
#5 Greenville-New Bern-Jacksonville, NC;  Charleston, SC;  Gainesville-
Ocala;  Des Moines;  Columbia, SC;  Wichita;  Mobile;  Colorado Springs;  
Spokane;  Madison;  Lafayette, LA;  Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-
VA;  Ft. Wayne, IN;  Modesto;  Lexington-Fayette, KY;  Augusta, GA;  
Boise;  Chattanooga;  Oxnard-Ventura;  Huntsville;  Santa Rosa;  
Youngstown-Warren;  Roanoke-Lynchburg;  Lansing-East Lansing;  
Jackson, MS;  Flint;  Reno;  Pensacola;  Fayetteville, NC;  Saginaw-Bay 
City-Midland, MI;  Shreveport;  Corpus Christi;  Beaumont-Port Arthur;  
Appleton-Oshkosh;  Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula;  Atlantic City-Cape 
May;  Burlington-Plattsburgh;  Quad Cities 
#6 Tyler-Longview, TX;  Fayetteville, AR;  Peoria;  Springfield, MO;  
Montgomery;  Palm Springs;  Salisbury-Ocean City, MD;  Macon;  
Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY;  Savannah;  Evansville;  Utica-Rome;  
Erie;  Anchorage;  Myrtle Beach;  Portland, ME;  Wausau-Stevens Points;  
South Bend;  Ft. Smith, AR;  Morgantown-Clarksburg-Fairmont, WV;  
Binghamton;  Wilmington, NC;  Lubbock;  Columbus, GA;  Charleston, 
WV;  Odessa-Midland, TX;  Yakima, WA;  Amarillo, TX;  Travese City-
Petoskey, MI;  Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA;  Terre Haute;  Duluth-
Superior 
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#7 Eugene-Springfield, OR;  Rockford;  Flagstaff-Prescott;  Poughkeepsie;  
Asheville, NC;  Tallahassee;  Hagerstown-Chambersburg-Waynesboro, 
MD-PA;  New London, CT;  Lincoln, NE;  San Luis Obispo, CA;  
Kalamazoo;  Lebanon-Rutland-White River Junction, NH-VT;  Tupelo, 
MS;  Green Bay;  Cape Cod;  Johnstown, PA;  Topeka;  Dothan, AL;  
Waco;  Laredo;  Chico;  Santa Barbara;  Muncie-Marion, IN 
#8 Florence, SC;  Medford-Ashland, OR;  Alexandria, LA;  Bangor, ME;  
Lake Charles, LA;  Laurel-Hattiesburg, MS;  Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN;  
La Crosse, WI;  Redding, CA;  Bend, OR;  Marion-Carbondale, IL;  
Bryan-College Station, TX;  Abilene, TX;  Panama City, FL;  Lima, OH;  
Eau Claire, WI;  Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA;  Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-
OH;  Wheeling, WV;  Monroe, LA;  Columbia, MO;  Wichita Falls, TX;  
Billings, MT;  Texarkana, TX-AR;  Altoona, PA;  Grand Junction, CO;  
Albany, GA;  Sioux City, IA;  Williamsport, PA;  Rapid City, SD;  
Harrisonburg, VA;  Watertown, NY;  San Angelo, TX;  Bismarck, ND;  
Grand Forks, ND-MN;  Jackson, TN;  Great Falls, MT;  Meridian, MS;  
Casper, WY 
#9 Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA;  Cedar Rapids, IA;  Olean, NY;  Bowling 
Green, KY;  Sunbury-Selinsgrove-Lewisburg, PA;  Elmira-Corning, NY;  
Champaign, IL;  St. Cloud, MN;  Ft. Walton Beach, FL;  Winchester, VA;  
Rochester, MN;  Charlottesville, VA;  Tuscaloosa, AL;  Joplin, MO;  
Dubuque, IA;  Pittsburg, KS;  Bloomington, IL;  Lafayette, IN;  LaSalle-
Peru, IL;  Elizabeth City-Nags Head, NC;  Meadville-Franklin, PA;  
Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL;  State College, PA;  Columbus-Starkville-
West Point, MS;  Montpelier-Barre-St. Johnsbury, VT;  Valdosta, GA;  
Elkins-Buckhannon-Weston, WV;  Mankato-New Ulm-St. Peter, MN;  
Lawton, OK;  Decatur, IL;  Bluefield, WV;  Ithaca, NY;  Cookeville, TN;  
Sebring, FL;  Jonesboro, AR;  Cheyenne, WY;  Beckley, WV;  Mason 
City, IA;  Brunswick, GA 
#10 Ann Arbor;  Killeen-Temple, TX;  Fredericksburg, VA;  New Bedford-
Fall River;  Concord, NH;  Merced, CA;  Manchester, NH;  Danbury, CT;  
Rocky Mount-Wilson, NC;  Frederick, MD;  Clarksville-Hopkinsville, 
TN-KY;  Hilton Head;  Muskegon, MI;  New River Valley, VA;  Santa Fe;  
Sussex, NJ;  Pueblo, CO;  Battle Creek, MI;  Hamptons-Riverhead, NY;  
Augusta-Waterville, ME;  Sheboygan, WI;  Lewiston-Auburb, ME;  The 
Florida Keys 
#11 Akron;  Wilmington, DE;  Sarasota-Bradenton;  Stockton;  Daytona 
Beach;  Visalia-Tulare-Hanford, CA;  Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL;  
Melbourne-Titusville-Cocoa, FL;  York, PA;  New Haven;  Worcester;  
Lancaster, PA;  Morristown, NJ;  Portsmouth-Dover-Rochester, NH;  Ft. 
Pierce-Stuart-Vero Beach, FL;  Bridgeport, CT;  Ft. Collins-Greeley;  
Victor Valley, CA;  Canton;  Reading, PA;  Newburgh-Middletown, NY;  
Trenton;  Stamford-Norwalk 
#12 Nassau-Suffolk, NY;  Riverside-San Bernadino;  San Jose;  Middlesex-
Somerset-Union, NJ;  Monmouth-Ocean, NJ 
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The categorization of the 297 Arbitron markets into 12 market groups makes reporting 
statistics on local radio more vivid and comprehensible.  The highest-population markets 
with the highest LCS are grouped together, whereas the lowest-population markets with the 
lowest LCS are grouped together, and so on.  This allows comparisons among groups while 
separating out the effect of markets’ population and LCS. 
 
 
The Local Ownership Cap 
 
This section describes the recent legal environment for local radio: 
 
• The FCC raised the local ownership caps in 1992, from an overall cap of two to an 
overall cap ranging from two to four. 
• Congress raised the local ownership caps again in 1996, moving the overall cap to a 
sliding scale ranging from one to eight. 
 
Before 1992, the Local Radio Ownership Rule specified that no entity could own more than 
one FM station and one AM station within a local radio market.5  In April 1992, the FCC 
sought to change this rule, allowing each radio company, organization, or individual to 
acquire stations until they exceed a cap of twenty-five percent local market share.6  After 
reconsideration, however, the FCC backed off and enacted less drastic changes. 
 
As of September 1992, the Local Radio Ownership Rule became a sliding scale such that: (1) 
in markets with fifteen or more stations, an entity could own up to four stations in total, with 
no more than two AM or two FM stations; (2) in markets with between seven and fourteen 
stations, an entity could own up to three stations in total, with no more than two AM or two 
FM stations; and (3) in markets with six or fewer stations, each entity remained limited to no 
more than one AM and one FM station [because each entity was prohibited from owning 50 
percent or more of the stations in a local market].7 
 
The Current Caps 
 
Congress, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, relaxed the Local Radio Ownership Rule 
even further.  The caps Congress specified in that legislation remain in force today.  (The 
details of how those caps are applied, however, have changed, as this chapter will discuss 
later.)  Table 3 describes the local ownership caps and how they vary by the number of 
stations in each market.8 
 
                                                
5 Federal Communications Commission, In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, MM Docket No. 
91-140, 7 FCC Rcd 2755 ¶ 31 (April 10, 1992). 
6 Id. ¶ 12. 
7 Federal Communications Commission, 47 CFR Part 73 Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, MM 
Docket No. 91-140, FCC 92-361, 57 F.R. 42701 (September 16, 1992). 
8 Local Radio Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (a)(1) (2005). 
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 Table 2-3: The Local Radio Ownership Rule 
 
In a market with… Total Limit AM Limit FM Limit 
45 or more stations 8 stations 5 stations 5 stations 
30 to 44 stations 7 stations 4 stations 4 stations 
15 to 29 stations 6 stations 4 stations 4 stations 
10 to 14 stations 5 stations 3 stations 3 stations 
8 or 9 stations 4 stations 3 stations 3 stations 
6 or 7 stations 3 stations 3 stations 3 stations 
4 or 5 stations 2 stations 2 stations 2 stations 
1 to 3 stations 1 station 1 station 1 station 
 
The rule as described in the last four rows is not spelled out explicitly, but is implied by the 
limitation that no entity can own more than 50 percent of the stations in a local radio market.9  
Note that having exactly 50 percent of the stations became permissible in 1996, whereas the 
1992 changes specified that each entity must own less than 50 percent.  Changing “less than” 
to “exactly” allowed greater ownership consolidation in even the very smallest markets. 
 
Commercial or Noncommercial? 
 
Table 2-3 explains the basics of the local ownership rules.  It lays out the numeric caps and 
how they vary by the number of stations in a market.  But Table 2-3 leaves out one important 
detail—it does not specify whether the stations involved are commercial or noncommercial.  
But this additional information is necessary for the FCC to determine whether an entity is 
complying with the Local Radio Ownership Rule.  Applying the Rule involves a three-step 
process: 
 
Step One: The FCC counts the number of commercial and noncommercial stations in 
the local market.  The total number of stations determines which caps will apply.  In 
other words, it tells the FCC which row of Table 2-3 to follow. 
 
Step Two: The FCC counts only the number of commercial stations that each entity 
owns within the local market.  It makes separate counts of the total number of 
commercial stations, the number of commercial AM stations, and the number of 
commercial FM stations. 
 
Step Three: Finally, the FCC compares the numbers of stations owned (from Step Two) 
to the corresponding local caps (from Step One).  If, in a particular market, an entity 
owns too many commercial stations in total, too many AM stations, or too many FM 
stations, then that entity’s holdings in that market violate the Local Ownership Rule. 
 
When determining the total number of stations from 1992 to 2004, the FCC only counted 
commercial stations in Step One.  But in September 2004, the FCC changed this to include 
both commercial and noncommercial stations.  To determine which numerical caps apply to a 
                                                
9 Id. § 73.3555 (a)(1)(iv). 
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 particular local market, the FCC counts both the commercial and noncommercial stations.  
This change increased the caps in most markets and allows more ownership consolidation to 
occur.  On the other hand, when the FCC counts the number of stations owned by each entity 
in Step Two and applies the local ownership caps, it only counts each entity’s commercial 
stations.  This has been the case since 1992 and was not changed in 2004.   
 
Thus, the Local Radio Ownership Rule is a limit on the number of commercial stations an 
entity may own—even though the size of a market (determined in Step One) includes both 
commercial and noncommercial stations.  This asymmetry between Step One, which counts 
commercial and noncommercial stations, and Step Two, which counts only commercial 
stations, allows more consolidation to occur than a rule that only counted commercial 
stations in each step.10 
 
 
The FCC’s Signal-Contour Market Definition 
 
This section explains that: 
 
• The method by which the FCC defines markets shapes how the local ownership caps 
will actually be enforced. 
• From 1992 until 2004, the FCC’s signal-contour market definition allowed more 
consolidation than Arbitron’s market definition would have allowed. 
• Because of mergers allowed during the signal-contour market definition era, in 104 
markets there is now at least one radio company or organization that exceeds the local 
ownership cap. 
 
How the FCC applies the Local Radio Ownership Rule (described in Table 2-3 and the 
explanation in the previous section of the FCC’s three-step process to calculate a cap) 
depends on another important detail: which stations are considered part of a local market and 
which stations are not.  Applying a local cap to a “market” necessitates that the FCC define 
what a market is and specify what each market includes.  The particular way the FCC defines 
markets determines how the cap on local radio ownership will be enforced. 
 
The FCC’s Idiosyncratic Market Definition 
 
So far, this chapter has implied that the FCC uses the same definitions for local markets as 
the industry and this report—Arbitron markets.  And today, the FCC does.  But that is a 
recent development.  During most of the radio industry’s history, including the lead-up to and 
aftermath of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC used a much more complex 
                                                
10 Changing Step One to count only commercial stations would reduce the local ownership caps in 
most markets and thus prevent more consolidation than the current, asymmetrical rule does.  But 
eliminating the asymmetry by changing Step Two to count both commercial and noncommercial 
stations would not prevent much consolidation.  Very few owners of commercial stations also own 
noncommercial stations, and vice versa.  So counting noncommercial and commercial stations against 
the cap in Step Two would push only a tiny number of radio entities over the caps, if any. 
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 Figure 2-2.  The FCC’s Signal-Contour Market Definition (as used from 1992-2004). 
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 approach.  For many decades until 2004, the FCC used a signal-contour method of defining 
local markets. Signal-contour methods are based on the overlapping signal coverage areas of 
radio stations.  In 1992, the FCC codified a particular implementation of this method, which 
is described in Figure 2-2.11 
 
The signal-contour method worked adequately and did not cause alarm—until the local 
ownership cap increased, at which point the signal-contour method became something of a 
loophole.  With higher caps, the signal-contour method became more permissive and allowed 
more consolidation to occur.  The two panels of Figure 2-2 explain how, in some markets, a 
market definition based on signal contours allowed more mergers among radio companies to 
transpire than would have been permissible otherwise. 
 
In September 2004, the FCC switched to Arbitron’s market definition.12  The Arbitron 
market definition is more restrictive when used to apply the Local Radio Ownership Rule—if 
it had been in place since 1992, it would have allowed less ownership consolidation.  The 
change in market definition meant that, suddenly, some radio station owners exceeded the 
local cap in some markets. But rather than making local owners divest stations held in excess 
of the local caps, the FCC grandfathered in the excessive holdings.  
 
Grandfathered In—In Excess of the Cap, That Is 
 
The issue of market definition explains why radio companies in some markets appear to have 
radio-station holdings in violation of the local ownership cap.  For example, when a company 
owns nine stations in a market with a cap of seven stations, the signal-contour market 
definition can often explain the apparent violation. 
 
Because of the FCC’s previous use of signal-contour market definition, some owners now 
exceed the local ownership cap and were grandfathered in when the market definition 
changed in 2004.  Table 2-4 shows how many markets and how many owners are in such a 
situation.13 
 
In 104 markets, or over one-third of all Arbitron markets, a radio company exceeds some 
aspect of the local ownership cap, whether it is the overall cap, the FM cap, or the AM cap.  
Appendix B to this chapter lists the individual Arbitron markets in which at least one entity 
exceeds the cap. 
 
                                                
11 For a helpful overview and explanation, see Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Broadcast Services; 
Radio Stations, Television Stations, 65 Fed. Reg. 82305 ¶¶ 2-4 (Dec. 28, 2000). 
12 Notice of Public Information Collection(s) Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications 
Commission, Comments Requested, 69 Fed. Reg. 78022 (Dec. 29, 2004). 
13 Source data for ownership holdings and market sizes: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA 
Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Table 2-4.  Holdings in Excess of the Local Ownership Cap, by Market Group. 
 
Market 
Group 
Number 
of 
Markets 
in Group 
Markets 
with  
Owner(s) 
Exceeding 
Overall 
Cap 
(# of 
Owners in 
Excess) 
Markets 
with 
Owner(s) 
Exceeding 
FM Cap 
(# of 
Owners in 
Excess) 
Markets 
with 
Owner(s) 
Exceeding 
AM Cap 
(# of 
Owners in 
Excess) 
Markets 
with 
Owner(s) in 
Excess of at 
least One 
Aspect of 
the Cap 
(Overall, 
FM, or AM) 
Percent 
of 
Markets 
in Excess 
1 12 2 (2) 3 (3) 1 (1) 3 25% 
2 13 0 (0) 3 (3) 0 (0) 3 23% 
3 27 5 (5) 9 (13) 1 (1) 11 41% 
4 23 8 (8) 13 (18) 1 (1) 14 61% 
5 38 6 (6) 16 (19) 0 (0) 16 42% 
6 32 11 (13) 14 (22) 0 (0) 17 53% 
7 23 3 (4) 5 (6) 0 (0) 6 26% 
8 39 7 (8) 12 (13) 0 (0) 13 33% 
9 39 7 (7) 9 (9) 0 (0) 11 28% 
10 23 4 (4) 6 (6) 0 (0) 7 30% 
11 23 3 (3) 2 (2) 0 (0) 3 13% 
12 5 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 0% 
TOTAL 297  56 (60) 92 (114) 3 (3) 104 35% 
 
Exceeding the Caps Means Greater Concentration 
 
Using the signal-contour market definition resulted in even higher levels of concentration 
than raising the local caps using Arbitron’s market definition would have allowed.  The 
concentration of ownership, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is 
greater in markets with at least one entity in excess of the cap.  We introduced the HHI in 
Chapter 1 as a tool antitrust authorities use to assess concentration.  It is simply the sum of 
the squared market shares of each company in a market. 
 
Markets with at least one owner in excess of some aspect of the local ownership cap have an 
average listenership-ratings HHI of 2868, compared to an average of 2465 for markets 
without.  HHIs based on stations’ advertising revenue show a similar difference: 3741 for 
markets with an owner in excess of the cap, 3431 for markets without.14 
 
Thus, markets with cap-exceeding owners have HHIs that are 403 points greater (using 
shares of listenership ratings) and 310 points greater (using shares of advertising revenue). 
This shows how important regulatory details like market definition can become. 
                                                
14 Source data for the HHI calculations (Arbitron ratings and revenue estimates): Media Access Pro 
(Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 The Devil Is in the Details 
 
Holdings acquired under the old signal-contour market definition have been grandfathered in.  
Thus, situations in which some entity exceeds the cap are not necessarily illegal.  Such 
situations illustrate, however, that regulatory details can matter quite a bit.  And this 
highlights another problem with the signal-contour market definition, beyond the way it 
exacerbated increasing consolidation. 
 
One reason we’ve waited until the third section of this chapter to explain the issue of market 
definition is the issue’s complexity.  The signal-contour method market definition, in 
particular, is almost hopelessly complicated to analyze, let alone explain.  Signal-contour-
defined markets exist only in the most intangible way.  For example, a station in Waterbury, 
Connecticut could be in hundreds of different markets, depending on how many stations’ 
signals its own signal overlaps.  Arbitron’s method of market definition—assigning each 
station a home in exactly one market—is much more practical and intuitive. 
 
Thinking of markets in terms of the convoluted and multiplicative signal-contour market 
definition is like staring at the radio industry through the looking glass.  Moreover, such a 
lack of clarity makes it difficult for the public to monitor the industry—or the FCC itself, for 
that matter. It was such a big problem, in fact, that the FCC actually had to solve it by 
switching to the Arbitron definition in September 2004.  We can be thankful that the FCC 
saw fit to fix the problem, but we still have to deal with the results from the many years that 
they used the opaque signal-contour market definition. 
 
 
The Largest Owner(s) in Each Local Market Over Time 
 
In this section, we consider how big, in terms of the number of stations owned, the largest 
owner in each local market has become: 
 
• The average number of stations owned by the largest owner in each market has 
increased, from a maximum of two in most markets to a maximum of eleven. 
• This is a result of the increased local ownership cap as well as the signal-contour 
market definition. 
 
The most basic and direct way to measure the effect of the FCC (in 1992) and Congress (in 
1996) having raised the local ownership cap is to count how many stations the largest radio 
company in each local market owns. 
 
Until 1992, the Local Radio Ownership Rule stated that no entity could control more than 
one AM and one FM station in each market—so the largest owner in each market was 
constrained to two stations in total.15  Between 1992 and 1996, radio companies in all but the 
                                                
15 The ownership-history database we have constructed from BIA Financial Networks data shows 
that, in several markets, some entity exceeds the supposed limit of two.  This could be a result of 
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 smallest markets were constrained to owning three or four stations in total.  Statistics on the 
number of stations owned by the largest owner in each market should reflect this change.  
They should also demonstrate the effect of the local-cap increase contained in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
 
Figure 2-3 displays an average, for each market group, of the number of stations owned 
within an Arbitron market by the largest owner in that market.16  Vertical lines denote the 
1992 increase in the caps and the 1996 further increase in the caps.  We have calculated the 
number of stations owned by the largest owner in each individual market.  But we present 
market-group averages because, as we explained in the first section of this chapter, it would 
be impossible to distinguish 297 separate lines packed into a single graph. 
 
Figure 2-3. Number of Stations Owned in a Market by the Largest Owner in a Market, 
1975-2005, Average by Market Group. 
 
 
 
In Figure 2-3, we see the pattern one would expect.  From 1975 to 1992, the largest 
companies in all markets owned only two stations.  Between 1992 and 1996, the largest 
companies grew to an average size of between two and four stations.  After 1996, the 
statistics differ more by market group. 
                                                                                                                                                  
inaccurate or incomplete data on mergers and acquisitions.  It could also simply result from the fact 
that the FCC’s signal-contour markets do not correspond to Arbitron markets. 
16 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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For market groups 1 through 9, those with relatively high local commercial share (LCS), the 
largest owners have, on average, between five and eight stations.  These numbers correspond, 
roughly, to the limits under the current local ownership rule.  The rule currently caps 
ownership on a sliding scale from five to eight, depending on the number of stations in each 
market, for markets with at least 10 stations. 
 
In market groups 10 through 12, those with relatively low LCS, the largest owner in each 
market tended to have between three and four stations during the period from 1996 through 
2005.  Low-LCS markets tend to have relatively fewer stations that are home to them.  Not 
only does this smaller number of stations allow fewer opportunities for mergers, but it also 
brings tougher constraints under the local ownership cap (see Table 2-3 above). 
 
Comparison to the Local Ownership Caps 
 
The number of stations held by the largest owner in each market correlates imperfectly with 
the local ownership cap in those markets.  The correlation is imperfect partly because of the 
complexities of how to define markets described earlier (i.e., the old signal-contour method 
versus the current Arbitron-based method). 
 
Table 2-5.  Current Local Ownership Caps versus Current Largest Owners’ Holdings, 
by Market Group. 
 
Market 
Group 
Average 
Number of 
Stations in 
Market 
(Com/Noncom) 
Average 
Number of 
Stations 
Owned by 
Each Owner 
Average 
Number of 
Stations 
Owned by 
Largest 
Owner 
Average 
Overall 
Local 
Ownership 
Cap 
Difference 
(Largest 
Owner’s 
Stations 
minus Cap) 
1 76 (57/19) 2.3 7.4 8.0 -0.6 
2 52 (41/11) 2.2 7.1 7.8 -0.7 
3 43 (35/8) 2.2 6.8 7.3 -0.5 
4 37 (30/7) 2.6 7.0 7.0 -0.0 
5 30 (25/5) 2.5 6.3 6.6 -0.3 
6 27 (22/5) 2.9 6.5 6.3 +0.2 
7 21 (17/4) 2.5 5.3 6.0 -0.7 
8 19 (15/4) 2.9 5.6 5.9 -0.3 
9 16 (13/3) 2.6 5.3 5.6 -0.3 
10 13 (10/3) 2.1 4.2 4.7 -0.5 
11 15 (11/4) 1.8 3.7 5.3 -1.6 
12 22 (15/7) 1.9 4.2 5.8 -1.6 
ALL  28 (22/6) 2.5 5.8 6.2 -0.4 
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 Table 2-5 shows how the number of stations owned by the largest owner compares to the 
number of stations in each market, the number of stations owned by the average owner (as 
opposed to the largest owner), and the local ownership cap.17  Even on average, the largest 
owners in the markets categorized as market group 6 exceed the local ownership cap.   
 
This section has shown that the largest owner in each market now has more stations than the 
largest owner did before the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  This is the most direct and 
straightforward result of raising the local ownership cap.  The largest owners in each local 
market became much larger.  Less straightforward, but also important to remember, is that 
some markets experienced even greater consolidation because of the FCC’s old signal-
contour market definition, as the previous section explained. 
 
 
Local Concentration 
 
This section discusses measures of economic concentration within local markets: 
 
• Concentration of ownership in the vast majority of local markets, as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), has increased dramatically, often well beyond 
levels that the Department of Justice would consider to be cause for concern. 
• Local HHIs based on listenership ratings now range from 1396 to 3634 across the 
twelve market groups, where figures greater than 1800 are considered a “danger 
zone” for excessive concentration. 
• Local HHIs based on advertising revenue shares now range from 1646 to 5533 across 
market groups, with most exceeding the threshold of 1800. 
 
Concentration of local market shares is probably an even better measure of the concentration 
of economic and social power than the number of stations owned by the largest owner in 
each market.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), or the sum of squared market shares, 
provides a specific measure of concentration. 
 
If harms to consumers from reduced competition are the fire, then antitrust authorities use 
HHI as one way to measure how thick the smoke is.  Under the Department of Justice’s and 
Federal Trade Commission’s merger guidelines, an HHI of 1000 or more presents some 
cause for concern about future mergers, while an HHI of 1800 presents an even greater cause 
for concern.  When the flames of anti-competitive practices are severe enough, an HHI of 
1800 or more sets off the alarms.  High HHI numbers represent a danger zone for excessive 
concentration. 
 
                                                
17 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 2-4 shows HHIs based on local Arbitron listenership ratings over the last ten years, 
broken down by market group.18  In Spring 1996, average HHIs in the market groups ranged 
from 616 (Group 12) to 2214 (Group 8).  By Spring 2005, the average HHIs ranged from 
1396 (Group 12) to 3634 (Group 8).  The listenership ratings HHIs in each market group 
demonstrate a steady increase in concentration within local markets over the past decade. 
 
Figure 2-4.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Local Market Concentration of 
Listenership Ratings, 1996-2005, Average by Market Group. 
 
 
 
Most local markets’ ratings-based HHIs were already high to begin with.  The merger 
guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
view HHIs between 1000 and 1800 as somewhat troublesome and HHIs above 1800 as very 
troublesome.19  Out of 297 Arbitron markets, 232 had HHIs greater than 1800 in Spring 
2005.  Sixty-three more had HHIs between 1000 and 1800.  (For the other two markets, no 
HHI measure was available.)  In sum, the majority of local radio markets have levels of 
concentration that ordinarily give rise to antitrust concerns about excessive market power. 
 
                                                
18 Source data for the HHI calculations based on Arbitron ratings: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), 
BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
19 Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (March 2006), p. 20. 
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 Local HHIs Based on Revenue 
 
An alternative measure of concentration is to calculate HHIs based on market shares of 
advertising revenue.  Figure 2-5 displays these HHIs over a slightly different time period, 
1993 to 2004.20  This time frame has the advantage of providing data from before the 
Telecom Act. 
 
Figure 2-5. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for Local Market Concentration of 
Station Revenue, 1993-2004, Average by Market Group. 
 
 
 
The HHIs based on revenue and shown in Figure 2-5 are much higher and more volatile.  
They also demonstrate an upward trend, moving from a range of 840 (Group 1) to 5017 
(Group 10) in 1993 to a range of 1646 (Group 12) to 5533 (Group 10) in 2004.   
 
Not surprisingly, local radio fares even worse under the FTC/DOJ merger guidelines using 
revenue-based HHIs than using ratings-based HHIs.  Of the 297 Arbitron markets, 281 had a 
revenue-based HHI greater than 1800 in 2004.  Another 14 markets—mostly very large 
markets from market group 1—had HHIs between 1000 and 1800.  (Once again, HHIs for 
two markets were not available.) 
                                                
20 Source data for the HHI calculations based on BIA station-level revenue estimates: Media Access 
Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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Appendices C and D reports the HHIs, as well as the two- and four-firm concentration ratios 
(the summed market shares of either two or four firms), for each Arbitron market, using 
ratings-based (Appendix C) and revenue-based concentration measures (Appendix D). 
 
Concentration Well Beyond the Danger Zone 
 
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission use HHI statistics as a 
“ ‘starting point’ for analysis,” according to the 2006 revisions to their merger guidelines.21 
Even previous to the recent revisions, it was clear that the last decade’s radio mergers were 
highly questionable.  Whether the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are 
moving away from the HHI measure, which has been in usage since the 1980s, is a separate 
issue. 
 
Besides, even the recent revisions would suggest the need for concern about competition in 
local radio markets.  In the revised guidelines, high HHIs do not necessarily lead to antitrust 
action, just as low HHIs do not necessarily lead to inaction by the antitrust authorities.  But 
the HHIs in local radio are well beyond the ranges contemplated in the merger guidelines.  
For most local radio markets, concentration has gone well past the threshold of 1800 HHI 
into the danger zone of 3000, 4000, 5000, and even greater HHIs.  The mergers that Congress 
has allowed in radio have greatly reduced competition, and should certainly have been 
scrutinized more fully, based on any version of the merger guidelines. 
 
The substantially and increasingly high HHIs of local radio markets cast doubt on the 
wisdom of raising the caps in 1996.  The potential harms to the public from such high 
concentration include reduced programming quality, reduced diversity of programming, or 
higher prices for consumer goods (an indirect effect of higher radio-advertising prices). 
 
But the harms from concentration are not limited to such indirect effects on programming 
and prices.  Consolidated control of the radio industry may also have facilitated the recent 
scandal over payola-like practices.  Having fewer players in an industry may have made it 
easier to develop and enforce the rules of illicit schemes to funnel pay-for-play money from 
record labels through independent promoters to radio companies. 
 
 
Justifying the Local Ownership Cap—Or an Even Lower Cap 
 
This section provides two methods of justification for a numeric local ownership cap.  Both 
of these are algorithms for calculating a numeric cap to prevent HHIs above 1800: 
 
• Method #1 for justifying the numeric caps implies that the overall local ownership 
cap should sit between two and five in all but the largest markets, population-wise 
(that is, in all market groups except 1, 2, and 12). 
                                                
21 Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (March 2006), p. 20. 
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 • Method #2 for justifying the numeric caps implies that the overall local ownership 
cap should sit between two and four in all but the most populated markets. 
• Even the largest markets—the thirty markets in market groups 1, 2, and 12—require 
caps between five and eight, which correspond to the current caps in some of those 
markets and even lower caps in others. 
 
Some radio companies and some regulators have challenged and will continue to challenge 
the logic of the local ownership cap in court.  But the analysis of the previous section shows 
that raising the local ownership cap has caused a sharp increase in both ratings and revenue 
concentration within local markets.  Such an increase creates conditions in which radio might 
serve the public less satisfactorily by reducing choice of programming offerings, reducing 
quality of programming, or indirectly inflating prices for goods or services whose sellers 
advertise on radio.  Based on the concerns associated with high HHIs, and the recent, large 
increases in local radio HHIs, one might conclude that lower caps would be preferable to 
higher caps. 
 
Method #1: Preventing Concentration Resulting from One Large Owner 
 
To maintain the current local ownership caps in the face of court challenges, or to implement 
lower caps, the FCC must provide a justification.  This section provides a pair of justification 
methods that connect numeric caps (i.e., one entity may not own more than X stations in a 
market) to measures of concentration.  The first method, described in this sub-section, 
involves determining what local cap is necessary to prevent one large owner from obtaining 
overly concentrated control. 
 
First, we take the current distribution of ratings among stations in each local market as given.  
Accepting this distribution as given just means accepting the idea that some stations will 
always be more popular than others, perhaps because they have higher-wattage antennae or 
particularly loyal audiences.  (The alternative would be to treat all stations as equal, which 
has ridiculous implications like treating the 50,000-watt WABC station in New York City as 
equivalent to the 1,250-watt WFMU in East Orange, New Jersey.) 
 
Next, we suppose that each station in each market had a distinct owner.  Then, in each 
market, we imagine a hypothetical radio company.  This company buys the highest-rated 
station, then the next-higher-rated station, and so on.  What local ownership cap is necessary 
to keep the local HHI below the danger zone of 1800 and above? 
 
For example, consider a hypothetical market with 31 stations in which one station gets 10 
percent of the ratings, fifteen stations get 5 percent each, and fifteen stations get 1 percent 
each.  The hypothetical largest owner buys the 10 percent station first.  All the other stations 
are independently owned.  With a cap of one, the HHI would be 490 [or 102 + 15(52) + 
15(12)]. 
 
With a cap of two, the hypothetical largest owner can buy another station, one of the 5-
percent-rated stations.  Now the HHI becomes 590 [or 152 + 14(52) + 15(12)].  With a cap of 
three, the HHI becomes 740 [or 202 + 13(52) + 15(12)]. 
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This process continues until the cap hits seven, when the hypothetical largest owner has 40 
percent market share (it would own the 10-percent-rated station and six five-percent-rated 
stations). At that point, the HHI reaches 1840 [or 402 + 9(52) + 15(12)].  So a cap of seven 
would be too high to keep this local market’s HHI below 1800.  This implies that a cap of six 
is needed. 
 
The advantage of method #1 is its conservatism in one respect.  Except for the holdings of 
the hypothetical largest owner, this method assumes that every other station is independently 
owned.  In reality, a second owner might consolidate ownership among those stations, 
increasing the local HHI.  On the other hand, this method assumes that a large owner can 
cherry-pick the highest-rated stations.  In this sense, the method of justifying the local 
ownership cap provides a prophylactic rule against a worst-case scenario. 
 
Table 2-6 shows the results of such an inquiry, and the local ownership cap that is implied by 
that procedure.22 
 
Table 2-6.  Justifying a Numeric Local Ownership Cap, Method #1. 
 
Market 
Group 
Average Implied Local 
Ownership Cap 
Based on Method #1 
Average Actual 
Local Ownership 
Cap 
Difference 
(Implied – Actual) 
1 6.7 8.0 -1.3 
2 5.2 7.8 -2.4 
3 4.2 7.3 -3.1 
4 3.9 7.0 -3.1 
5 3.5 6.6 -3.1 
6 2.8 6.3 -3.5 
7 3.1 6.0 -2.9 
8 1.9 5.9 -4.0 
9 2.6 5.6 -3.0 
10 3.3 4.7 -1.4 
11 4.3 5.3 -1.0 
12 7.6 5.8 +1.8 
 
In market groups 1 through 11, the average implied ownership cap is lower than the average 
actual ownership cap.  In some market groups, the average implied cap is as many as 3 or 4 
stations lower. 
 
Only in the odd market group 12—which contains only five Arbitron markets—is the 
implied cap higher than the actual cap.  In these markets, LCS is very low, meaning that most 
of their listeners tune in to stations that are not home to that market.  This means that 
ownership of the home-market stations provides less leverage in increasing or reducing HHI.  
                                                
22 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 This explains why market group 12 is an anomaly.  The bottom line for the other 292 
Arbitron markets is that the current local ownership caps are too high to maintain an HHI of 
1800. 
 
Table 2-6 shows that, using method #1 which takes the current distribution of listener ratings 
among stations as given, lower local ownership caps are justified to ensure that local HHIs 
stay below 1800.  
 
Method #2: Divesting the Lowest-Rated Stations to Reduce the Local HHI 
 
Our second approach to justifying a numeric local ownership cap involves something of the 
opposite procedure: asking how many fewer stations the largest local radio entities would 
have to own in order to bring HHIs back out of the danger zone.  Method #2 is based on the 
idea of keeping market concentration below the danger zone marked by an HHI of 1800. 
 
For this method, we start by taking both the current distribution of stations’ ratings and the 
current ownership of stations as given.  From there, we calculate what each market’s HHI 
would be if successively lower ownership caps were enforced, until the HHI is below 1800. 
 
For example, consider a hypothetical market in which one owner has six stations, one owner 
has five stations, and one owner has four stations.  Suppose the HHI currently exceeds 1800. 
We would first calculate the HHI under a local ownership cap of five stations.  Thus, we 
imagine that the owner with six stations has to divest one station to an independent owner.  
The HHI would be recalculated.  If the HHI no longer exceeds 1800, then we stop, 
considering the implied cap (the necessary cap to reduce the HHI below the danger zone of 
1800 and above) to be five.   
 
If the HHI still exceeded 1800, we do the process again with the hypothetical cap reduced by 
one, from five to four.  Under a cap of four, the owner that originally had six stations would 
be imagined to divest two stations now, each to independent owners.  In addition, the owner 
that originally had five stations would now have to divest one station, to yet another 
independent owner.  We would recalculate the HHI.  If it fell below 1800, then the implied 
cap would be four.  If not, we would do the process again with a cap of three, and so on. 
 
Method #2 requires us to treating markets with HHIs that are already below 1800 in a 
different way.  For these markets, we simply take the number of stations owned by the largest 
owner as a hypothetical cap, and add one. 
 
Why do we add one, not more, not less?  This reflects the result of a thought experiment in 
which the largest owner(s) could add one more station, and all other owners could engage in 
mergers and acquisitions until they own as many stations as the largest owner would.  We 
imagine that these mergers increase the HHI as much as possible, since the goal of this 
justification exercise is to calculate a cap that prevents an HHI over 1800.  As it happens, 
such hypothetical merger activity would push the HHIs in all of these markets up to the brink 
of 1800, if not over 1800. 
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 Finally, to calculate the overall average implied cap for each market group, one simply 
averages the two kinds of implied caps (for markets over 1800 and for markets under 1800) 
across all markets.  Table 2-7 reports the results for each market group, breaking out the 
calculations for the markets within each group with HHIs over and under 1800, and reporting 
the overall average implied cap in the right-most column.23 
 
Table 2-7.  Justifying a Numeric Local Ownership Cap, Method #2. 
 
HHI ≥ 1800 HHI < 1800 
Market 
Group 
 
Number 
of 
Markets 
Average Cap 
Needed to 
Bring HHI 
Below 1800 
Number 
of 
Markets 
Average 
Number of 
Stations 
Owned by 
Largest Owner 
Overall Average 
Implied Local 
Ownership Cap 
Based on Method #2 
1 1 5.0 11 7.5 8.2 
2 9 4.0 4 6.8 5.2 
3 23 3.1 4 6.0 3.7 
4 20 2.9 3 5.0 3.3 
5 34 2.5 4 6.3 3.0 
6 30 2.3 2 6.5 2.7 
7 19 2.2 4 4.8 2.8 
8 38 1.6 1 4.0 1.7 
9 30 1.5 9 5.3 2.6 
10 14 1.1 9 4.1 2.7 
11 14 0.9 9 3.3 2.3 
12 0 n/a 5 4.2 5.2 
 
The average caps implied in Table 2-7 are lower that the actual averages of the local 
ownership caps in every market group except market group 1.  (For comparison, you can 
refer back to the average actual caps reported in Table 2-5.)  Even for market group 1, the 
caps implied by method #2 are only slightly greater than the actual caps.  Therefore, method 
#2 can justify numeric local ownership caps lower than the existing caps in every Arbitron 
market except the 12 members of market group 1, i.e. the 12 very largest Arbitron markets. 
 
Whether one prefers method #1 or method #2, the end conclusion is the same.  Numeric caps 
at the current level or even lower levels are needed to protect the public, the small-business 
community, and the political sphere against excessive market concentration.  These numeric 
caps are easy for Congress and the FCC to promulgate and enforce and easy for the public to 
understand.  For all these reasons, the current Local Radio Ownership Rule—or a Rule with 
even more stringent numeric caps—is justified. 
 
                                                
23 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 The Local Ownership Index: A Proposed Metric 
Capturing One Aspect of Localism 
 
Ownership of local radio has become more nationalized over the past decade.  This section 
introduces an index created by Future of Music Coalition for measuring the level of local 
ownership in local markets over time: 
 
• Future of Music Coalition’s Local Ownership Index is constructed by averaging the 
localness of each station’s owner in a local market, where localness is measured as 
one minus the fractional geographic reach of each owner. 
• In 1995, the average index was 97.1 across the 297 Arbitron markets, but by 2005 the 
average index was 69.9, representing a 28 percent drop in local ownership in just ten 
years. 
• The average Local Ownership Index across market groups has declined from its 1995 
range of 93 to 99 to a range in 2005 of 64 to 82. 
• Restoring the Local Ownership Index to even 90 percent of its 1995 levels would, in 
most markets, require licensing dozens of new full-power and low-power stations, as 
well as re-allocating digital audio broadcast spectrum, to new, completely local 
entities. 
 
So far, this chapter has focused on competition within local markets—the concentration of 
listenership ratings or advertising revenue.  But the FCC has two other important policy goals 
to pursue, namely diversity and localism.  In this section, we focus on localism, and 
introduce a method we created to measure one particular aspect of localism.  The Local 
Ownership Index we introduce here measures the geographic footprint of radio companies—
and tracks the recent shift from local to national control. 
 
Local Ownership as One Component of Localism 
 
As explained in the introduction to this chapter, localism means serving the interests of a 
local community as separate and distinct from that community’s identity as part of the nation 
or the world.  It pertains to where programming is produced, who produces it, and whether 
that programming meets local communities’ and local residents’ needs. 
 
Many factors, most of them qualitative rather than quantitative, constitute this notion of 
localism.  With this section we do not mean to underemphasize or overshadow the qualitative 
aspects of localism, such broadcasters having in-depth knowledge of local government or 
showcasing the music local bands on the air.  But we believe that at least one aspect of 
localism is quantitative: local ownership. 
 
Statistics about whether owners of radio stations are locally based, as opposed to being 
spread out regionally or nationally, are relevant if one subscribes to a theory that local 
ownership should be favored.  Assume, for the sake of argument, that local owners and 
employees do the best job of assessing local preferences and needs and providing the 
appropriate programming to meet those preferences and needs.  Under this theory, a locally 
owned company with locally based employees would be most preferable.  Next would be a 
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 nationally owned company with local program directors, local DJs, and a local office.  Least 
preferable would be nationally owned station without a local office.  The local ownership 
index shows that, if such a theory is correct, we are not getting the most preferable kind of 
ownership of our radio station.  Our Local Ownership Index measures how close a local 
market comes to the most preferable version of localism. 
 
Even if one disagrees with the above theory, the Local Ownership Index still has value as a 
measure of radio’s nationalization.  The lower the index, the more nationalized the local 
market.  In this way, the Local Ownership Index takes the national-market concerns of 
Chapter 1 and connects them to the local markets we have discussed here in Chapter 2.  If 
nationalization threatens competition, diversity, or localism in local markets, then the Local 
Ownership Index provides a useful measure to document the threat. 
 
Localness as the Opposite of Geographic Reach 
 
We define local ownership by using a measure we introduced in Chapter 1, geographic 
reach.  This measure applies to owners of radio stations and is calculated nationwide.  The 
geographic reach of an entity (whether a company, organization, or individual) is the number 
of states, markets, counties, or cities in which that entity owns stations.  The smaller the 
geographic reach, the more local a radio company is.  The most local a company can be is to 
own stations in only one state, one market, one county, and one city.  On the opposite end of 
the spectrum, a company might span dozens of states or hundreds of markets. 
 
We can express geographic reach as a fraction.  As of 2005, there were 51 states (including 
the District of Columbia), 297 markets, 1,632 counties, and 4,664 cities in which radio 
stations have their broadcast towers.24  So the fractional geographic reach across markets, 
for instance, would be the number of markets in which a company has stations, minus one, 
divided by the total number of markets in which there are radio stations (or 297) minus one.25  
To take a concrete example, Radio One has stations in 22 Arbitron markets.  So its fractional 
geographic reach is 22 minus 1 divided by 297 minus 1, that is, 21 divided by 296, or 0.07.  
This measures Radio One’s reach beyond a single locality. 
 
We turn fractional geographic reach around, subtracting it from one, to measure localness.  
For Radio One, this figure across markets would be one minus its fractional geographic 
reach: 1 minus 0.07, or 0.93.  For a one-station entity—which can only inhabit one city, 
county, market, and state—this measure of localness would equal 1.  For a hypothetical 
entity that spanned, say, every state in the U.S., this figure would be 0 when measuring 
localness with respect to states. 
                                                
24 The number of counties and cities in which radio stations have towers has increased between 1975 
and 2005.  Calculations of the Local Ownership Index over time take these increases into account. 
25 Why subtract one from both the numerator and denominator?  This makes the fractional geographic 
reach equal to zero when an entity exists in only one state, one market, one county, or one city.  Every 
entity with a radio station must have radio stations in at least one state, one market, one county or one 
city, so it makes sense to set the fractional geographic reach equal to zero (and thus the localness 
measure to one) for the most local station owner possible. 
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 Constructing the Local Ownership Index 
 
From this measure of localness, we created a measure of local ownership that applies to 
markets.  The Local Ownership Index is based on averaging the localness (that is, one minus 
the fractional geographic reach) of the owners of each station within an Arbitron market.  
 
The measure of localness we employ is very close to one for all but the very largest 
companies.  For one example, notice that Radio One’s localness measure with respect to 
states is 0.93, despite the fact that Radio One is among the fifteen largest radio companies in 
the U.S.  For another, consider that Clear Channel’s localness measure with respect to cities 
is 0.87, since Clear Channel has stations in 634 cities. 
 
To make the index more useful, and to better highlight the differences between markets with 
more and less local owners, each localness index is equal to the number 100 raised to the 
power equal to the average localness in a particular market with respect to some geographical 
measure (whether states, markets, counties, or cities).  With this mathematical 
transformation, we create a localness index that falls anywhere between 1 and 100, with 100 
representing the most local ownership possible.  We use four geographical measures (states, 
markets, counties, and cities), calculate a localness index for each, and average them to get 
the composite Local Ownership Index.   
 
Usually the four different measures of localness corresponding to the four geographical 
measures are highly correlated.  But we average all four measures to differentiate between 
regional companies (which would span many cities but not many states) from truly national 
companies (which would span many cities and states). 
 
Changes in the Local Ownership Index Over Time 
 
Figure 2-6 displays the average Local Ownership Index within each of the 12 market groups, 
from 1975 to 2005.26  Vertical lines denote both the 1992 increase in the local ownership 
caps and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  In the legend for Figure 2-6, the market 
groups are listed in descending order of the 2005 average Local Ownership Index. 
 
The average index in each market group stayed basically the same—at levels between 93 and 
99—from 1975 through 1996.  After that, the Local Ownership Index has declined 
significantly in most markets.  As Figure 2-6 illustrates graphically, in Fall 1995, the market 
group averages for the Local Ownership index ranged from 93.29 (group 1) to 98.57 (group 
9).  By 2005, the market group averages ranged from 64.78 (group 4) to 81.03 (group 12).  
The vast majority of markets have experienced a decline in local ownership, as one would 
have expected. 
                                                
26 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 2-6.  Local Ownership Index, 1975-2005, Average by Market Group. 
 
 
 
As Figure 2-6 shows, the Telecom Act had a larger effect on the Local Ownership Index than 
the 1992 increase in the local caps.  Both the elimination of the national ownership cap and 
the further increase in the local ownership caps—changes that came together in the 1996 
Telecom Act—caused the decline in the Local Ownership Index.  Removing the national cap 
allowed radio companies to spread out nationwide, while relaxing the local caps allowed the 
new national radio companies to purchase a greater share of the stations in each local market.  
 
There is not a clear correlation between the population of a market and its Local Ownership 
Index.  The large markets of group 2 and the small markets of group 8 each have some of the 
lowest levels of the Local Ownership Index. 
 
There is, however, some relationship between the local commercial share (LCS) in a market 
and its Local Ownership Index.  Recall the example of Nassau-Suffolk as a low-LCS market 
earlier in the chapter.  Market groups 10, 11, and 12, which each contain Arbitron markets 
with low LCS, have some of the higher figures for the Local Ownership Index.  Thus, the 
stations which are home to these low-LCS markets tend to be locally owned.  One might 
explain this by saying that the large, geographically spread-out companies can obtain 
profitable market shares in these low-LCS markets with stations from nearby markets and 
without stations that are home to those markets. 
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 The Local Ownership Index varies considerably across individual markets, but one can still 
see a downward trend among them.  In Fall 1995, the index ranged from a low of 89.86 (in 
Battle Creek, MI) to a high of 99.99 (in four different markets).  In Fall 2005, the index 
ranged from a low of 28.42 (in Sussex, NJ) to a high of 99.88 (in Sebring, FL). 
 
Interpreting the Local Ownership Index: Some Hypotheticals 
 
The Local Ownership Index we have constructed has a scale from 1 to 100.  But all the actual 
measured values for the Local Ownership Index (for the years 1975 to 2005) fall between 27 
and 100, and most values fall between 50 and 100.  This is because low values of the index 
correspond to extremely high levels of ownership consolidation.  For instance, a value of 1 
represents an extreme in which every station in the market is owned by a company that owns 
station in every single state, market, county, and city—such a situation is implausible, 
especially with a local ownership cap in place. 
 
A value of 10 represents a market in which the average station is owned by a company that 
owns stations in half the states (26), half the markets (148), half the counties (817), and half 
the cities (2,348).  This is also implausible under the current conditions in the radio industry, 
considering that the largest company, Clear Channel, has stations in 634 cities, not 2,348. 
 
A value of 50 represents a market in which the average station is owned by a company that 
owns stations in 9 states, 46 markets, 247 counties, and 708 cities.  This kind of figure 
actually occurs in many markets, especially those in which Clear Channel has a large 
presence.  In those markets in which Clear Channel is particularly dominant, or splits the 
bulk market with one other national radio company, the values of the Local Ownership Index 
can get even lower than 50. 
 
 
Restoring Localism: A Policy Proposal 
 
We have shown that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had a drastic impact on local 
ownership and thus, on one aspect of localism.  Congress and the FCC could reverse this 
trend of declining local ownership in radio in three ways: 
 
1. Change the licensing process such that new licenses go to entirely local entities and 
may only be transferred to entirely local entities 
2. Use the digital audio broadcast (DAB) transition as occasion to reallocate spectrum to 
entirely local entities 
3. License more low-power radio stations 
 
Licensing of Full-Power Stations 
 
First, the FCC could change the licensing process such that new licenses in each local market 
with an excessively low Local Ownership Index go to entirely local entities.  “Excessively 
low” could mean a value for the index of less than 80 or less than 90, which today would 
include 217 or 243, respectively, of the 297 local markets.  “Entirely local” or “completely 
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 local” just means that the owner’s geographic reach extends only to one state, one market, 
one county, and one city.  These new licenses, once issued, would only be transferable to 
another entirely local entity. 
 
The Digital Transition 
 
Second, Congress or the FCC could re-allocate existing radio spectrum to entirely local 
entities.  With the new technology of digital audio broadcast (DAB), the spectrum it takes to 
broadcast one stream of programming will now support three to five streams of 
programming.  Right now, radio companies assume that they will retain their current 
spectrum and obtain this increase in capacity without being obligated to make additional 
compensation or to meet additional public interest obligations, something that FMC and 
many other public interest and media groups have urged the FCC to establish.  But instead of 
letting existing owners of radio stations have this advantage, the FCC could take some of it 
back—especially in markets with excessively low Local Ownership Indexes.  Once the 
transition to DAB was made, local ownership would increase. 
 
Low-Power FM Licensing 
 
Third, Congress or the FCC could allow more low-power radio stations to be licensed, 
especially in more populated areas.  Schools, church groups, union locals, and other 
organizations could benefit from these small-broadcast-radius stations.  Unfortunately, fewer 
than 1000 low-power stations have been licensed to date nationwide—about three per 
Arbitron market.  Three wholly local low-power stations only mitigate the decline in local 
ownership, as measured by the Local Ownership Index, a tiny amount.  Significant increases 
in low-power licenses would be necessary to reverse the trend of the past decade. 
 
Table 2-8: New, Completely Local Stations Needed to Restore the Local Ownership 
Index to 90 Percent of Its 1995 Level, by Market Group. 
 
Market 
Group 
Average Current 
Number of 
Stations 
Average Number of ADDITIONAL, Fully 
Local Stations Needed to Reach 90 
Percent of 1995 Local Ownership Index 
1 76 91 
2 52 94 
3 43 82 
4 37 94 
5 30 66 
6 27 65 
7 21 50 
8 19 66 
9 16 30 
10 13 32 
11 15 38 
12 22 26 
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 Big Changes are Needed to Restore Local Ownership of Radio 
 
Table 2-8 shows that, in many markets, dozens of additional, locally owned stations would 
be needed to restore the Local Ownership Index to even 90 percent of where it stood in 
1995.27  But, as we have explained in this section, Congress and the FCC have three viable 
methods at their disposal to increase localism in local markets: new full-power licenses, 
reallocation of spectrum in light of the DAB transition, and new low-power licenses. 
 
Appendix E reports the Local Ownership Index for each Arbitron market in 1975, 1985, 
1995, and 2005, as well as the number of new, completely local stations needed to restore the 
index to 90 percent of its 1995 level. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Local radio has been transformed by the twin trends of consolidation and nationalization over 
the past decade.  Regulatory changes by the FCC in 1992 and more dramatic changes by 
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 increased the overall local ownership cap, 
unleashing both trends.  Making things worse, the FCC’s method of market definition 
allowed even greater consolidation in over one hundred local markets. 
 
Potential problems associated with highly concentrated market share—higher prices for any 
goods advertised on radio, lower quality of programming, reduced variety of programming, 
and even the facilitation of payola-like practices—suggest that the FCC should aim to reduce 
concentration in local markets.  Keeping the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index below the danger 
zone of 1800 or above should be a target for the FCC. In pursuit of that goal, numeric caps 
even lower than the existing caps would be justified. This would advance all three of the 
policy goals that Congress has mandated for the FCC: competition, diversity, and localism. 
 
Raising the local caps also led to a historic nationalization of ownership in radio, especially 
because raising the local caps was combined in the Telecom Act with eliminating the 
national ownership cap.  But technological advances like digital audio broadcast could allow 
more licensees to use the radio spectrum.  This gives Congress and the FCC an opportunity 
to reverse, at least in part, increasing consolidation and decreasingly local ownership.  An 
influx of new, completely local owners would ameliorate both the dangers of consolidation 
and the harms that might accompany radio companies’ geographic expansion far beyond the 
local communities they are required to serve. 
 
                                                
27 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
81
  
  
Chapter 3 
Programming 
 
 
he recent, drastic consolidation of radio ownership documented in Chapters 1 and 2 
raises concerns in its own right.  Power of the media can translate into political, 
economic, and social power.  Concentrating that power in the hands of relatively few 
companies, organizations, and individuals—entities that are increasingly national, not local—
goes against the FCC's directives to promote competition and localism.   But what about the 
FCC's third policy goal of promoting diversity? 
 
Addressing diversity requires us to examine the programming that radio stations broadcast.  
In studying programming, we experience the constraints of the data available to us.  A 
comprehensive historical database extending to the period before the watershed 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 does not exist.  Much worse, the data available are 
relatively broad-brush.  In general, the data available for purchase at an affordable price and 
the data we can collect ourselves do not feature the detail to pinpoint individual syndicated 
programs or individual songs. 
 
Instead, we rely largely on data about programming formats.  A format is a kind of brand 
name that tells listeners about the programming they will hear on a station, whether that 
means songs from a particular musical genre, local news stories, information in a foreign 
language, or professional sporting events.  Formats give us some useful information but are 
not the whole picture.  Thus, we also look at the charted playlists of some music-radio 
stations. 
 
Even with perfect data, diversity is a difficult concept to measure, and the FCC has 
understandably had trouble proposing a quantitative measure for diversity.  Diversity can 
refer to anything from diversity of political viewpoints to ethnic diversity, or from 
programming-format variety to ownership variety.  Part of this chapter will discuss format 
variety as one way to measure diversity.  But one must acknowledge, as we emphasized in 
our 2002 report, the difference between variety and diversity.  Diversity is a more robust but 
more difficult concept to quantify. 
 
This chapter will use a range of perspectives to study radio programming and what it means 
for programming diversity in the wake of the recent wave of consolidation.  It will show: 
 
• Homogenized Programming: Just fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial 
programming. 
• Large Station Groups Program Narrowly: Owners who exceed or exactly meet the 
local ownership cap tend to program heavily in just eight formats. 
T 
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 • Only Small Station Groups Offer Niche Formats: Niche musical formats like 
Classical, Jazz, Americana, Bluegrass, New Rock, and Folk, where they exist, are 
provided almost exclusively by smaller station groups. 
• Small Station Groups Sustain Public-Interest Programming: Children’s 
programming, religious programming, foreign-language and ethnic-community 
programming, are also predominantly provided by smaller station groups. 
• Format Overlap Remains Extensive: Radio formats with different names can 
overlap up to 80% in terms of the songs played on them. 
• Individual Stations Use Highly Similar Playlists: Playlists for commonly owned 
stations in the same format can overlap up to 97%. 
• Network Ownership Is Also Concentrated: The three largest radio companies in 
terms of station ownership are also the three largest companies in terms of 
programming-network ownership. 
 
 
About Programming Formats 
 
In this section, we introduce the subject of programming formats by: 
 
• Explaining what programming formats are and provide some examples 
• Detailing how information about programming formats is collected 
• Describing our approach to interpreting the available programming-format data. 
 
It is easiest to explain radio programming formats by naming a few: Country, Sports, Adult 
Contemporary, Smooth Jazz, News, Rock, Classical, and so on.  Musical radio formats 
developed as a way to signal to listeners that they could expect to hear songs from particular 
artists or from particular musical genres.  Other formats developed in an analogous way to 
describe the programming one might hear; for example, a station branding itself with the 
Talk format would signal to listeners that they could expect to disk jockeys talking, 
interviewing guests, and taking listeners' calls, with only the occasional song thrown in. 
 
Some people might not find a format label like Alternative to be meaningful.  So-called 
alternative music has definitely shifted and evolved over the years, especially in terms of 
radio stations’ playlists.  But a programming format name like Alternative remains usefully 
descriptive to some extent.  If it were not, stations would not advertise themselves with their 
format names, with slogans like “the new rock Alternative” or “today’s Top 40.” 
 
How Data on Formats Are Collected 
 
The data we use to measure programming formats come from an industry consulting firm 
called BIA Financial Networks (BIA).  BIA surveys radio stations on a regular basis and asks 
them to describe their programming format.  They have electronic data on formats going 
back to Spring 1996, just after the Telecommunications Act was passed.  (Unfortunately, no 
data from prior to that date are available in electronic form from BIA or anyone else, to our 
knowledge.) 
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 There are approximately 120 different names for programming formats that appear at some 
point in BIA’s data for 1996 through 2005.1  Some formats are very prevalent (like News), 
and some very rare (like Folk).  A small number of new formats have appeared over this time 
period, like “Jack,” a format largely featuring songs from the same musical genre as the 
Classic Rock format does, but with a longer playlist.  An even smaller number of formats 
disappeared over time.  Sometimes a format disappears just because a new name for the 
format becomes popular—as when Black Adult Contemporary became Urban Adult 
Contemporary. 
 
When BIA collects data about a station’s format, the station provides a primary format, a 
secondary format, and a tertiary format.2  This often reflects the fact that radio stations can 
offer different kinds of programming during different parts of the week or different times of 
day.  For example, a station might offer Classical in the morning, Jazz at the noon hour, and 
Rock in the afternoon and evening.  This station’s format might be captured as 
“Rock/Classical/Jazz,” demonstrating the relative prevalence of each kind of programming 
for that particular station.  On the other hand, if another station played country music all day, 
then BIA would designate its format as “Country” with no secondary or tertiary formats 
indicated. 
 
Increasing Sophistication of the Data 
 
Over time, as BIA has grown as a company, expanded its staff, and developed data-collecting 
expertise, it has been able to collect more detailed data.  In the format data for 1996, most 
stations just had a primary format—no secondary or tertiary format.  But in the format data 
for 2005, many more stations had primary, secondary, and tertiary formats listed in BIA’s 
database.   
 
One can see the increasing sophistication of BIA’s data in the rapidly increasing number of 
primary-secondary-tertiary format combinations.  In Spring 1996, there were 282 different 
combinations for the commercial stations in BIA’s database.  By Spring 2005, there were 763 
such combinations for commercial stations.3 
 
This growth in the number of primary-secondary-tertiary format combinations is too large to 
be believed as a true measure.  In other words, it is unlikely that radio stations were 2.7 times 
more likely to split their programming week or day into multiple parts.  Nor is this 170 
percent growth explained by the growth in the number of licensed commercial stations, 
which is only 9 percent over that period.  It is much more likely that BIA has simply 
collected increasingly detailed format data over the period from 1996 to 2005. 
 
The radio industry’s deeply flawed method of measurement counts every unique combination 
of primary-secondary-tertiary as a unique format.  But this method implicitly asserts that the 
industry has developed almost five hundred new programming formats over the last decade.  
                                                
1 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
2 See any recent edition of Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks. 
3 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Our more accurate method of measuring format variety acknowledges that most of the new 
format names actually involve a recombination of old format names. 
 
For example, the radio industry and its consultants would like to give themselves credit for 
increasing innovation.  When they count up how many programming formats are available in 
a market, for instance, they count: 
 
 Rock/Classical/Jazz 
 Rock/Jazz/Classical 
 
as two completely different formats. 
 
We argue that this produces misleading results.  If a market already has a 
Rock/Classical/Jazz station, then adding a Rock/Jazz/Classical station does not add as much 
variety—let alone diversity—than a Zydeco station would.  
 
A Sensible Way to Measure Formats, Correcting for BIA’s Increasing Sophistication 
 
To measure formats properly, we separate out the primary, secondary, and tertiary formats 
and assign weights to them.  These weights reflect the idea that the programming week or 
day for each station may be split between different types of programming. 
 
If a station has only a primary format in the BIA database, then that format gets a weight of 
100%.  If there are a primary and secondary format listed, but no tertiary format, then the 
primary format gets a weight of 60% and the secondary format gets a weight of 40%.  If 
there are primary, secondary, and tertiary formats listed, then the weights are 48%, 32%, and 
20%, respectively. 
 
We cannot know from BIA’s database exactly how each station chooses programming, so we 
assign weights in the same way for every station. The weights are arbitrary, but applied 
uniformly across all stations.  The weights are designed so that the ratio of primary to 
secondary programming is 1.5:1 (that is, the primary format is assumed to receive 50% more 
airtime than the secondary format).  When there’s a tertiary format as well, the radio of 
secondary to tertiary programming is similar, at 1.6:1. 
 
This method avoids the problem of treating Rock/Classical/Jazz (to continue with the 
example above) as completely different from Rock/Jazz/Classical.  Instead, our method 
counts the number of station equivalents to measure fractional amounts of a station’s 
broadcast day or week. Using this measure, a market that starts with a Rock/Classical Jazz 
station has: 
 
 0.48 station equivalents programming Rock, 
 0.32 station equivalents programming Classical, and 
 0.20 station equivalents programming Jazz. 
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 When we add a Rock/Jazz/Classical station to this market, the counts become: 
 
 0.96 station equivalents programming Rock (0.48 + 0.48), 
 0.52 station equivalents programming Classical (0.32 + 0.20), and 
 0.52 station equivalents programming Jazz (0.20 + 0.32). 
 
Our method of counting reflects that these two stations in our hypothetical market are really 
offering three different musical genres to the public, not just two.  But instead of finding that 
variety has doubled when the second station was added, we find that the array of 
programming formats available—three—is unchanged.  What has changed is how much of 
those three programming formats—Rock, Classical, and Jazz—are available.  For these 
reasons we find our method of measuring format variety to be much more accurate for 
describing exactly what kinds of programming are available to the public. 
 
 
The Most Common Programming Formats 
 
This section shows that:  
 
• Just fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial programming. 
• Noncommercial radio provides a very different set of programming formats than 
commercial radio. 
• Sports, Talk, and Classic Rock are the fastest-growing formats over the last decade. 
 
Using the method described at the end of the previous section, we can document the relative 
frequency of the 120 different programming formats that appear in BIA’s database (whether 
as primary, secondary, and tertiary).  We start by looking at the 10,761 commercial stations 
broadcasting in Spring 2005 for which we have data from BIA on their programming 
formats. 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the dominance of the Country format on commercial radio nationwide.4  As 
of Spring 2005, we estimate that Country garnered 19% of the airtime on commercial 
stations.  (Country’s dominance is slightly on the wane; in Spring 1996 the Country format 
received an estimated 25% of the airtime.)  Just fifteen formats make up 76% of commercial 
programming, as shown in Figure 3-1.  In Spring 1996, the top fifteen formats made up 79% 
of commercial programming. 
 
                                                
4 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 3-1.  Programming Formats Among Commercial Stations, Spring 2005. 
 
 
 
These figures should only be treated as rough estimates, because BIA’s data from 1996 are 
much less precise than its 2005 data, as discussed in the previous section.  But even with 
these rough figures we can see that the vast increase in the concentration of radio ownership 
has done little to change the concentration of programming formats. 
 
Appendix F catalogs the prevalence of all programming formats in commercial radio for 
Spring 1996 and Spring 2005. 
 
Different Offerings from Noncommercial Stations 
 
Figure 3-2 displays the analogous information to Figure 3-1, but for the 2,601 
noncommercial radios stations for which we have data.5  The picture of noncommercial radio 
is quite different.  What are uncommon formats in the world of commercial radio—formats 
like Classical, Jazz, and Gospel—are in the top fifteen formats for noncommercial radio. 
 
                                                
5 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 3-2.  Programming Formats Among Noncommercial Stations, Spring 2005. 
 
 
 
 
Another important difference between commercial and noncommercial radio is the difference 
between secular and religious programming.  Fully 36% of the programming on 
noncommercial radio was religious programming of some sort as of Spring 2005. This 
increased from 31% in 2001, and includes formats like Christian, Religion, Christian 
Contemporary, Gospel, Black Gospel, Southern Gospel, Religious Music, and Inspiration.  
Commercial radio, by contrast, only featured 10% programming in religious formats. 
 
In short, noncommercial radio is the primary source for art music, religious music, and other 
religious programming. 
 
BIA’s database only has information about noncommercial stations’ formats in a more or less 
comprehensive fashion starting in 2001, so it is harder to track changes over time.  But 
Appendix G displays the relative frequency of all programming formats in noncommercial 
radio for Spring 2001 and Spring 2005. 
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 Format Growth and Format Disappearance 
 
In the last decade, several formats, while not new to the radio dial, have experienced rapid 
growth.  Table 3-1 shows the formats expanding the most since 1996.6 
 
Table 3-1.  The Ten Fastest-Growing Commercial Formats, by Number of Station-
Equivalents Gained (Changes from 1996 to 2005). 
 
Format 1996 2005 Station-Equivalents Gained 
Change in Share of 
Total Airtime 
Sports 203 505 +302 +2.5% 
Talk 549 810 +261 +1.6% 
Classic Rock 295 489 +194 +1.4% 
Hot AC 166 354 +188 +1.5% 
Adult Standards 68 236 +168 +1.5% 
Rock 75 207 +132 +1.1% 
Oldies 681 799 +118 +0.1% 
Classic Hits 31 148 +117 +1.0% 
Mexican 35 143 +108 +1.0% 
News 462 565 +103 +0.3% 
 
As Table 3-1 shows, first among these is Sports, followed closely by Talk.  Some of the 
relatively new or previously uncommon formats that gained traction between 1996 and 2005 
include Classic Hits and Mexican.  Other popular formats, like Oldies, have simply grown in 
keeping with the expansion in the number of FCC-licensed stations. 
 
Other formats have shrunk somewhat or have begun to disappear from terrestrial radio.  The 
dominance of Country has dwindled somewhat, as documented in Table 3-2 (and as 
illustrated in Figures 3-1 and 3-2).7  Adult Contemporary’s share has also declined, partly 
because it has subdivided into Hot Adult Contemporary, Urban Adult Contemporary, Soft 
Adult Contemporary, Lite Adult Contemporary, and Mix Adult Contemporary.  As we 
emphasized in our 2002 report, this may not reflect any increase in programming diversity.  
Rather, it may reflect only a change in branding strategies by radio companies.  (The section 
on format overlap later in this chapter will explain further how formats with different names 
often feature the same songs.) 
 
                                                
6 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
7 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Table 3-2.  The Ten Fastest-Shrinking Commercial Formats, by Number of Station-
Equivalents Lost (Changes from 1996 to 2005). 
 
Format 1996 2005 Station-Equivalents Lost 
Change in Share of 
Total Airtime 
Country 2377 2011 -366 -7.0% 
Adult Contemporary 1012 740 -272 -4.1% 
Nostalgia 209 115 -94 -1.2% 
Album Oriented Rock 165 74 -91 -1.1% 
Middle of the Road 73 18 -55 -0.6% 
70s Oldies 58 8 -50 -0.6% 
Religion 199 152 -47 -0.8% 
Easy Listening 86 46 -40 -0.5% 
Full Service 90 52 -38 -0.5% 
Big Band 39 15 -24 -0.3% 
 
Surprisingly, despite demographic trends toward an aging population, formats focused on 
older listeners like Nostalgia and Big Band have seen their airtime decline markedly.  Other 
formats from the earlier days of radio, like Full Service, Middle of the Road, and Easy 
Listening, have also fallen out of favor.   
 
In other cases of declining format shares, as with the Album Oriented Rock, 70s Oldies, and 
Religion formats, radio stations are probably using different or more specific names for 
similar programming.  In those examples, the formats are now more often labeled Classic 
Rock, 70s Hits, and Christian, respectively. 
 
 
Niche Formats 
 
In this section, we examine the fate of so-called niche formats, that is, formats less 
commonly offered by radio stations.  We find that: 
 
• Fewer stations feature Classical or Jazz as their primary format, but the overall 
amount of airtime for these formats has remained approximately the same. 
• Niche formats, as the “long tail” of the radio industry, show some signs of increasing 
profitability. 
 
It is difficult for any policy analyst to specify what set of programming formats should be 
offered on the radio.  On the other hand, the FCC’s diversity and localism goals require the 
agency to evaluate whether radio is serving the public interest along those dimensions.  So 
we suggest an approach to analyzing formats that looks at the availability of niche formats.  
The most popular formats—that is, those fifteen formats making up three-quarters of 
commercial radio—are available in most markets (though certainly not always).  But niche 
formats are often missing from the radio picture. 
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  Disappearing Classical and Jazz Radio? 
 
Some niche formats are believed to be disappearing from the radio dial.  Popular press 
accounts of stations changing formats away from Classical and Jazz, especially, have led 
some people to believe that these formats are struggling.  BIA’s data cannot provide 
information about specific playlists in these formats.  Thus we cannot analyze the quality of 
programming or the changing character of programming choices.  But we can talk about the 
simple frequency with which radio stations broadcast in these formats. 
 
Table 3-3.  Classical and Jazz Programming. 
 
2001 2005 
Type Format 
Estimated 
Station-
Equivalents 
(with % of 
total) 
Number 
of 
Primary-
Format 
Stations 
Estimated 
Station-
Equivalents 
(with % of 
total) 
Number 
of 
Primary-
Format 
Stations 
Classical 34.76 (0.33%) 37 
33.56 
(0.31%) 36 Commercial 
Jazz 16.60 (0.16%) 14 
10.72 
(0.10%) 8 
Classical 248.56 (10.6%) 272 
251.60 
(9.7%) 267 Noncommercial 
Jazz 75.20 (3.2%) 63 
82.04 
(3.2%) 69 
 
Table 3-3 shows that the small number of commercial stations that program Classical or Jazz 
decreased between 2001 and 2005.8  Fewer commercial stations have Classical or Jazz as 
their primary format. 
 
Using our method of separately accounting for primary, secondary, and tertiary formats—
rather than borrowing BIA Financial Networks’ method of categorizing formats, as we did in 
our 2002 study—we are able to distinguish Jazz from Smooth Jazz.  This provides us with a 
more precise view of Jazz radio than in previous or other organizations’ reports. 
 
In the noncommercial sector, the picture is more mixed.  The absolute number of station-
equivalents devoted to Classical and Jazz has increased.  But the percentage of total 
noncommercial airtime declined for Classical, and merely held steady for Jazz.  The number 
of noncommercial stations listing Classical as their primary format declined, reflecting a 
small trend of Classical stations switching to a News/Classical combination.  The number of 
noncommercial stations with Jazz as their primary format actually increased. 
 
Recall from Chapter 1 that the total number of commercial stations grew slightly from 2001 
to 2005, and that the number of noncommercial stations grew even more during that time.  
                                                
8 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 What Table 3-3 shows is that, in the context of more stations being licensed, the percentage 
of the total airtime across all stations devoted to both Jazz and Classical has declined. 
 
Neglecting the Long Tail of Radio Programming Formats 
 
Chris Anderson’s book The Long Tail has popularized a way of thinking about product 
markets.9  What percentage of the market is captured by how large a percentage of the 
product offerings?  If we takes this kind of approach to radio offerings, we can observe how 
traditional radio devotes a large percentage of its airtime to a relatively small set of formats. 
 
Figure 3-3.  Distribution of Programming Formats, Spring 1996 vs. Spring 2005. 
 
 
The horizontal axis of Figure 3-3 reflects a list the formats offered on commercial radio, 
sorted in descending order of airtime devoted to them.10  The vertical axis is simply the 
percentage of airtime devoted to each format.  So, from left to right, Figure 3-3 graphs the 
percentage of airtime devoted to the most popular format, to the second-most popular format, 
and so on. 
 
Figure 3-3 displays the “long tail” graphs for commercial radio in 1996 and 2005 
simultaneously to show the lack of contrast between them.  While the most popular format, 
Country, had become less prevalent by 2005, the rest of the long tail graph looks fairly 
                                                
9 Chris Anderson, The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More (Hyperion, 
2006).  See also Anderson’s blog at http://www.thelongtail.com (last visited November 21, 2006). 
10 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
92
 similar.  There is not a lot of density at the tail of the graph—the so-called niche formats—
but it is growing slightly. 
 
In 1996, the top fifteen formats had 80 percent of the revenue for commercial stations.  By 
2005, the top fifteen’s share had declined 6 percentage points to 74 percents.  Turned around, 
that shows the long tail’s growing share: in 1996, the other hundred or so formats had a 20 
percent share of commercial radio revenue, but by 2005 they had 26 percent.11  One other 
piece of evidence for niche formats’ economic viability comes from online music sales.  For 
instance, statistics from the online record label Magnatune, which offers music from a wide 
array of genres, Classical accounted for 4 of the top 10 titles by weekly album sales and for 
19 of the top 50.12 
 
Commercial radio is still overwhelmingly focused on a small number of formats.  To 
reiterate, commercial radio devotes 75 percent of its airtime to just 15 formats.  But the long 
tail graph and the concentration of revenue suggest that niche formats in the tail of the 
distribution of format frequency may be increasingly financially attractive.  Perhaps the large 
radio companies have focused too much on cost-side efficiencies, offering a similar array of 
formats everywhere.  Smaller station groups and noncommercial stations are fostering or 
developing niche formats, while large station groups are not, as we will see in the next 
section. 
 
 
Programming of Large Station Groups Grandfathered Over the Cap 
 
This section demonstrates that: 
 
• Using our method of measuring format variety, we can compare the programming of 
station groups that are over, exactly at, or under the local ownership cap. 
• Niche musical formats like Classical, Jazz, Americana, Bluegrass, New Rock, and 
Folk, where they exist, are provided almost exclusively by smaller station groups. 
• Children’s programming, religious programming, foreign-language and ethnic-
community programming, are also predominantly provided by smaller station groups. 
 
The FCC’s Local Radio Ownership Rule, although relaxed by Congress in the 
Telecommunications Act,13 still limits the size of station groups.14  (A station group is a set 
of stations owned or controlled by a single company in the same local market.)  But 
enforcement of this rule depends on the details.  In Chapter 2, we discussed the FCC’s signal-
contour method of market definition and how it allowed more consolidation than would have 
                                                
11 Revenue calculations for Spring 2005 formats based on BIA’s estimates for annual, station-level 
revenue in 2004.  For symmetry, revenue calculations for Spring 1996 based on 1995 revenue.  
Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
12 Magnatune, “50 Best-Selling Albums This Week,” at 
http://www.magnatune.com/info/stats/best_selling_this_week (visited November 20, 2006). 
13 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b). 
14 FCC Local Radio Ownership Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a) (2004). 
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 occurred otherwise.  In 104 markets, at least one station group exceeds the local ownership 
cap but has been grandfathered in. 
 
In theory, large station groups offer radio companies an opportunity to offer the widest 
variety.  It stands to reason that a station group containing, say, twelve stations could be more 
likely to offer a wider variety of programming formats than a station group with only four 
stations.  So one might expect station groups in excess of the local ownership cap to offer 
programming in a wider range of programming formats.  These groups do not simply have 
large numbers of stations—they also have more stations than their competitors.  And the shift 
to an Arbitron market definition together with their grandfathered status protects them from 
competitors owning as many stations as they do. 
 
Figure 3-4.  Distribution of Formats Among Station Groups Grandfathered 
in Excess of the Local Ownership Cap. 
 
 
To measure programming variety among station groups in excess of the local ownership cap, 
one can simply calculate the number of station-equivalents for each format.  Figures 3-4, 3-5, 
and 3-6 are pie charts showing the programming offerings of the aggregate set of station 
groups in excess of the cap, the aggregate set of station groups exactly at the cap, and the 
aggregate set of station groups below the cap, respectively.15 
 
                                                
15 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5 are highly similar.  The largest station groups—that is, those in 
excess of or exactly at the local ownership cap—focus on just a few formats.  For those 
station groups in excess of the cap, the most frequent formats are (in order): Country, Classic 
Rock, Talk, Sports, News, Oldies, Contemporary Hit Radio, and Adult Contemporary.  These 
eight formats alone make up 56 percent of their programming. 
 
Figure 3-5.  Distribution of Formats Among Station Groups 
Exactly Meeting the Local Ownership Cap. 
 
 
For those station groups with holdings exactly meeting at least one part of the local 
ownership cap, the most frequent formats are exactly the same, but in a different order: 
Country, Talk, Classic Rock, Oldies, Contemporary Hit Radio, Adult Contemporary, Sports, 
and News.  For station groups at the cap exactly, these eight formats make up 59 percent of 
the programming. 
 
The other format categories are underrepresented compared to the rest of radio.  Among the 
largest station groups, Spanish-language formats are relatively underrepresented, as are 
religious-formats (both music- and talk-oriented formats).  Meanwhile the Classical and Jazz 
formats are almost nonexistent among large station groups. 
 
Figure 3-6 shows a different landscape exists for smaller station groups.  This pie chart has 
the names of less common formats highlighted in bold.  Classical and Jazz formats are more 
common.  So are Spanish-language and religious formats.  The balance across all 
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 programming format categories is generally more even.  It appears that a wider variety of 
programming comes from the relatively small station groups—not the large station groups 
that resulted from the FCC’s signal-contour market definition.  This finding casts doubt on 
any claims that larger station groups will offer the public a wider variety of programming. 
 
Figure 3-6.  Distribution of Formats Among Station Groups 
Strictly Below the Local Ownership Cap. 
 
 
Less Common Formats 
 
A company allowed to have holdings in excess of the Local Radio Ownership Rule’s limits 
will have the most opportunities to program in specific niche formats within the BIA format 
categories discussed in the last section.  For example, if a radio company has 10 stations in a 
local market in which all other companies are now limited to 7 stations, then those 3 stations 
in excess give an owner particular flexibility.  Thus it is natural to ask whether radio 
companies in excess of the ownership caps tend to program more diverse or unusual formats. 
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 Table 3-4. Formats Predominantly Provided by Station Groups Under the Cap. 
 
Station-Equivalents Percentage of Airtime 
Category Format Under 
Cap 
Exactly 
At Cap 
Over 
Cap 
Under 
Cap 
Exactly 
At Cap 
Over 
Cap 
Classical 177.04 3 3 3.0% 0.2% 0.3% 
Jazz 70.08 1.4 1.6 1.2% 0.1% 0.2% 
Big Band 13.2 0 0 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Folk 6.76 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Americana 7 0.2 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Bluegrass 4.92 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
New Rock 15.8 1.2 0.8 0.3% 0.1% 0.1% 
Tropical 16.04 0.32 1.4 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 
Variety 320.84 4.12 3.6 5.5% 0.3% 0.4% 
Eclectic 14.72 0 0 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Music 
Diverse 6.4 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Christian Contemp. 259.96 9 4 4.4% 0.6% 0.5% 
Gospel 240.68 21.8 17.4 4.1% 1.5% 2.0% 
Black Gospel 24.6 4 2 0.4% 0.3% 0.2% 
Southern Gospel 17.48 0 1 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 
Religious 
Music 
Religious Music 10.84 0 0 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Easy Listening 25.2 3 2.4 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% Office 
Beautiful Music 5.4 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Educational 54.92 0.4 0 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% Children’s 
Children 54.2 3 1 0.9% 0.2% 0.1% 
NPR 28.68 0 0 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
Public Svc. 8.4 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Information 36.6 1.2 0.2 0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 
Business & Financial 17.72 3.2 0.48 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 
News & 
Public 
Service 
Progressive 5.6 1 0 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 
Religion 222.56 2 2 3.8% 0.1% 0.2% 
Christian 349.4 7 2 5.9% 0.5% 0.2% 
Inspiration 48.6 0.8 0 0.8% 0.1% 0.0% 
Religion & 
Spirituality 
Motivational 3.48 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Spanish 202.04 17.12 6.96 3.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
Mexican 100 8.92 10.04 1.7% 0.6% 1.2% 
Ethnic 44.28 5.8 0.92 0.8% 0.4% 0.1% 
International 5.12 0.4 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Asian 6.8 1 1 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Polish 4 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Portuguese 3.8 0 0 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Greek 2 0 0 0.03% 0.0% 0.0% 
Polka 1.2 0 0 0.02% 0.0% 0.0% 
Internat’l 
 
Japanese 1 0 0 0.02% 0.0% 0.0% 
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One might think that large, grandfathered-in station groups offer radio companies an 
opportunity to experiment.  As it happens, companies do not appear to take that opportunity.  
Looking at a group of ten less common music formats, one can compare the offerings of 
radio companies in markets where their holdings exceed the local ownership caps to the 
offerings of all other radio companies.  This analysis, displayed in Table 3-4, looks only at 
stations in the 297 Arbitron-rated markets in the U.S.16 
 
Table 3-4 shows the vast array of formats that are either not represented or proportionately 
underrepresented among the stations in large station groups.  Many important music formats 
are missing, including Classical, Jazz, Americana, Bluegrass, and Folk.  These are all formats 
in which local governments and the federal government (through the National Endowment 
for the Arts) have invested heavily,17 yet they are absent from the large station groups’ 
programming.  As one agency of the U.S. government has worked to ensure that children 
learn about jazz and classical music in school, Congress and the FCC have allowed radio 
consolidation to foster large station groups that ignore those genres. 
 
Furthermore, the smaller station groups are the sole source for whole other groups of radio 
formats: programming for children, religious programming, foreign-language and ethnic-
group-focused programming, and certain categories of news and public service 
programming. 
 
In sum, the musical variety across the Arbitron markets is coming from radio owners whose 
holdings are under the caps.  Owners who exceed or exactly meet the local ownership cap 
tend to program heavily in the more common Country, Classic Rock, Talk, Sports, News, 
Oldies, Contemporary Hit Radio, and Adult Contemporary formats.  Tired of reading the 
same list of eight formats again and again?  Perhaps radio listeners are, too.  Remember the 
22 percent decline in listenership depicted in Figure 1-10 at the end of Chapter 1. 
 
 
Overlap Between Formats 
 
As an update to our 2002 study, we again demonstrate the sometimes extreme degree of 
overlap between programming formats with different names, showing that: 
 
• Radio formats with different names can overlap up to 80% in terms of the songs 
played on them. 
• Format overlap has maintained its high level between 2002 and 2006. 
 
So far, we have taken the radio industry on its own terms in this chapter.  We have declined 
to count a Rock/Classical/Jazz station as being all that different from a Rock/Jazz/Classical 
station.  (Of course, we now know that no station in a large station group would have such a 
                                                
16 Source data: Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
17 See National Endowment for the Arts, “National Initiatives: National Endowment for the Arts Jazz 
Masters Fellowships,” at http://www.nea.gov/national/jazz/index.html (visited November 21, 2006). 
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 format, since it includes Classical and Jazz.)  But aside from separating out stations’ primary, 
secondary, and tertiary formats, we have used data provided by the industry itself to measure 
the diversity of programming on radio. 
 
One problem with doing so has been that we have been treating formats with overlapping 
playlists like Adult Contemporary, Hot Adult Contemporary, Urban Adult Contemporary, 
Soft Adult Contemporary, Lite Adult Contemporary, and Bright Adult Contemporary as 
entirely different formats.  Now we turn to another data source—the radio charts kept by 
Radio and Records magazine—to investigate how different these formats really are. 
 
Radio and Records’ charts document the most popular songs played within several formats.  
The formats have slightly different names than the formats from BIA Financial Networks’ 
data, but most of the format names will be familiar by now.  We collected the charts for all 
formats for the first week of May 2006.  We then determined which songs were common to 
two or more formats’ Radio and Records charts.  Finally, we created a Venn diagram to 
display the overlapping relationships between the formats, based on their top twenty, thirty, 
forty, or fifty songs (the number varies depending on the format). 
 
Figure 3-7 demonstrates that little has changed since we last did this exercise in our 2002 
study.18  Of the 571 songs included in the 790 available slots on all charts, 143 songs were 
being played on more than one format.  The “rock” cluster of formats—Rock, Alternative, 
and Active Rock—continues to have a high degree of overlap, with 21 songs common to all 
three.  This represents 70 percent of the top thirty songs charted for Rock. 
 
An even larger cluster of formats, connected to the “rock” cluster, involves an amalgam of 
formats related to Adult Contemporary, Pop, and Urban.  All but 8 songs out of the Hot 
Adult Contemporary’s top 40 are featured in the charts of other formats.  All but 13 songs out 
of CHR Rhythmic’s top 50 were played heavily on other formats.   
 
                                                
18 Source data: Radio and Records, format charts for the week ending May 5, 2006, at various format 
pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
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 Figure 3-7.  Overlap Between Charts of Radio and Records Formats, May 2006. 
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 Changes (or Lack Thereof) in Overlap Over Time 
 
The pairs with the highest degree of overlap are displayed in Table 3-5 and compared with 
data from Radio and Records dating back to 1994, 1998, and 2002.19  Some overlapping pairs 
have grown closer, some have grown farther apart, but the overall picture remains very 
similar. 
 
The phenomenon of “crossover” between formats is not new. Musical genres can involve 
arbitrary distinctions. And avid music listeners often enjoy music from multiple genres, 
perhaps mixed together.  So we do not mean to argue that crossover is a bad thing.  However, 
we are concerned that, to this point, the radio industry and the FCC have merely relied on 
format variety, meaning the number of formats available on the air, as an indication of 
increasing diversity.  The Venn diagram underscores the point that, at the playlist level, real 
playlist diversity has not occurred. 
 
Table 3-5.  Format Pairs With the Highest Percentage Overlap, 1994-2006. 
 
Format 1 Format 2 1994 Overlap 
1998 
Overlap 
2002 
Overlap 
2006 
Overlap 
CHR Rhythmic Urban 63% 58% 76% 62% 
Alternative Active Rock n/a 48% 58% 52% 
Rock Active Rock n/a 66% 73% 80% 
CHR Pop CHR Rhythmic 28% 32% 42% 40% 
Alternative Rock 35% 40% 60% 70% 
Hot AC CHR Pop 50% 80% 40% 43% 
Hot AC AAA n/a 37% 50% 37% 
CHR Pop Urban 18% 10% 30% 30% 
Urban Urban AC n/a 53% 30% 27% 
AC Hot AC 73% 27% 27% 43% 
 
Misleading Research 
 
Every time the FCC has had proceedings about revising its media ownership rules, the 
broadcasting industry has summoned its vast resources to fund a variety of quantitative 
studies.  These studies are not peer-reviewed.  The industry does not make the data 
underlying these studies available to the public for scrutiny.  In our 2002 study, we 
emphasized the problems of using the industry’s own data to measure the industry—
especially with regard to format overlap.  We find it dangerous that industry-produced 
research has glossed over the fact that formats with different names can have highly similar, 
almost identical programming. 
                                                
19 Source data for 2006: Radio and Records, format charts for the week ending May 5, 2006, at 
various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com.  Source data for 1994, 1998, and 2002: See 
Peter DiCola and Kristin Thomson, Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and Musicians? 
(2002), available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/research/radiostudy.cfm, pp. 59-61, and the 
references cited therein. 
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For example, in economist Jerry Hausman’s comments on behalf of Clear Channel, he runs a 
regression relating the number of formats available to the number of owners of stations in a 
market.  He provides little discussion of the nature of his format data, except to explain why 
he can validly use data from two separate sources.  He addresses none of the complicated 
issues of measuring formats, such as the distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary 
formats or the issue of format overlap.  Instead, he comes to the cursory conclusion that “a 
decrease in the number of owners in a market leads to an increase in format variety.”20 
 
Using format variety as one’s sole measure of programming diversity, without looking at the 
format data in detail and from a number of perspectives (as we have tried to do here), is a 
mistake.  Suppose you had a cabinet full of Mason jars.  Every jar has a different label on the 
outside: grape jam, purple jam, grape preserves, grape jelly, “made last April,” and so on.  
Do you have a wider variety of choices for what to spread on your toast just because the 
labels are different?  Even if the substance contained in every jar is made from mixing sugar 
with the very same grapes from your backyard? 
 
The same point, about Mason jar labels and grape jam, holds true for radio formats and actual 
programming.  Increased format variety in and of itself does not promote the public interest.  
Saying that it does is like saying that it doesn’t matter what’s in your Mason jars, just that 
you have lots of ways for writing down what’s in them.  What the Venn diagram in Figure 3-
7 shows is that policy makers cannot rely on measures that simply count formats as though 
they were all completely different. 
 
No Basis for Changes in Policy 
 
Certainly some lessons can be learned from counting up the number of formats.  For 
instance, we learned a lot by counting the number of different formats offered by differently 
sized station groups.  But to take an increase in the sheer number of formats offered as 
evidence that radio consolidation has been beneficial would be naïve.   
 
Adding a Soft Adult Contemporary station to a market that already featured Lite Adult 
Contemporary, Bright Adult Contemporary, and regular old Adult Contemporary would not 
reflect much of an increase, if any, in programming variety or true programming diversity.  
Neither would adding a News/Sports/Talk station to a market that already had four 
News/Talk/Sports stations—possibly owned by the very same company adding the new 
station. 
 
The FCC should not relax the Local Radio Ownership Rule on the basis of format-variety 
statistics.  Instead, the Commission should find ways to collect more detailed information 
about what is contained within those formats—what songs were played, what syndicated 
programs were aired, what local news stories were covered, what new musicians were 
                                                
20 Statement of Professor Jerry A. Hausman, Comments of Clear Channel Communications, Inc., MB 
Docket Nos. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, p. 4 ¶ 9. 
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 showcased, and so on.  Then the FCC should make such data available to the public so that 
the public can understand radio consolidation and the health of their public airwaves. 
 
 
Overlap of Individual Stations’ Playlists 
 
This section takes the next step from measuring the overlap between format-wide charts to 
investigating the overlap between individual station playlists.  It shows: 
 
• Playlists for commonly owned stations in the same format can overlap up to 97% out 
of each station’s top 30. 
• For large radio companies, the average level of overlap between commonly owned 
stations in the same format is typically greater than 50 percent. 
• Radio stations of large companies appear to draw songs from a narrow national pool. 
 
Beyond looking at the overlap between Radio and Records’ aggregated charts for several 
formats, we also analyzed the overlap between the top songs played by individual stations.  
From the Radio and Records website, we collected information on 1,617 traditional radio 
stations (AM and FM), plus 75 charts from individual record stores and satellite radio 
stations.  These data represent airplay for the week from June 25, 2006 through July 1, 2006. 
 
We found a number of examples of extreme overlap between stations in the same format 
with the same owner.  For instance, WQRB-FM in Eau Claire and WRWD-FM in 
Poughkeepsie, both Country stations, had 93% of the same songs in their respective top 30 
charts.  These two stations are not even in the same region of the U.S.  This strongly suggests 
that the large radio companies are using centralized programming methods rather than local 
program directors to choose songs. 
 
Table 3-6 lists 32 songs.21  The songs in bold represent the 4 songs unique to one of the two 
stations in question.  The other 28 songs are common to the two stations.  The songs are 
listed in descending order of frequency of airplay at WQRB-FM. 
 
In their comments filed in the FCC’s current media-ownership proceeding, Clear Channel 
claims the following: “Clear Channel’s local managers – including approximately 250 local 
general managers and approximately 900 local program directors – make their own decisions 
about programming and community events based on extensive audience research conducted 
at the local level.”22  Our data from BIA Financial Networks show that WQRB-FM and 
WRWD-FM do have different program directors.  But our data also show that Clear 
Channel’s statement is highly misleading. 
                                                
21 Note that the data from Radio and Records only inform us about the top 30 songs played on each 
station, not any songs outside the top 30.  Source data: Radio and Records, individual station charts 
for the week ending July 1, 2006, at various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
22 Comments of Clear Channel Communications, Inc., MB Docket Nos. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-
317, 00-244, p. 22 n. 90. 
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 Table 3-6.  Example of Extreme Playlist Overlap Between Two Commonly Owned 
Stations with the Same Format: Clear Channel stations WQRB-FM (Eau Claire, 
Wisconsin) and WRWD-FM (Poughkeepsie, New York). 
 
Spins, 
WQRB 
FM 
Rank, 
WQRB 
FM 
Artist Song 
Rank, 
WRWD 
FM 
Spins, 
WRWD 
FM 
46 1 Kenny Chesney Summertime 2 35 
46 2 Carrie Underwood Don't Forget To Remember Me 3 35 
44 3 Wreckers Leave The Pieces 8 28 
43 4 Toby Keith A Little Too Late 1 36 
42 5 Sugarland Down In Mississippi (Up To No Good) 25 10 
42 6 Keith Anderson Everytime I Hear Your Name 7 31 
41 7 Rascal Flatts Me And My Gang 5 33 
40 8 Gary Allan Life Ain't Always Beautiful 9 25 
40 9 Trace Adkins Swing 17 14 
39 10 Steve Holy Brand New Girlfriend 11 20 
38 11 Brooks & Dunn Building Bridges 21 11 
38 12 SheDaisy In Terms Of Love 27 8 
38 13 Matt Jenkins Bad As I Want To --- ? 
38 14 Jake Owen Yee Haw 30 5 
37 15 Josh Turner Would You Go With Me 13 19 
36 16 Big & Rich 8th Of November 18 13 
36 17 Little Big Town Bring It On Home 23 10 
35 18 Tim McGraw When The Stars Go Blue --- ? 
35 19 Billy Currington Why, Why, Why 22 10 
35 20 Josh Gracin Favorite State Of Mind 16 15 
35 21 Rodney Atkins If You're Going Through Hell 6 32 
33 22 Brad Paisley The World 4 35 
30 23 Eric Church How 'Bout You 12 19 
30 24 Faith Hill Sunshine And Summertime 15 16 
30 25 Darryl Worley Nothin' But A Love Thang 29 8 
28 26 Danielle Peck Findin' A Good Man 14 16 
28 27 Miranda Lambert New Strings 19 12 
26 28 Pat Green Feels Just Like It Should 24 10 
25 29 Jack Ingram Love You 26 8 
25 30 Trent Willmon On Again Tonight 20 12 
? --- Kenny Rogers I Can't Unlove You 10 24 
? --- Diamond Rio God Only Cries 28 8 
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 Since WQRB-FM and WRWD-FM have different program directors, then why do their 
playlists overlap by 93 percent?  It could be that the program directors have total professional 
autonomy, and they could have picked the exact same songs.  It could be that songs outside 
of the top 30 for each station differ more.  But this level of overlap raises questions for the 
music community about why they overlap and whether the pool is too small.23 
 
Clear Channel and other large radio companies test a specific, national pool of songs on 
focus group subjects (which could be local).  Thus the choices available to program directors 
are limited to begin with.  Then, marketing research departments create statistical models that 
attempt to tailor playlists to local preferences. 
 
To illustrate what we mean by a national pool from which radio stations’ playlists are 
drawn, Table 3-7 shows the owner-format combinations with the lowest ratios of unique 
songs to available slots.24 
 
Table 3-7.  National Pools of Songs for Commonly Owned Stations in the Same Format. 
 
Owner Format Stations Playlist Slots 
Unique 
Songs 
Ratio of 
Songs to 
Slots 
Unique 
Songs per 
Station 
Clear Channel Country 72 2160 133 6.2% 1.8 
Clear Channel Pop 72 2151 147 6.8% 2.0 
Clear Channel AC 40 1150 123 10.7% 3.1 
Citadel Country 23 690 91 13.2% 4.0 
CBS Radio Country 17 510 86 16.9% 5.1 
Citadel Pop 17 510 92 18.0% 5.4 
Radio One Gospel 12 360 68 18.9% 5.7 
Clear Channel Hot AC 27 771 148 19.2% 5.5 
Clear Channel Urban 26 776 150 19.3% 5.8 
Clear Channel Active Rock 21 618 129 20.9% 6.1 
Cumulus Pop 9 270 63 23.3% 7.0 
Radio One Urban AC 17 510 121 23.7% 7.1 
 
                                                
23 A footnote to this example: Both Eau Claire and Poughkeepsie are markets in which Clear Channel 
took advantage of the FCC’s signal-contour market definition to exceed the current local ownership 
cap (which uses Arbitron’s market definitions).  In Eau Claire, Clear Channel has 6 total stations, 5 
FM and 1 AM, exceeding the FM cap of 4 stations by 1 station.  In Poughkeepsie, Clear Channel has 
7 stations, 5 FM and 2 AM, exceeding both the overall cap of 6 and the FM cap of 4 by 1 station.  
Since both markets are outside the top 100 Arbitron markets, Clear Channel’s new owners plan to sell 
them off.  But this example suggests that a relationship may exist between extreme consolidation 
beyond the local ownership cap and centralized programming. 
24 Source data: Radio and Records, individual station charts for the week ending July 1, 2006, at 
various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
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 For example, there are 133 songs that appear in the top-thirty charts of the 72 Country 
stations owned by Clear Channel that Radio and Records happens to survey.  Thus, even if 
each station has its own program director, each program director would only contribute 1.8 
choices to the national pool of 133 songs, on average. 
 
Clear Channel seems to have overstated the degree of control enjoyed by their local program 
directors.  Even though the number of spins for each song is different on different stations, 
the small pool from which songs are selected, dominated by major-label releases, is the same. 
 
The songs on different stations in the same format are highly similar for most of the large 
radio companies.  Figure 3-8 is a bar chart comparing the average pairwise overlap between 
stations in the same format with the same owner, weighted by the number of pairs (as 
opposed to giving the average overlap within each format equal weight). 25  Suppose 
Company X has three stations in the Pop format (stations A, B, and C) and two stations in the 
Hot AC format (stations D and E).  There are three Company X pairs in the Pop format (A & 
B, B & C, and A & C) and just one pair in the Hot AC format (D & E).  The average pairwise 
overlap is average percentage of songs that overlap across all four of those pairs: A & B, B & 
C, A & C, and D & E. 
 
Remember that the figures in Figure 3-8 are averages across station pairs.  Some pairs of 
stations, like WQRB-FM and WRWD-FM, have playlists overlapping at 93 percent or more.  
Fourteen percent of all station pairs with the same owner and the same format have 70 
percent or more of the same songs in their playlists.26  Other pairs of stations in the same 
format will have much less overlap.  But the overall image is that of a restricted set of songs 
from which stations make their playlists. 
 
                                                
25 Source data: Radio and Records, individual station charts for the week ending July 1, 2006, at 
various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
26 Specifically, 1312 out of 9194 pairs.  Source data: Radio and Records, individual station charts for 
the week ending July 1, 2006, at various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
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 Figure 3-8.  Average Pairwise Overlap Between Stations in the Same Format, By 
Owner, June 25-July 1, 2006. 
 
 
 
What Figure 3-8 means is that if you take two stations in the same format with the same 
owner, on average those two stations’ playlists will overlap by 51 percent or more, if the 
owner in question is one of the six largest: Clear Channel, CBS Radio (formerly Infinity), 
ABC Radio, Citadel, or Radio One.  Once again, despite their arguments to the contrary, 
Clear Channel’s large scale does not result in any increased diversity.  Any two Clear 
Channel stations in the same format will overlap by 54.6 percent, regardless of where they 
are located geographically within the U.S. 
 
Table 3-8 disaggregates the results, showing the average pairwise overlap for each owner-
format combination.27  The pairwise overlap provides a more tangible measure of the overlap 
between commonly owned stations than the unique-songs measure in Table 3-7.  It focuses 
on the similarity of on-air programming rather than the average contribution of each program 
director to the national pool of songs. 
 
                                                
27 Source data: Radio and Records, individual station charts for the week ending July 1, 2006, at 
various format pages on http://www.radioandrecords.com. 
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 Network Programming 
 
This final section focuses on programming networks, showing that: 
 
• The FCC needs to collect better data on network programming from its radio 
licensees. 
• The three largest radio companies in terms of station ownership are also the three 
largest companies in terms of programming-network ownership. 
 
We focus a great deal on station ownership in this report, and with good reason, as station 
ownership affects programming and reflects important political, economic, and social power.  
But on top of station ownership lies another layer: ownership of the programming networks 
that syndicate radio shows in various formats to virtually every station in the U.S. 
 
Much of the material that radio stations broadcast today is produced by national 
programming networks and licensed as syndicated shows to hundreds of stations 
nationwide.  This includes familiar talk show names like Rush Limbaugh, Dennis Prager, and 
Dr. Laura, and syndicated music programming like Jack FM and Radio Disney. 
 
In BIA Financial Networks’s database, network information is only available for 5,914 
stations, while it is completely missing for 8,251 stations.28  We decline to summarize this 
information here because it is so incomplete.  (We can verify its incompleteness by 
comparing totals for certain networks, like National Public Radio, against the totals one can 
calculate from the BIA data.)  But we bring up the issue of networks here to close on the 
essential public policy issue of access to data. 
 
As we have stressed throughout this report, the lack of comprehensive, easily available data 
limits the kinds of analysis we can do.  Nowhere does this constraint bite more forcefully 
than in measuring the pervasiveness of programming networks.  We recommend: (1) that the 
FCC require the broadcasters themselves to provide information about what programming 
networks they carry during what times of day, (2) maintain a database of who owns the 
programming networks carried by U.S. radio stations, and (3) make these data available in a 
easily accessible and convenient form on the FCC website. 
 
To make the best decisions about media policy it can, the FCC needs to demand that its 
licensees provide it with more specific information.  We are not advocating that the FCC 
monitor broadcasts, just objective information about programming networks and their 
ownership.  These data would be prohibitively expensive to collect for a single private party 
(that is, without industry cooperation). And such data are not available in a useable form 
from programming networks’ websites.  Because the FCC licenses stations to use the public 
airwaves, they have the power to require five more fields of data, or fifty.  The current lack 
of data and lack of public education could be rectified within a year.  The FCC must simply 
require that the licensees provide more data in a useable format.  
 
                                                
28 Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, November 2005 data. 
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 Arbitron does conduct a survey called RADAR to measure the listenership of some of the 
major programming networks.  We can use this less-than-ideal data to illustrate another 
important point about media consolidation.  Figure 3-9 compares station ownership shares to 
the shares of network listening measured by Arbitron, which we should emphasize is an 
incomplete survey of all programming networks.29 
 
Figure 3-9.  Concentration of Station Ownership and 
Concentration of Network Programming. 
 
 
 
What Figure 3-9 shows is that three of the same companies that dominate station ownership 
also dominate programming-network ownership.  This is not a coincidence.  Clear Channel, 
CBS Radio, and ABC/Disney (soon to merge with Citadel) all use their position in station 
ownership to advance their position in programming-network ownership, and vice versa. 
 
                                                
29 Source data: [station ownership] Media Access Pro (Radio Version), BIA Financial Networks, 
November 2005 data; [network listenership] The Arbitron Company, “Arbitron Releases RADAR ® 
89 June 2006 Radio Network Ratings,” at http://www.arbitron.com/national_radio/radar.htm (visited 
November 21, 2006). 
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 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has briefly described the landscape of radio programming as of late 2005 and 
2006.  Commercial AM and FM radio are dominated by a relatively small number of 
programming formats.  This high concentration of formats is related to the increased 
concentration of local radio ownership documented in Chapter 2.  The largest station groups 
do not offer niche formats.  Rather, these formats are supplied by smaller commercial station 
groups and noncommercial stations.  Furthermore, in our analysis of playlists, we saw 
tremendous overlap in programming among formats of different names and between stations 
in the same format with the same owner.  These redundancies exist regardless of geography 
and local input.  They undermine the FCC’s goals of diversity and localism, and they show a 
link between centralized ownership and homogenized programming. 
 
Measuring programming variety is made more difficult by a lack of clear, consistent, 
comprehensive, and publicly available data.  In this chapter we have attempted to glean what 
insights we could about radio programming and how it serves the public interest, without 
imposing value judgments about what programming is good or bad.  Diversity in 
programming means, in part, having a wide variety of programming available.  We have seen 
that what diversity exists in traditional radio today comes from small companies and 
organizations, not consolidators. 
 
The FCC should seek to collect much more and much better objective data about radio 
programming.  The data we have, however, raise important concerns about the diversity and 
localism of radio programming.  Thus, the FCC should not raise the local ownership caps.  
No sound evidence supports the notion that radio consolidation has enhanced programming 
diversity.  Better ways to expand diversity and localism in radio are to grant more licenses to 
small, local entities and to expand low-power radio.  While there is no easy way to measure 
whether radio serves the public interest, the analysis in this chapter should suggest that the 
changes wrought by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 have not resulted in benefits for 
the public in terms of radio programming. 
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Conclusion 
Policy Recommendations 
 
 
e conclude by collecting the policy recommendations we have made at various 
points throughout this study.  We respectfully submit these recommendations to 
the FCC as part of its quadrennial review of its media ownership rules, including 
the Local Radio Ownership Rule.  The Executive Summary, included at the front of the 
study, already provides a synopsis of what our research has uncovered about radio 
consolidation’s history over the past three decades.  Here we look forward to a more 
competitive, local, and diverse future for radio. 
 
Safeguarding Competition 
 
(1) Maintain the current local ownership caps; or 
 
(2) Institute lower caps.  Ownership caps on radio-station ownership prevent concentration 
of economic, social, and political power.  The most commonly accepted measure of 
concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), has reached a high level in the 
national market and dangerous levels in most local markets.  We have designed a pair of 
methods to calculate the ownership caps necessary to keep the HHI below the threshold of 
danger in each local market [see Chapter 2 for details].  The FCC could justify a lower cap 
by using either of the methods or by combining them, applying the lower cap whenever the 
results of the two methods differ. 
 
(3) Retain the current attribution rules.  In light of the recent trend of taking media 
companies off the public stock market and into the holdings of private equity firms, it is 
essential that the FCC continue to use its 5 percent threshold to determine when a company is 
considered to own a radio station [see the Introduction].  Otherwise, shifting radio stations to 
private equity could become a loophole in the local ownership caps. 
 
(4) Encourage ownership by small, independent, or minority owners.  We recommend 
that Congress and the FCC consider several initiatives, ranging from tax incentives to 
requirements on sale and divestiture of stations, including the 448 reportedly to be sold by 
Clear Channel [see Chapter 1 for citations of precedents]. 
 
Restoring Localism 
 
(5) Adopt the Local Ownership Index developed by Future of Music Coalition.  Local 
ownership is one key aspect of the broader concept of localism.  But it has the benefit of 
being relatively easy to quantify [see Chapter 2 for details].  From 1975 to 2005, the Local 
Ownership Index has declined drastically, suggesting the need for the following three policy 
proposals to restore local ownership. 
W 
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(6) Change the full-power licensing process.  In recent years, some non-profit entities have 
benefited greatly from the points system used to allocate new, noncommercial, full-power 
FM licenses.  We applaud this previous progress, but we also point out that many of the 
organizations that have benefited are national [see Chapter 1].  In the future, new licenses 
should go to entirely local entities and should only be transferred to entirely local entities.  
Otherwise, the level of local control over local radio stations will remain harmed. 
 
(7) Use the digital audio broadcast (DAB) transition as an occasion to reallocate 
spectrum to entirely local entities.  The transition to DAB has been slow so far.  With 
concentration at historically high levels and localism at historically low levels, it does not 
make sense to allow current licensees to enjoy two to five times the digital channels with 
their current spectrum allocation.  Local, independent entities could make better use of that 
spectrum.  
 
(8) License more low-power FM stations.  Some states, especially on the east coast, still 
have fewer than five licensed low-power FM stations.  Congress should heed the engineering 
studies commissioned by the FCC and relax the rule banning low-power FM licenses when 
they would use frequencies supposedly too close to those of existing full-power FM stations. 
 
Fostering Diversity 
 
(9) Measure diversity more accurately.  The FCC should disregard the industry practice of 
using format variety—simply counting up the number of format names—as a measure of true 
programming diversity.  Instead, the FCC should acknowledge the imperfections in the 
available data on formats, work to collect better data, and in the meantime use more subtle 
measures of format variety like the one we have used in Chapter 3. 
 
(10) End structural payola.  The practice of accepting funds from “independent promoters” 
in return for airplay—alongside more crude forms of payola involving gifts to radio 
employees—represents a structural problem with how radio playlists have been developed.  
The FCC should enforce the prohibition on payola by requiring broadcasters to provide data 
on both playlists and on consumer-testing pools of songs and monitor that data to verify a 
level playing field for musicians on music radio. 
 
(11) Apply the competition, localism, and diversity goals to the DAB spectrum.  The 
diversity requirement is especially important to DAB if the spectrum reallocation we 
recommend does not occur.  In this case, current licensees will enjoy up to five times the 
spectrum.  The FCC should expect five times the diversity from its licensees—not just 
rehashing of the same narrow playlists and syndication choices. 
 
Improving Access to Data 
 
(12) Collect more ownership-related information from licensees.  The public should have 
much better basic information about radio licensees: such as their owner; their parent 
company; their headquarters and main centers of employment; and their local marketing 
agreements (LMAs), if any. 
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(13) Begin collecting objective data on programming.  We emphasize the term “objective” 
because we believe that creating access to the simplest objective information about 
programming would be a major step forward.  We do not expect the FCC to begin analyzing 
or classifying content—that step can be left to the public, but only if it has the raw, objective 
data.  We would include such objective and easily verifiable information such as what 
networks each station carries, what popular syndicated shows each station carries, what 
playlists music stations are using, and so on. 
 
(14) Make all information on radio easily available to the public on the FCC website.  
Citizens should not have to purchase a $7,000 commercial database to understand who owns 
which radio stations, where those owners are located, and what those owners are putting on 
the air. 
 
(15) Keep increasing public access and public involvement.  The FCC should have 
responsibility for cataloguing the public comments made in its proceedings.  It should also 
continue the current policy of holding more public hearings when the media-ownership rules 
are reviewed.  We have been encouraged by the FCC’s efforts on this front and we urge the 
FCC to maintain its trajectory towards more open and transparent decision-making. 
 
Radio has great importance for our culture, our economy, and our democracy.  The public 
deserves to see it repaired.  These proposals aim to take the research findings from this 
quantitative history of radio consolidation, alongside the past assumptions of radio policy 
that did not hold true, and apply those lessons to radio today.  The proposals also 
acknowledge the role of new technologies, including those applying directly to the traditional 
radio spectrum.  Radio has a future in a media environment among new technologies.  If 
Congress, the FCC, and the policy community worked together to implement these fifteen 
proposals, we believe that the unfortunate state of traditional radio would improve, to the 
benefit of all. 
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